From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
haitao.huang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/sgx: Do not free backing memory on ENCLS[ELDU] failure
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:00:01 +1200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9d5ba82536b5dc49eeb8ab2f18a7b393eaed81fa.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <op.1l0ob9jbwjvjmi@hhuan26-mobl1.mshome.net>
> > > > >
> > > > > This part puzzles me in the pseudo-code.
> > > > >
> > > > > The version is read first:
> > > > >
> > > > > TMP_VER := DS:RDX[63:0];
> > > > >
> > > > > Then there's MAC calculation, comparison, and finally this check:
> > > > >
> > > > > (* Check version before committing *)
> > > > > IF (DS:RDX ≠ 0)
> > > > > THEN #GP(0);
> > > > > ELSE
> > > > > DS:RDX := TMP_VER;
> > > > > FI;
> > > > >
> > > > > For me it is a mystery what does zero the slot and in what condition
> > > > > it would be non-zero. Perhaps the #GP refers anyway to this check?
> > > >
>
>
> We discussed this internally, and agree this part of pseudo code needs be
> corrected/clarified.
>
> Here is what we think was going on when ELDU invoked with PCMD of all
> zeros: ELDU would check if the PCMD.SECINFO.FLAGS.PT is 0 which indicates
> that the page being loaded is a PT_SECS, and the PAGEINFO.SECS is not
> zero, then the instruction will #GP(0). Thus, ELDU is behaving correctly
> – it is an omission in the SDM pseudocode.
>
> The version checking code above also need be clarified because the VA slot
> would be cleared at this point and TMP_VER should be zero.
"VA slot would be cleared at this point" isn't accurate. The VA slot itself is
still occupied at this point. The original TMP_VER before the decryption is the
VA slot value stored by EWB, and after decryption it becomes 0, if the
decryption is correct. The correct pseudo-code should be:
IF (TMP_VER != 0)
THEN #GP(0);
ELSE
DS:RDX = TMP_VER;
FI;
The check of TMP_VER against 0 is just an additional safe guard to make sure
decryption didn't fail.
--
Thanks,
-Kai
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-11 22:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-28 20:11 [RFC PATCH 0/4] SGX shmem backing store issue Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/sgx: Do not free backing memory on ENCLS[ELDU] failure Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:20 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 22:53 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 23:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-03 2:01 ` Kai Huang
2022-05-07 17:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-09 17:17 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-10 0:36 ` Kai Huang
2022-05-11 10:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 18:29 ` Haitao Huang
2022-05-11 22:00 ` Kai Huang [this message]
2022-05-12 21:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-06 22:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] x86/sgx: Set dirty bit after modifying page contents Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:40 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:41 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-06 22:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-06 22:40 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-07 18:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/sgx: Obtain backing storage page with enclave mutex held Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:58 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:44 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-06 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] x86/sgx: Do not allocate backing pages when loading from backing store Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:12 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] SGX shmem backing store issue Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 18:50 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-29 19:45 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-30 3:22 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-30 15:52 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-02 14:36 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-02 17:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-02 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-04 22:13 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 22:58 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-04 23:36 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 23:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-05 0:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 23:05 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-07 17:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-07 17:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-09 17:09 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 17:23 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-12 14:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 21:29 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:20 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 6:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-05 6:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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