From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 173EDC43334 for ; Sun, 26 Jun 2022 06:04:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229957AbiFZGEh (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 Jun 2022 02:04:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50010 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229742AbiFZGEf (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 Jun 2022 02:04:35 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D8C7F63DC for ; Sat, 25 Jun 2022 23:04:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6F78361117 for ; Sun, 26 Jun 2022 06:04:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 68CA8C34114; Sun, 26 Jun 2022 06:04:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1656223473; bh=Sxg45dpWyCxdfnRkmbhQJLhpc4Q5GApEgHHnSJE6d8M=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=stBkEV3AE0xpbrzUqqaRjOfQw+pUvY4D7TXfAaHBnQQGrHOIDqE15ZLrZev0lU5HJ 8Z9LTwZZXgExrReLzk8StJD+lSTLJci+CS4TrUWFEu9+CV+sLWT9kcKGCSrrccdDBe XfsAFl7irjqgdOe5odpYRBaJTYnKUwd4dY+8TI6xUxU+phjSBgsPNpnjTwpvPgm6Y0 BNDTafNymJ7QI6VA9FtpoMwTA8kxg9hbxrfmJfl9lH2f+/7lZCVIIZyJdP9/4J5hts LtRlfMA8/qzWmg2AaZJ7HE1wejt1NjQ0mDno/eBXe7Z0hMThJ5+a41D0n8BKQIEqDI aJGjWx6VR3gFA== Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2022 09:04:29 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Zhiquan Li Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, tony.luck@intel.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, fan.du@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] x86/sgx: fine grained SGX MCA behavior Message-ID: References: <20220622093705.2891642-1-zhiquan1.li@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20220622093705.2891642-1-zhiquan1.li@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 22, 2022 at 05:37:02PM +0800, Zhiquan Li wrote: > V4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220608032654.1764936-1-zhiquan1.li@intel.com/T/#t > > Change since V4: > - Switch the order of the two variables at patch 02 so all of variables > are in reverse Christmas style. > - Do not initialize "ret" because it will be overridden by the return > value of force_sig_mceerr() unconditionally. > - Add Co-developed-by and Signed-off-by from Cathy Zhang at patch 01. > - Add Acked-by from Kai Huang at patch 01. > > V3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/41704e5d4c03b49fcda12e695595211d950cfb08.camel@kernel.org/T/#t > > Changes since V3: > - Take the definition of EPC page flag SGX_EPC_PAGE_KVM_GUEST from > Cathy Zhang's third patch of SGX rebootless recovery patch set but > discard irrelevant portion, since it might need some time to > re-forge and these are two different features. > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/41704e5d4c03b49fcda12e695595211d950cfb08.camel@kernel.org/T/#m9782d23496cacecb7da07a67daa79f4b322ae170 > > V2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/694234d7-6a0d-e85f-f2f9-e52b4a61e1ec@intel.com/T/#t > > Changes since V2: > - Repurpose the owner field as the virtual address of virtual EPC page > - Remove struct sgx_vepc_page and relevant code. > - Remove patch 01 as the changes are not necessary in new design. > - Rework patch 02 suggested by Jarkko. > - Adapt patch 03 and 04 since struct sgx_vepc_page was discarded. > - Replace EPC page flag SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_VEPC with > SGX_EPC_PAGE_KVM_GUEST as they are duplicated. > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/eb95b32ecf3d44a695610cf7f2816785@intel.com/T/#u > > V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/443cb425-009c-2784-56f4-5e707122de76@intel.com/T/#t > > Changes since V1: > - Updated cover letter and commit messages, added valuable > information from Jarkko, Tony and Kai’s comments. > - Added documentations for struct struct sgx_vepc and > struct sgx_vepc_page. > > Hi everyone, > > This series contains a few patches to fine grained SGX MCA behavior. > > When VM guest access a SGX EPC page with memory failure, current > behavior will kill the guest, expected only kill the SGX application > inside it. > > To fix it we send SIGBUS with code BUS_MCEERR_AR and some extra > information for hypervisor to inject #MC information to guest, which > is helpful in SGX virtualization case. > > The rest of things are guest side. Currently the hypervisor like > Qemu already has mature facility to convert HVA to GPA and inject #MC > to the guest OS. > > Then we extend the solution for the normal SGX case, so that the task > has opportunity to make further decision while EPC page has memory > failure. > > However, when a page triggers a machine check, it only reports the PFN. > But in order to inject #MC into hypervisor, the virtual address > is required. Then repurpose the “owner” field as the virtual address of > the virtual EPC page so that arch_memory_failure() can easily retrieve > it. > > Add a new EPC page flag - SGX_EPC_PAGE_KVM_GUEST to interpret the > meaning of the field. > > Suppose an enclave is shared by multiple processes, when an enclave > page triggers a machine check, the enclave will be disabled so that > it couldn't be entered again. Killing other processes with the same > enclave mapped would perhaps be overkill, but they are going to find > that the enclave is "dead" next time they try to use it. Thanks for > Jarkko’s head up and Tony’s clarification on this point. > > Our intension is to provide additional info so that the application has > more choices. Current behavior looks gently, and we don’t want to > change it. > > If you expect the other processes to be informed in such case, then > you’re looking for an MCA “early kill” feature which worth another > patch set to implement it. > > Unlike host enclaves, virtual EPC instance cannot be shared by multiple > VMs. It is because how enclaves are created is totally up to the guest. > Sharing virtual EPC instance will be very likely to unexpectedly break > enclaves in all VMs. > > SGX virtual EPC driver doesn't explicitly prevent virtual EPC instance > being shared by multiple VMs via fork(). However KVM doesn't support > running a VM across multiple mm structures, and the de facto userspace > hypervisor (Qemu) doesn't use fork() to create a new VM, so in practice > this should not happen. > > This series is based on tip/x86/sgx. > > Tests: > 1. MCE injection test for SGX in VM. > As we expected, the application was killed and VM was alive. > 2. MCE injection test for SGX on host. > As we expected, the application received SIGBUS with extra info. > 3. Kernel selftest/sgx: PASS > 4. Internal SGX stress test: PASS > 5. kmemleak test: No memory leakage detected. > > Much appreciate your feedback. > > Best Regards, > Zhiquan > > Zhiquan Li (3): > x86/sgx: Repurpose the owner field as the virtual address of virtual > EPC page > x86/sgx: Fine grained SGX MCA behavior for virtualization > x86/sgx: Fine grained SGX MCA behavior for normal case > > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 4 +++- > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > -- > 2.25.1 > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen BR, Jarkko