From: riel@redhat.com
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: danielmicay@gmail.com, tytso@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org,
hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, mingo@kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 15:57:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com> (raw)
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems,
in order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the
canary, and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or
obtained through some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems,
which will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32
bit systems, so the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on
64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
v2:
- improve changelogs
- address Ingo's coding style comments
next reply other threads:[~2017-05-24 15:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-24 15:57 riel [this message]
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function riel
2017-05-24 16:15 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary riel
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86: ascii armor the x86_64 boot init stack canary riel
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 " riel
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 " riel
2017-05-24 16:34 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-19 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the " Solar Designer
2017-09-19 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-19 21:10 ` Daniel Micay
2017-09-20 11:18 ` Yann Droneaud
2017-09-20 15:03 ` Solar Designer
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