* [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-12 13:18 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-12 13:18 ` Andrey Albershteyn
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-12 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
---
fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
--- a/fs/file_attr.c
+++ b/fs/file_attr.c
@@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ int error;
if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
@@ -242,12 +247,20 @@ int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
} else {
fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
}
+
err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
- if (!err)
- err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = security_inode_file_setattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
}
+
+out:
inode_unlock(inode);
-
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index bf3bbac4e02a..9600a4350e79 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cc9b54d95d22..d2da2f654345 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -1053,6 +1057,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
{ }
+static inline int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fb57e8fddd91..09c891e6027d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2622,6 +2622,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
+ * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
+ *
+ * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
+ * @fa: extended attributes to get
+ *
+ * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
* @dentry: associated dentry
--
2.47.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
@ 2025-05-12 13:25 Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file Andrey Albershteyn
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-12 13:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn, Andrey Albershteyn
This patchset introduced two new syscalls file_getattr() and
file_setattr(). These syscalls are similar to FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl()
except they use *at() semantics. Therefore, there's no need to open the
file to get a fd.
These syscalls allow userspace to set filesystem inode attributes on
special files. One of the usage examples is XFS quota projects.
XFS has project quotas which could be attached to a directory. All
new inodes in these directories inherit project ID set on parent
directory.
The project is created from userspace by opening and calling
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR on each inode. This is not possible for special
files such as FIFO, SOCK, BLK etc. Therefore, some inodes are left
with empty project ID. Those inodes then are not shown in the quota
accounting but still exist in the directory. This is not critical but in
the case when special files are created in the directory with already
existing project quota, these new inodes inherit extended attributes.
This creates a mix of special files with and without attributes.
Moreover, special files with attributes don't have a possibility to
become clear or change the attributes. This, in turn, prevents userspace
from re-creating quota project on these existing files.
NAME
file_getattr/file_setattr - get/set filesystem inode attributes
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/syscall.h> /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
#include <unistd.h>
long syscall(SYS_file_getattr, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
struct fsxattr *fsx, size_t size, unsigned int at_flags);
long syscall(SYS_file_setattr, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
struct fsxattr *fsx, size_t size, unsigned int at_flags);
Note: glibc doesn't provide for file_getattr()/file_setattr(),
use syscall(2) instead.
DESCRIPTION
The syscalls take fd and path. If path is absolute, fd is not
used. If path is empty, fd can be AT_FDCWD or any valid fd which
will be used to get/set attributes on.
This is an alternative to FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR/FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
ioctl with a difference that file don't need to be open as we
can reference it with a path instead of fd. By having this we
can manipulated filesystem inode attributes not only on regular
files but also on special ones. This is not possible with
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl as with special files we can not call
ioctl() directly on the filesystem inode using file descriptor.
at_flags can be set to AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW or AT_EMPTY_PATH.
RETURN VALUE
On success, 0 is returned. On error, -1 is returned, and errno
is set to indicate the error.
ERRORS
EINVAL Invalid at_flag specified (only
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH is
supported).
EINVAL Size was smaller than any known version of
struct fsxattr.
EINVAL Invalid combination of parameters provided in
fsxattr for this type of file.
E2BIG Size of input argument **struct fsxattr** is too
big.
EBADF Invalid file descriptor was provided.
EPERM No permission to change this file.
EOPNOTSUPP Filesystem does not support setting attributes
on this type of inode
HISTORY
Added in Linux 6.15.
EXAMPLE
Create directory and file "mkdir ./dir && touch ./dir/foo" and then
execute the following program:
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int
main(int argc, char **argv) {
int dfd;
int error;
struct fsxattr fsx;
dfd = open("./dir", O_RDONLY);
if (dfd == -1) {
printf("can not open ./dir");
return dfd;
}
error = syscall(467, dfd, "./foo", &fsx, 0);
if (error) {
printf("can not call 467: %s", strerror(errno));
return error;
}
printf("dir/foo flags: %d\n", fsx.fsx_xflags);
fsx.fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NODUMP;
error = syscall(468, dfd, "./foo", &fsx, 0);
if (error) {
printf("can not call 468: %s", strerror(errno));
return error;
}
printf("dir/foo flags: %d\n", fsx.fsx_xflags);
return error;
}
SEE ALSO
ioctl(2), ioctl_iflags(2), ioctl_xfs_fsgetxattr(2)
---
Changes in v5:
- Remove setting of LOOKUP_EMPTY flags which does not have any effect
- Return -ENOSUPP from vfs_fileattr_set()
- Add fsxattr masking (by Amir)
- Fix UAF issue dentry
- Fix getname_maybe_null() issue with NULL path
- Implement file_getattr/file_setattr hooks
- Return LSM return code from file_setattr
- Rename from getfsxattrat/setfsxattrat to file_getattr/file_setattr
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250321-xattrat-syscall-v4-0-3e82e6fb3264@kernel.org
Changes in v4:
- Use getname_maybe_null() for correct handling of dfd + path semantic
- Remove restriction for special files on which flags are allowed
- Utilize copy_struct_from_user() for better future compatibility
- Add draft man page to cover letter
- Convert -ENOIOCTLCMD to -EOPNOSUPP as more appropriate for syscall
- Add missing __user to header declaration of syscalls
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250211-xattrat-syscall-v3-1-a07d15f898b2@kernel.org
Changes in v3:
- Remove unnecessary "dfd is dir" check as it checked in user_path_at()
- Remove unnecessary "same filesystem" check
- Use CLASS() instead of directly calling fdget/fdput
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122-xattrat-syscall-v2-1-5b360d4fbcb2@kernel.org
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20250109174540.893098-1-aalbersh@kernel.org/
Previous discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/20240520164624.665269-2-aalbersh@redhat.com/
---
Amir Goldstein (1):
fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr()
Andrey Albershteyn (6):
fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks
fs: split fileattr/fsxattr converters into helpers
fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOSUPP
fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/arm64/tools/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
fs/Makefile | 3 +-
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 8 +-
fs/file_attr.c | 475 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/ioctl.c | 309 ------------------
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fileattr.h | 26 ++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +
include/linux/security.h | 16 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 6 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 8 +-
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 3 +
security/security.c | 30 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +
29 files changed, 621 insertions(+), 313 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 0d8d44db295ccad20052d6301ef49ff01fb8ae2d
change-id: 20250114-xattrat-syscall-6a1136d2db59
Best regards,
--
Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
2025-05-12 13:25 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-12 13:25 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:27 ` [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-12 13:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
From: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
This patch moves function related to file extended attributes manipulations to
separate file. Just refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
---
fs/Makefile | 3 +-
fs/file_attr.c | 318 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/ioctl.c | 309 ---------------------------------------------
include/linux/fileattr.h | 4 +
4 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 310 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 77fd7f7b5d02..2f1daaea86da 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
fs_types.o fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o init.o \
- kernel_read_file.o mnt_idmapping.o remap_range.o pidfs.o
+ kernel_read_file.o mnt_idmapping.o remap_range.o pidfs.o \
+ file_attr.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BUFFER_HEAD) += buffer.o mpage.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc_namespace.o
diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2910b7047721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/file_attr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
+#include <linux/fileattr.h>
+
+/**
+ * fileattr_fill_xflags - initialize fileattr with xflags
+ * @fa: fileattr pointer
+ * @xflags: FS_XFLAG_* flags
+ *
+ * Set ->fsx_xflags, ->fsx_valid and ->flags (translated xflags). All
+ * other fields are zeroed.
+ */
+void fileattr_fill_xflags(struct fileattr *fa, u32 xflags)
+{
+ memset(fa, 0, sizeof(*fa));
+ fa->fsx_valid = true;
+ fa->fsx_xflags = xflags;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
+ fa->flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_APPEND)
+ fa->flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_SYNC)
+ fa->flags |= FS_SYNC_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_NOATIME)
+ fa->flags |= FS_NOATIME_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_NODUMP)
+ fa->flags |= FS_NODUMP_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
+ fa->flags |= FS_DAX_FL;
+ if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT)
+ fa->flags |= FS_PROJINHERIT_FL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_xflags);
+
+/**
+ * fileattr_fill_flags - initialize fileattr with flags
+ * @fa: fileattr pointer
+ * @flags: FS_*_FL flags
+ *
+ * Set ->flags, ->flags_valid and ->fsx_xflags (translated flags).
+ * All other fields are zeroed.
+ */
+void fileattr_fill_flags(struct fileattr *fa, u32 flags)
+{
+ memset(fa, 0, sizeof(*fa));
+ fa->flags_valid = true;
+ fa->flags = flags;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_SYNC_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_SYNC;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_APPEND_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_APPEND;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_NODUMP_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NODUMP;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_NOATIME_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NOATIME;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_DAX_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_DAX;
+ if (fa->flags & FS_PROJINHERIT_FL)
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
+
+/**
+ * vfs_fileattr_get - retrieve miscellaneous file attributes
+ * @dentry: the object to retrieve from
+ * @fa: fileattr pointer
+ *
+ * Call i_op->fileattr_get() callback, if exists.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error on failure.
+ */
+int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+
+ if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
+ return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+
+ return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
+
+/**
+ * copy_fsxattr_to_user - copy fsxattr to userspace.
+ * @fa: fileattr pointer
+ * @ufa: fsxattr user pointer
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -EFAULT on failure.
+ */
+int copy_fsxattr_to_user(const struct fileattr *fa, struct fsxattr __user *ufa)
+{
+ struct fsxattr xfa;
+
+ memset(&xfa, 0, sizeof(xfa));
+ xfa.fsx_xflags = fa->fsx_xflags;
+ xfa.fsx_extsize = fa->fsx_extsize;
+ xfa.fsx_nextents = fa->fsx_nextents;
+ xfa.fsx_projid = fa->fsx_projid;
+ xfa.fsx_cowextsize = fa->fsx_cowextsize;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(ufa, &xfa, sizeof(xfa)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_fsxattr_to_user);
+
+static int copy_fsxattr_from_user(struct fileattr *fa,
+ struct fsxattr __user *ufa)
+{
+ struct fsxattr xfa;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&xfa, ufa, sizeof(xfa)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ fileattr_fill_xflags(fa, xfa.fsx_xflags);
+ fa->fsx_extsize = xfa.fsx_extsize;
+ fa->fsx_nextents = xfa.fsx_nextents;
+ fa->fsx_projid = xfa.fsx_projid;
+ fa->fsx_cowextsize = xfa.fsx_cowextsize;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic function to check FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR/FS_IOC_SETFLAGS values and reject
+ * any invalid configurations.
+ *
+ * Note: must be called with inode lock held.
+ */
+static int fileattr_set_prepare(struct inode *inode,
+ const struct fileattr *old_ma,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * The IMMUTABLE and APPEND_ONLY flags can only be changed by
+ * the relevant capability.
+ */
+ if ((fa->flags ^ old_ma->flags) & (FS_APPEND_FL | FS_IMMUTABLE_FL) &&
+ !capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_setflags(inode, old_ma->flags, fa->flags);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * Project Quota ID state is only allowed to change from within the init
+ * namespace. Enforce that restriction only if we are trying to change
+ * the quota ID state. Everything else is allowed in user namespaces.
+ */
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
+ if (old_ma->fsx_projid != fa->fsx_projid)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if ((old_ma->fsx_xflags ^ fa->fsx_xflags) &
+ FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Caller is allowed to change the project ID. If it is being
+ * changed, make sure that the new value is valid.
+ */
+ if (old_ma->fsx_projid != fa->fsx_projid &&
+ !projid_valid(make_kprojid(&init_user_ns, fa->fsx_projid)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check extent size hints. */
+ if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT) &&
+ !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE) &&
+ !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * It is only valid to set the DAX flag on regular files and
+ * directories on filesystems.
+ */
+ if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX) &&
+ !(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Extent size hints of zero turn off the flags. */
+ if (fa->fsx_extsize == 0)
+ fa->fsx_xflags &= ~(FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE | FS_XFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT);
+ if (fa->fsx_cowextsize == 0)
+ fa->fsx_xflags &= ~FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vfs_fileattr_set - change miscellaneous file attributes
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: the object to change
+ * @fa: fileattr pointer
+ *
+ * After verifying permissions, call i_op->fileattr_set() callback, if
+ * exists.
+ *
+ * Verifying attributes involves retrieving current attributes with
+ * i_op->fileattr_get(), this also allows initializing attributes that have
+ * not been set by the caller to current values. Inode lock is held
+ * thoughout to prevent racing with another instance.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error on failure.
+ */
+int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct fileattr old_ma = {};
+ int err;
+
+ if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_set)
+ return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ err = vfs_fileattr_get(dentry, &old_ma);
+ if (!err) {
+ /* initialize missing bits from old_ma */
+ if (fa->flags_valid) {
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= old_ma.fsx_xflags & ~FS_XFLAG_COMMON;
+ fa->fsx_extsize = old_ma.fsx_extsize;
+ fa->fsx_nextents = old_ma.fsx_nextents;
+ fa->fsx_projid = old_ma.fsx_projid;
+ fa->fsx_cowextsize = old_ma.fsx_cowextsize;
+ } else {
+ fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
+ }
+ err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
+ if (!err)
+ err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ }
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
+
+int ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp)
+{
+ struct fileattr fa = { .flags_valid = true }; /* hint only */
+ int err;
+
+ err = vfs_fileattr_get(file->f_path.dentry, &fa);
+ if (!err)
+ err = put_user(fa.flags, argp);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioctl_getflags);
+
+int ioctl_setflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp)
+{
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct fileattr fa;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ int err;
+
+ err = get_user(flags, argp);
+ if (!err) {
+ err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
+ if (!err) {
+ fileattr_fill_flags(&fa, flags);
+ err = vfs_fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, &fa);
+ mnt_drop_write_file(file);
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioctl_setflags);
+
+int ioctl_fsgetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct fileattr fa = { .fsx_valid = true }; /* hint only */
+ int err;
+
+ err = vfs_fileattr_get(file->f_path.dentry, &fa);
+ if (!err)
+ err = copy_fsxattr_to_user(&fa, argp);
+
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioctl_fsgetxattr);
+
+int ioctl_fssetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct fileattr fa;
+ int err;
+
+ err = copy_fsxattr_from_user(&fa, argp);
+ if (!err) {
+ err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
+ if (!err) {
+ err = vfs_fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, &fa);
+ mnt_drop_write_file(file);
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioctl_fssetxattr);
diff --git a/fs/ioctl.c b/fs/ioctl.c
index c91fd2b46a77..5bf1e4215252 100644
--- a/fs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ioctl.c
@@ -453,315 +453,6 @@ static int ioctl_file_dedupe_range(struct file *file,
return ret;
}
-/**
- * fileattr_fill_xflags - initialize fileattr with xflags
- * @fa: fileattr pointer
- * @xflags: FS_XFLAG_* flags
- *
- * Set ->fsx_xflags, ->fsx_valid and ->flags (translated xflags). All
- * other fields are zeroed.
- */
-void fileattr_fill_xflags(struct fileattr *fa, u32 xflags)
-{
- memset(fa, 0, sizeof(*fa));
- fa->fsx_valid = true;
- fa->fsx_xflags = xflags;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
- fa->flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_APPEND)
- fa->flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_SYNC)
- fa->flags |= FS_SYNC_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_NOATIME)
- fa->flags |= FS_NOATIME_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_NODUMP)
- fa->flags |= FS_NODUMP_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
- fa->flags |= FS_DAX_FL;
- if (fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT)
- fa->flags |= FS_PROJINHERIT_FL;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_xflags);
-
-/**
- * fileattr_fill_flags - initialize fileattr with flags
- * @fa: fileattr pointer
- * @flags: FS_*_FL flags
- *
- * Set ->flags, ->flags_valid and ->fsx_xflags (translated flags).
- * All other fields are zeroed.
- */
-void fileattr_fill_flags(struct fileattr *fa, u32 flags)
-{
- memset(fa, 0, sizeof(*fa));
- fa->flags_valid = true;
- fa->flags = flags;
- if (fa->flags & FS_SYNC_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_SYNC;
- if (fa->flags & FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
- if (fa->flags & FS_APPEND_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_APPEND;
- if (fa->flags & FS_NODUMP_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NODUMP;
- if (fa->flags & FS_NOATIME_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NOATIME;
- if (fa->flags & FS_DAX_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_DAX;
- if (fa->flags & FS_PROJINHERIT_FL)
- fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
-
-/**
- * vfs_fileattr_get - retrieve miscellaneous file attributes
- * @dentry: the object to retrieve from
- * @fa: fileattr pointer
- *
- * Call i_op->fileattr_get() callback, if exists.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error on failure.
- */
-int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
-{
- struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
-
- if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
- return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
-
- return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
-
-/**
- * copy_fsxattr_to_user - copy fsxattr to userspace.
- * @fa: fileattr pointer
- * @ufa: fsxattr user pointer
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, or -EFAULT on failure.
- */
-int copy_fsxattr_to_user(const struct fileattr *fa, struct fsxattr __user *ufa)
-{
- struct fsxattr xfa;
-
- memset(&xfa, 0, sizeof(xfa));
- xfa.fsx_xflags = fa->fsx_xflags;
- xfa.fsx_extsize = fa->fsx_extsize;
- xfa.fsx_nextents = fa->fsx_nextents;
- xfa.fsx_projid = fa->fsx_projid;
- xfa.fsx_cowextsize = fa->fsx_cowextsize;
-
- if (copy_to_user(ufa, &xfa, sizeof(xfa)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_fsxattr_to_user);
-
-static int copy_fsxattr_from_user(struct fileattr *fa,
- struct fsxattr __user *ufa)
-{
- struct fsxattr xfa;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&xfa, ufa, sizeof(xfa)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- fileattr_fill_xflags(fa, xfa.fsx_xflags);
- fa->fsx_extsize = xfa.fsx_extsize;
- fa->fsx_nextents = xfa.fsx_nextents;
- fa->fsx_projid = xfa.fsx_projid;
- fa->fsx_cowextsize = xfa.fsx_cowextsize;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generic function to check FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR/FS_IOC_SETFLAGS values and reject
- * any invalid configurations.
- *
- * Note: must be called with inode lock held.
- */
-static int fileattr_set_prepare(struct inode *inode,
- const struct fileattr *old_ma,
- struct fileattr *fa)
-{
- int err;
-
- /*
- * The IMMUTABLE and APPEND_ONLY flags can only be changed by
- * the relevant capability.
- */
- if ((fa->flags ^ old_ma->flags) & (FS_APPEND_FL | FS_IMMUTABLE_FL) &&
- !capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
- return -EPERM;
-
- err = fscrypt_prepare_setflags(inode, old_ma->flags, fa->flags);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- /*
- * Project Quota ID state is only allowed to change from within the init
- * namespace. Enforce that restriction only if we are trying to change
- * the quota ID state. Everything else is allowed in user namespaces.
- */
- if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
- if (old_ma->fsx_projid != fa->fsx_projid)
- return -EINVAL;
- if ((old_ma->fsx_xflags ^ fa->fsx_xflags) &
- FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT)
- return -EINVAL;
- } else {
- /*
- * Caller is allowed to change the project ID. If it is being
- * changed, make sure that the new value is valid.
- */
- if (old_ma->fsx_projid != fa->fsx_projid &&
- !projid_valid(make_kprojid(&init_user_ns, fa->fsx_projid)))
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- /* Check extent size hints. */
- if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT) &&
- !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE) &&
- !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /*
- * It is only valid to set the DAX flag on regular files and
- * directories on filesystems.
- */
- if ((fa->fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX) &&
- !(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* Extent size hints of zero turn off the flags. */
- if (fa->fsx_extsize == 0)
- fa->fsx_xflags &= ~(FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE | FS_XFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT);
- if (fa->fsx_cowextsize == 0)
- fa->fsx_xflags &= ~FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * vfs_fileattr_set - change miscellaneous file attributes
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: the object to change
- * @fa: fileattr pointer
- *
- * After verifying permissions, call i_op->fileattr_set() callback, if
- * exists.
- *
- * Verifying attributes involves retrieving current attributes with
- * i_op->fileattr_get(), this also allows initializing attributes that have
- * not been set by the caller to current values. Inode lock is held
- * thoughout to prevent racing with another instance.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error on failure.
- */
-int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- struct fileattr *fa)
-{
- struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
- struct fileattr old_ma = {};
- int err;
-
- if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_set)
- return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
-
- if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
- return -EPERM;
-
- inode_lock(inode);
- err = vfs_fileattr_get(dentry, &old_ma);
- if (!err) {
- /* initialize missing bits from old_ma */
- if (fa->flags_valid) {
- fa->fsx_xflags |= old_ma.fsx_xflags & ~FS_XFLAG_COMMON;
- fa->fsx_extsize = old_ma.fsx_extsize;
- fa->fsx_nextents = old_ma.fsx_nextents;
- fa->fsx_projid = old_ma.fsx_projid;
- fa->fsx_cowextsize = old_ma.fsx_cowextsize;
- } else {
- fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
- }
- err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
- if (!err)
- err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
- }
- inode_unlock(inode);
-
- return err;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
-
-static int ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp)
-{
- struct fileattr fa = { .flags_valid = true }; /* hint only */
- int err;
-
- err = vfs_fileattr_get(file->f_path.dentry, &fa);
- if (!err)
- err = put_user(fa.flags, argp);
- return err;
-}
-
-static int ioctl_setflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp)
-{
- struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
- struct fileattr fa;
- unsigned int flags;
- int err;
-
- err = get_user(flags, argp);
- if (!err) {
- err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
- if (!err) {
- fileattr_fill_flags(&fa, flags);
- err = vfs_fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, &fa);
- mnt_drop_write_file(file);
- }
- }
- return err;
-}
-
-static int ioctl_fsgetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
-{
- struct fileattr fa = { .fsx_valid = true }; /* hint only */
- int err;
-
- err = vfs_fileattr_get(file->f_path.dentry, &fa);
- if (!err)
- err = copy_fsxattr_to_user(&fa, argp);
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static int ioctl_fssetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
-{
- struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
- struct fileattr fa;
- int err;
-
- err = copy_fsxattr_from_user(&fa, argp);
- if (!err) {
- err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
- if (!err) {
- err = vfs_fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, &fa);
- mnt_drop_write_file(file);
- }
- }
- return err;
-}
-
static int ioctl_getfsuuid(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
{
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(file)->i_sb;
diff --git a/include/linux/fileattr.h b/include/linux/fileattr.h
index 47c05a9851d0..6030d0bf7ad3 100644
--- a/include/linux/fileattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/fileattr.h
@@ -55,5 +55,9 @@ static inline bool fileattr_has_fsx(const struct fileattr *fa)
int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa);
int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
struct fileattr *fa);
+int ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp);
+int ioctl_setflags(struct file *file, unsigned int __user *argp);
+int ioctl_fsgetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp);
+int ioctl_fssetxattr(struct file *file, void __user *argp);
#endif /* _LINUX_FILEATTR_H */
--
2.47.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-12 13:25 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-12 13:25 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 15:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-12 13:27 ` [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-12 13:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
---
fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
--- a/fs/file_attr.c
+++ b/fs/file_attr.c
@@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ int error;
if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
@@ -242,12 +247,20 @@ int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
} else {
fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
}
+
err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
- if (!err)
- err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = security_inode_file_setattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
}
+
+out:
inode_unlock(inode);
-
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index bf3bbac4e02a..9600a4350e79 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cc9b54d95d22..d2da2f654345 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -1053,6 +1057,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
{ }
+static inline int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fb57e8fddd91..09c891e6027d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2622,6 +2622,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
+ * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
+ *
+ * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
+ * @fa: extended attributes to get
+ *
+ * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
* @dentry: associated dentry
--
2.47.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
2025-05-12 13:25 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-12 13:27 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-12 13:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
On 2025-05-12 15:25:11, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> This patchset introduced two new syscalls file_getattr() and
> file_setattr(). These syscalls are similar to FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl()
> except they use *at() semantics. Therefore, there's no need to open the
> file to get a fd.
>
> These syscalls allow userspace to set filesystem inode attributes on
> special files. One of the usage examples is XFS quota projects.
>
> XFS has project quotas which could be attached to a directory. All
> new inodes in these directories inherit project ID set on parent
> directory.
>
> The project is created from userspace by opening and calling
> FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR on each inode. This is not possible for special
> files such as FIFO, SOCK, BLK etc. Therefore, some inodes are left
> with empty project ID. Those inodes then are not shown in the quota
> accounting but still exist in the directory. This is not critical but in
> the case when special files are created in the directory with already
> existing project quota, these new inodes inherit extended attributes.
> This creates a mix of special files with and without attributes.
> Moreover, special files with attributes don't have a possibility to
> become clear or change the attributes. This, in turn, prevents userspace
> from re-creating quota project on these existing files.
>
> NAME
>
> file_getattr/file_setattr - get/set filesystem inode attributes
>
> SYNOPSIS
>
> #include <sys/syscall.h> /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> long syscall(SYS_file_getattr, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
> struct fsxattr *fsx, size_t size, unsigned int at_flags);
> long syscall(SYS_file_setattr, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
> struct fsxattr *fsx, size_t size, unsigned int at_flags);
>
> Note: glibc doesn't provide for file_getattr()/file_setattr(),
> use syscall(2) instead.
>
> DESCRIPTION
>
> The syscalls take fd and path. If path is absolute, fd is not
> used. If path is empty, fd can be AT_FDCWD or any valid fd which
> will be used to get/set attributes on.
>
> This is an alternative to FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR/FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
> ioctl with a difference that file don't need to be open as we
> can reference it with a path instead of fd. By having this we
> can manipulated filesystem inode attributes not only on regular
> files but also on special ones. This is not possible with
> FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl as with special files we can not call
> ioctl() directly on the filesystem inode using file descriptor.
>
> at_flags can be set to AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW or AT_EMPTY_PATH.
>
> RETURN VALUE
>
> On success, 0 is returned. On error, -1 is returned, and errno
> is set to indicate the error.
>
> ERRORS
>
> EINVAL Invalid at_flag specified (only
> AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH is
> supported).
>
> EINVAL Size was smaller than any known version of
> struct fsxattr.
>
> EINVAL Invalid combination of parameters provided in
> fsxattr for this type of file.
>
> E2BIG Size of input argument **struct fsxattr** is too
> big.
>
> EBADF Invalid file descriptor was provided.
>
> EPERM No permission to change this file.
>
> EOPNOTSUPP Filesystem does not support setting attributes
> on this type of inode
>
> HISTORY
>
> Added in Linux 6.15.
>
> EXAMPLE
>
> Create directory and file "mkdir ./dir && touch ./dir/foo" and then
> execute the following program:
>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <errno.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> int
> main(int argc, char **argv) {
> int dfd;
> int error;
> struct fsxattr fsx;
>
> dfd = open("./dir", O_RDONLY);
> if (dfd == -1) {
> printf("can not open ./dir");
> return dfd;
> }
>
> error = syscall(467, dfd, "./foo", &fsx, 0);
> if (error) {
> printf("can not call 467: %s", strerror(errno));
> return error;
> }
>
> printf("dir/foo flags: %d\n", fsx.fsx_xflags);
>
> fsx.fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_NODUMP;
> error = syscall(468, dfd, "./foo", &fsx, 0);
> if (error) {
> printf("can not call 468: %s", strerror(errno));
> return error;
> }
>
> printf("dir/foo flags: %d\n", fsx.fsx_xflags);
>
> return error;
> }
>
> SEE ALSO
>
> ioctl(2), ioctl_iflags(2), ioctl_xfs_fsgetxattr(2)
>
> ---
> Changes in v5:
> - Remove setting of LOOKUP_EMPTY flags which does not have any effect
> - Return -ENOSUPP from vfs_fileattr_set()
> - Add fsxattr masking (by Amir)
> - Fix UAF issue dentry
> - Fix getname_maybe_null() issue with NULL path
> - Implement file_getattr/file_setattr hooks
> - Return LSM return code from file_setattr
> - Rename from getfsxattrat/setfsxattrat to file_getattr/file_setattr
> - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250321-xattrat-syscall-v4-0-3e82e6fb3264@kernel.org
>
> Changes in v4:
> - Use getname_maybe_null() for correct handling of dfd + path semantic
> - Remove restriction for special files on which flags are allowed
> - Utilize copy_struct_from_user() for better future compatibility
> - Add draft man page to cover letter
> - Convert -ENOIOCTLCMD to -EOPNOSUPP as more appropriate for syscall
> - Add missing __user to header declaration of syscalls
> - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250211-xattrat-syscall-v3-1-a07d15f898b2@kernel.org
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Remove unnecessary "dfd is dir" check as it checked in user_path_at()
> - Remove unnecessary "same filesystem" check
> - Use CLASS() instead of directly calling fdget/fdput
> - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122-xattrat-syscall-v2-1-5b360d4fbcb2@kernel.org
>
> v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20250109174540.893098-1-aalbersh@kernel.org/
>
> Previous discussion:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/20240520164624.665269-2-aalbersh@redhat.com/
>
> ---
> Amir Goldstein (1):
> fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr()
>
> Andrey Albershteyn (6):
> fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
> lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
> selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks
> fs: split fileattr/fsxattr converters into helpers
> fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOSUPP
> fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
>
> arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/arm64/tools/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
> arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
> fs/Makefile | 3 +-
> fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 8 +-
> fs/file_attr.c | 475 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> fs/ioctl.c | 309 ------------------
> fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/fileattr.h | 26 ++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +
> include/linux/security.h | 16 +
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 6 +
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 8 +-
> include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 3 +
> security/security.c | 30 ++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +
> 29 files changed, 621 insertions(+), 313 deletions(-)
> ---
> base-commit: 0d8d44db295ccad20052d6301ef49ff01fb8ae2d
> change-id: 20250114-xattrat-syscall-6a1136d2db59
>
> Best regards,
> --
> Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
>
Ignore please, somehow b4 crashed with timeout on gmail
--
- Andrey
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-12 15:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-14 11:02 ` Andrey Albershteyn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2025-05-12 15:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Albershteyn, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn, Casey Schaufler
On 5/12/2025 6:25 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
> attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
>
> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
> index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
> --- a/fs/file_attr.c
> +++ b/fs/file_attr.c
> @@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
> int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
> + int error;
>
> if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
>
> + error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
If you're changing VFS behavior to depend on LSMs supporting the new
hooks I'm concerned about the impact it will have on the LSMs that you
haven't supplied hooks for. Have you tested these changes with anything
besides SELinux?
> return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
> @@ -242,12 +247,20 @@ int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> } else {
> fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
> }
> +
> err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
> - if (!err)
> - err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = security_inode_file_setattr(dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> }
> +
> +out:
> inode_unlock(inode);
> -
> return err;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index bf3bbac4e02a..9600a4350e79 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *name)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index cc9b54d95d22..d2da2f654345 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> +int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa);
> +int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa);
> int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> @@ -1053,6 +1057,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *name)
> { }
>
> +static inline int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index fb57e8fddd91..09c891e6027d 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2622,6 +2622,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
> + * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
> + * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
> + *
> + * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
> + * inode
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
> + * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
> + * @fa: extended attributes to get
> + *
> + * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
> + * inode
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
> * @dentry: associated dentry
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-13 9:17 Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-13 9:17 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-22 22:26 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-13 9:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
---
fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
index 2910b7047721df893540ff8a7c992558390eaa3a..be62d97cc444a445deac1c8ac8331f4a3766126a 100644
--- a/fs/file_attr.c
+++ b/fs/file_attr.c
@@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ int error;
if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
@@ -242,12 +247,20 @@ int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
} else {
fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
}
+
err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
- if (!err)
- err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = security_inode_file_setattr(dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
}
+
+out:
inode_unlock(inode);
-
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index bf3bbac4e02a59a67de4ace85b93b1a878131f60..9600a4350e791f47006720765c199e35d3abafd4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cc9b54d95d22cd11480c38148005ed778b7af1bd..d2da2f654345b36b20fbe68ce11468ca4a55d8b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa);
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -1053,6 +1057,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
{ }
+static inline int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fb57e8fddd911bbb417ed2e7db443979bf611f43..09c891e6027dc1803a3af024b2f676e263da8aec 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2622,6 +2622,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
+ * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
+ *
+ * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
+ * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
+ * @fa: extended attributes to get
+ *
+ * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
+ * inode
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
* @dentry: associated dentry
--
2.47.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-12 15:43 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2025-05-14 11:02 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-14 18:21 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-14 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein, linux-alpha,
linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k, linux-mips,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api, linux-arch,
selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs, Andrey Albershteyn
On 2025-05-12 08:43:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 5/12/2025 6:25 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> > Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
> > attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
> >
> > Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> > include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> > security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
> > index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
> > --- a/fs/file_attr.c
> > +++ b/fs/file_attr.c
> > @@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
> > int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> > {
> > struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
> > + int error;
> >
> > if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
> > return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
> >
> > + error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
> > + if (error)
> > + return error;
> > +
>
> If you're changing VFS behavior to depend on LSMs supporting the new
> hooks I'm concerned about the impact it will have on the LSMs that you
> haven't supplied hooks for. Have you tested these changes with anything
> besides SELinux?
Sorry, this thread is incomplete, I've resent full patchset again.
If you have any further comments please comment in that thread [1]
I haven't tested with anything except SELinux, but I suppose if
module won't register any hooks, then security_inode_file_*() will
return 0. Reverting SELinux implementation of the hooks doesn't
cause any errors.
I'm not that familiar with LSMs/selinux and its codebase, if you can
recommend what need to be tested while adding new hooks, I will try
to do that for next revision.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxgOAxg7N1OUJfb1KMp7oWOfN=KV9Lzz6ZrX0=XRGOQrEQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
--
- Andrey
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-14 11:02 ` Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-14 18:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-15 7:50 ` Andrey Albershteyn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2025-05-14 18:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Albershteyn
Cc: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein, linux-alpha,
linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k, linux-mips,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api, linux-arch,
selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs, Andrey Albershteyn,
Casey Schaufler
On 5/14/2025 4:02 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> On 2025-05-12 08:43:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 5/12/2025 6:25 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
>>> Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
>>> attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
>>>
>>> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>> fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
>>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
>>> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>> security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
>>> index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
>>> --- a/fs/file_attr.c
>>> +++ b/fs/file_attr.c
>>> @@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
>>> int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
>>> {
>>> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
>>> + int error;
>>>
>>> if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
>>> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
>>>
>>> + error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
>>> + if (error)
>>> + return error;
>>> +
>> If you're changing VFS behavior to depend on LSMs supporting the new
>> hooks I'm concerned about the impact it will have on the LSMs that you
>> haven't supplied hooks for. Have you tested these changes with anything
>> besides SELinux?
> Sorry, this thread is incomplete, I've resent full patchset again.
> If you have any further comments please comment in that thread [1]
>
> I haven't tested with anything except SELinux, but I suppose if
> module won't register any hooks, then security_inode_file_*() will
> return 0. Reverting SELinux implementation of the hooks doesn't
> cause any errors.
>
> I'm not that familiar with LSMs/selinux and its codebase, if you can
> recommend what need to be tested while adding new hooks, I will try
> to do that for next revision.
At a minimum the Smack testsuite:
https://github.com/smack-team/smack-testsuite.git
And the audit suite:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite.git
AppArmor has a suite as well, but I'm not sure where is resides.
My primary concern is that you're making changes that remove existing
hook calls and add new hook calls without verifying that the protections
provided by the old calls are always also provided by the new ones.
>
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxgOAxg7N1OUJfb1KMp7oWOfN=KV9Lzz6ZrX0=XRGOQrEQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-14 18:21 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2025-05-15 7:50 ` Andrey Albershteyn
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Albershteyn @ 2025-05-15 7:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek,
Tyler Hicks, Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein, linux-alpha,
linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k, linux-mips,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api, linux-arch,
selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs, Andrey Albershteyn
On 2025-05-14 11:21:46, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 5/14/2025 4:02 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> > On 2025-05-12 08:43:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 5/12/2025 6:25 AM, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> >>> Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
> >>> attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
> >>>
> >>> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> >>> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
> >>> ---
> >>> fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> >>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> >>> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >>> security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>> 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
> >>> index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
> >>> --- a/fs/file_attr.c
> >>> +++ b/fs/file_attr.c
> >>> @@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
> >>> int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> >>> {
> >>> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
> >>> + int error;
> >>>
> >>> if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
> >>> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
> >>>
> >>> + error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
> >>> + if (error)
> >>> + return error;
> >>> +
> >> If you're changing VFS behavior to depend on LSMs supporting the new
> >> hooks I'm concerned about the impact it will have on the LSMs that you
> >> haven't supplied hooks for. Have you tested these changes with anything
> >> besides SELinux?
> > Sorry, this thread is incomplete, I've resent full patchset again.
> > If you have any further comments please comment in that thread [1]
> >
> > I haven't tested with anything except SELinux, but I suppose if
> > module won't register any hooks, then security_inode_file_*() will
> > return 0. Reverting SELinux implementation of the hooks doesn't
> > cause any errors.
> >
> > I'm not that familiar with LSMs/selinux and its codebase, if you can
> > recommend what need to be tested while adding new hooks, I will try
> > to do that for next revision.
>
> At a minimum the Smack testsuite:
> https://github.com/smack-team/smack-testsuite.git
> And the audit suite:
> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite.git
>
> AppArmor has a suite as well, but I'm not sure where is resides.
Well, I thought about something more specific, I know about these
testsuites
>
> My primary concern is that you're making changes that remove existing
> hook calls and add new hook calls without verifying that the protections
> provided by the old calls are always also provided by the new ones.
I'm only adding new hooks, ioctls weren't calling any hooks.
--
- Andrey
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
2025-05-13 9:17 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
@ 2025-05-22 22:26 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2025-05-22 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Albershteyn, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Russell King,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Naveen N Rao, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
David S. Miller, Andreas Larsson, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86,
H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel, Max Filippov, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Mickaël Salaün,
Günther Noack, Arnd Bergmann, Pali Rohár, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Tyler Hicks,
Miklos Szeredi, Amir Goldstein
Cc: linux-alpha, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linux-m68k,
linux-mips, linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh,
sparclinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, linux-api,
linux-arch, selinux, ecryptfs, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs,
Andrey Albershteyn
On May 13, 2025 Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
> attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
>
> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
The only thing that gives me a slight pause is that on a set operation
we are going to hit both the get and set LSM hooks, but since the code
does call into the getter on a set operation this is arguably the right
thing.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-05-22 22:26 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2025-05-12 13:25 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 15:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-14 11:02 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-14 18:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-15 7:50 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:27 ` [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-05-13 9:17 Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-13 9:17 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-22 22:26 ` Paul Moore
2025-05-12 13:18 [PATCH v5 0/7] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-05-12 13:18 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
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