From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
To: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>,
perex@perex.cz, tiwai@suse.com, phucduc.bui@gmail.com,
kees@kernel.org, blum@kernel.org, hui.wang@canonical.com,
kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com, linux-sound@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@gmail.com,
jjzuming@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ALSA: jack: Protect debugfs setup against control removal
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 15:06:43 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87cxt9u74s.wl-tiwai@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFRLqsVH=Xkeoh2icgSftWCnk3uEUGPst=N3qeGoZ7Zy9+W6WA@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, 16 Oct 2026 15:00:37 +0200,
Cen Zhang wrote:
>
> Hi Takashi,
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> 于2026年10月16日周五 19:13写道:
> >
> > On Fri, 16 Oct 2026 04:04:37 +0200,
> > Cen Zhang wrote:
> > >
> > > The jack control attachment must remain alive while its injection
> > > interface is being initialized. snd_jack_kctl_add() links the attachment
> > > to jack->kctl_list and then calls snd_jack_debugfs_add_inject_node(),
> > > which dereferences jack_kctl->kctl to read the control name. Neither the
> > > list insertion nor the debugfs setup holds controls_rwsem.
> > >
> > > With CONFIG_SND_JACK_INJECTION_DEBUG enabled, an independent kernel
> > > control owner can remove the newly linked control in this order:
> > >
> > > 1. The creator publishes the control with snd_ctl_add(), which releases
> > > controls_rwsem, and links its attachment in snd_jack_kctl_add().
> > > 2. The remover takes controls_rwsem for writing in snd_ctl_remove().
> > > __snd_ctl_remove() unlinks the control and calls snd_ctl_free_one().
> > > snd_jack_kctl_private_free() unlinks and frees the attachment, then
> > > snd_ctl_free_one() frees the control.
> > > 3. The creator enters snd_jack_debugfs_add_inject_node() and reads the
> > > control name through the freed attachment.
> > >
> > > This causes a use-after-free read during jack creation. Hold the existing
> > > controls_rwsem for reading before linking the attachment and until the
> > > debugfs helper returns. The remover's write lock then keeps the attachment
> > > and its control alive throughout this post-publication setup interval.
> > >
> > > KASAN report as below:
> > >
> > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in snd_jack_kctl_add+0x50b/0x5e0
> > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810d8def00 by task kworker/2:1/68
> > >
> > > CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 68 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G O 7.2.0-rc6-pmb-bt-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
> > > Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
> > > Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
> > > Workqueue: events azx_probe_work [snd_hda_intel]
> > > Call Trace:
> > > <TASK>
> > > dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
> > > print_report+0xce/0x630
> > > ? snd_jack_kctl_add+0x50b/0x5e0
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
> > > ? snd_jack_kctl_add+0x50b/0x5e0
> > > kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
> > > ? snd_jack_kctl_add+0x50b/0x5e0
> > > snd_jack_kctl_add+0x50b/0x5e0
> > > ? snd_jack_kctl_add+0x5/0x5e0
> > > snd_jack_new+0x347/0x4c0
> > > snd_hda_jack_add_kctl_mst+0x19e/0x540 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > add_jack_kctl+0x1b9/0x2c0 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? __pfx_add_jack_kctl+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0xee/0x1c0
> > > snd_hda_jack_add_kctls+0x212/0x910 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > snd_hda_gen_build_controls+0x23a/0x6a0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
> > > ? __pfx_snd_hda_gen_build_controls+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
> > > snd_hda_codec_build_controls+0x2e4/0x9f0 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? __pfx_snd_hda_codec_build_controls+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? snd_hda_codec_build_pcms+0x4d8/0x6e0 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > hda_codec_driver_probe+0x26e/0x590 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? __pfx_hda_codec_driver_probe+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > really_probe+0x21f/0xa90
> > > __driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x490
> > > driver_probe_device+0x4f/0x130
> > > __device_attach_driver+0x1d2/0x2e0
> > > ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
> > > bus_for_each_drv+0x155/0x1d0
> > > ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
> > > __device_attach+0x1c3/0x490
> > > ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
> > > ? snd_hda_codec_configure+0x4a2/0x690 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > snd_hda_codec_configure+0x4c5/0x690 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? __pfx_snd_hda_codec_configure+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? __pfx_azx_probe_codecs+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? request_threaded_irq+0x21f/0x380
> > > azx_codec_configure+0x65/0x200 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > azx_probe_work+0x4d8/0x23b0 [snd_hda_intel]
> > > ? __pfx_azx_probe_work+0x10/0x10 [snd_hda_intel]
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? lock_release+0xc8/0x280
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > process_one_work+0x908/0x19c0
> > > ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? __kthread_parkme+0x175/0x220
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
> > > kthread+0x34f/0x460
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
> > > ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
> > > ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
> > > ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> > > ? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf80
> > > ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
> > > ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
> > > </TASK>
> > >
> > > Allocated by task 68:
> > > kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
> > > kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
> > > __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
> > > __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x251/0x610
> > > snd_jack_kctl_new+0x80/0x180
> > > snd_jack_new+0x4b/0x4c0
> > > snd_hda_jack_add_kctl_mst+0x19e/0x540 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > add_jack_kctl+0x1b9/0x2c0 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > snd_hda_jack_add_kctls+0x212/0x910 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > snd_hda_gen_build_controls+0x23a/0x6a0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
> > > snd_hda_codec_build_controls+0x2e4/0x9f0 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > hda_codec_driver_probe+0x26e/0x590 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > really_probe+0x21f/0xa90
> > > __driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x490
> > > driver_probe_device+0x4f/0x130
> > > __device_attach_driver+0x1d2/0x2e0
> > > bus_for_each_drv+0x155/0x1d0
> > > __device_attach+0x1c3/0x490
> > > snd_hda_codec_configure+0x4c5/0x690 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > azx_codec_configure+0x65/0x200 [snd_hda_codec]
> > > azx_probe_work+0x4d8/0x23b0 [snd_hda_intel]
> > > process_one_work+0x908/0x19c0
> > > worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
> > > kthread+0x34f/0x460
> > > ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
> > > ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
> > >
> > > Freed by task 436:
> > > kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
> > > kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
> > > kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
> > > __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
> > > kfree+0x307/0x580
> > > snd_jack_kctl_private_free+0x154/0x200
> > > __snd_ctl_remove+0x29f/0x3b0
> > > snd_ctl_remove+0x46/0x70
> > > remove_control_set+0x110/0x1b0 [pmbd_alsa_control_remove]
> > > param_attr_store+0x191/0x2f0
> > > module_attr_store+0x5d/0x90
> > > sysfs_kf_write+0xed/0x140
> > > kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x34b/0x500
> > > vfs_write+0x637/0x1010
> > > ksys_write+0x111/0x200
> > > do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
> > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> > >
> > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d8def00
> > > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
> > > The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> > > freed 64-byte region [ffff88810d8def00, ffff88810d8def40)
> > >
> > > The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> > > page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d8de
> > > flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
> > > page_type: f5(slab)
> > > raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000428c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
> > > raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
> > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> > >
> > > Memory state around the buggy address:
> > > ffff88810d8dee00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > ffff88810d8dee80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > >ffff88810d8def00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > ^
> > > ffff88810d8def80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > ffff88810d8df000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > ==================================================================
> > >
> > > Fixes: 2d670ea2bd53 ("ALSA: jack: implement software jack injection via debugfs")
> > > Assisted-by: LLM
> > > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > diff --git a/sound/core/jack.c b/sound/core/jack.c
> > > index 0f04018181acb20f6bf85b11a9f6d4c7d3179e5a..dd604ffd8c815a9828f5e4b30a70b7597c86a37f 100644
> > > --- a/sound/core/jack.c
> > > +++ b/sound/core/jack.c
> > > @@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ static void snd_jack_kctl_private_free(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl)
> > >
> > > static void snd_jack_kctl_add(struct snd_jack *jack, struct snd_jack_kctl *jack_kctl)
> > > {
> > > + guard(rwsem_read)(&jack->card->controls_rwsem);
> > > jack_kctl->jack = jack;
> > > list_add_tail(&jack_kctl->list, &jack->kctl_list);
> > > snd_jack_debugfs_add_inject_node(jack, jack_kctl);
> >
> > That looks too ad hoc. We need to check the real cause at first.
> >
> > Could you elaborate how this situation is triggered? In the above
> > stack trace, it looks like that the jack ctl was created via hd-audio
> > codec, but how was it removed?
> >
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Takashi
>
> I'm very sorry for wasting your time. Please disregard this patch.
> I'll be much more careful
> in the future.
OK. Meanwhile, I think we should work on the jack driver code a bit
more regarding the debugfs: namely, the debugfs is exposed already at
the creation of kctls, so they are accessible before other interface
registration via snd_card_register(). The debugfs addition should be
rather moved to the register phase for avoiding the unexpected access
via debugfs, instead. I'm going to submit a patch later.
thanks,
Takashi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-16 13:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-16 2:04 [PATCH] ALSA: jack: Protect debugfs setup against control removal Cen Zhang
2026-10-16 11:13 ` Takashi Iwai
2026-10-16 13:00 ` Cen Zhang
2026-10-16 13:06 ` Takashi Iwai [this message]
2026-10-16 13:30 ` Cen Zhang
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87cxt9u74s.wl-tiwai@suse.de \
--to=tiwai@suse.de \
--cc=baijiaju1990@gmail.com \
--cc=blum@kernel.org \
--cc=hui.wang@canonical.com \
--cc=jjzuming@gmail.com \
--cc=kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-sound@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=perex@perex.cz \
--cc=phucduc.bui@gmail.com \
--cc=tiwai@suse.com \
--cc=zzzccc427@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox