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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
	nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"open list:INTEL SGX" <intel-sgx-kernel-dev@lists.01.org>,
	Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wi>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 09:27:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181210082704.GA14594@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181210074717.GA9880@localhost>

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On Sun 2018-12-09 23:47:17, Josh Triplett wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 09, 2018 at 09:06:00PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> ...
> > > > > The default permissions for the device are 600.
> > > > 
> > > > Good. This does not belong to non-root.
> > > 
> > > There are entirely legitimate use cases for using this as an
> > > unprivileged user. However, that'll be up to system and distribution
> > > policy, which can evolve over time, and it makes sense for the *initial*
> > > kernel permission to start out root-only and then adjust permissions via
> > > udev.
> > 
> > Agreed.
> > 
> > > Building a software certificate store. Hardening key-agent software like
> > > ssh-agent or gpg-agent. Building a challenge-response authentication
> > > system. Providing more assurance that your server infrastructure is
> > > uncompromised. Offloading computation to a system without having to
> > > fully trust that system.
> > 
> > I think you can do the crypto stuff... as crypto already verifies the
> > results. But I don't think you can do the computation offload.
> 
> You can, as long as you can do attestation.

You can not, because random errors are very easy to trigger for person
with physical access, as I explained in the part of email you
stripped.

> > > As one of many possibilities, imagine a distcc that didn't have to trust
> > > the compile nodes. The compile nodes could fail to return results at
> > > all, but they couldn't alter the results.
> > 
> > distcc on untrusted nodes ... oh yes, that would be great.
> > 
> > Except that you can't do it, right? :-).
> > 
> > First, AFAICT it would be quite hard to get gcc to run under SGX. But
> > maybe you have spare month or three and can do it.
> 
> Assuming you don't need to #include files, gcc seems quite simple to run
> in an enclave: data in, computation inside, data out.

So is there a plan to run dynamically linked binaries inside enclave?
Or maybe even python/shell scripts? It looked to me like virtual
memory will be "interesting" for enclaves.


								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-10  8:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-08 17:09 [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-06-08 17:09 ` [PATCH v11 01/13] compiler.h, kasan: add __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ check for __no_kasan_or_inline Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-06-12 10:50 ` [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support Pavel Machek
2018-06-19 14:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-06-19 20:04     ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-19 20:23       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-19 21:48       ` Josh Triplett
2018-12-09 20:06         ` Pavel Machek
2018-12-10  7:47           ` Josh Triplett
2018-12-10  8:27             ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-12-10 23:12               ` Josh Triplett
2018-12-11 18:10                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-11 18:31                   ` Sean Christopherson
2018-06-19 20:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-21 12:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-06-25  9:44   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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