[PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Ian Abbott]

`spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for
arithmetic overflow.  For example, if the SPI message consisted of two
transfers and the first has a length of 10 and the second has a length
of (__u32)(-1), the total length would be seen as 9, even though the
second transfer is actually very long.  If the second transfer specifies
a null `rx_buf` and a non-null `tx_buf`, the `copy_from_user()` could
overrun the spidev's pre-allocated tx buffer before it reaches an
invalid user memory address.  Fix it by checking that neither the total
nor the individual transfer lengths exceed the maximum allowed value.

Thanks to Dan Carpenter for reporting the potential integer overflow.

Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti-GUHe90Wt2aFaa/9Udqfwiw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: <stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org> # 4.0+
---
This could be backported to kernels prior to 4.0, but the total and
individual lengths would need to be checked against `bufsiz` instead of
`INT_MAX`.
---
 drivers/spi/spidev.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/spi/spidev.c b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
index bb6b3ab..23ad978 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spidev.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
@@ -249,9 +249,10 @@ static int spidev_message(struct spidev_data *spidev,
 		total += k_tmp->len;
 		/* Since the function returns the total length of transfers
 		 * on success, restrict the total to positive int values to
-		 * avoid the return value looking like an error.
+		 * avoid the return value looking like an error.  Also check
+		 * each transfer length to avoid arithmetic overflow.
 		 */
-		if (total > INT_MAX) {
+		if (total > INT_MAX || k_tmp->len > INT_MAX) {
 			status = -EMSGSIZE;
 			goto done;
 		}
-- 
2.1.4

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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Mark Brown]

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On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 05:50:27PM +0000, Ian Abbott wrote:

> Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+

This doesn't apply against Linus' tree as far as I can tell - if you
think this needs to go to stable please send a version that applies
against that.

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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Ian Abbott]

On 23/03/15 18:50, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 05:50:27PM +0000, Ian Abbott wrote:
>
>> Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti-GUHe90Wt2aFaa/9Udqfwiw@public.gmane.org>
>> Cc: <stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org> # 4.0+
>
> This doesn't apply against Linus' tree as far as I can tell - if you
> think this needs to go to stable please send a version that applies
> against that.
>

Sorry about that.  It applies to linux-next and might apply against 4.1, 
depending on the timing.

Can you strip the Cc line or do you want me to repost the patch?

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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Mark Brown]

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On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 07:29:15PM +0000, Ian Abbott wrote:
> On 23/03/15 18:50, Mark Brown wrote:

> >This doesn't apply against Linus' tree as far as I can tell - if you
> >think this needs to go to stable please send a version that applies
> >against that.

> Sorry about that.  It applies to linux-next and might apply against 4.1,
> depending on the timing.

v4.1 is linux-next at this point...

> Can you strip the Cc line or do you want me to repost the patch?

I've applied it, but like I say it won't go to stable.

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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Dmitry Torokhov]

On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 10:50 AM, Ian Abbott <abbotti-GUHe90Wt2aFaa/9Udqfwiw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> `spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
> determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
> length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for
> arithmetic overflow.  For example, if the SPI message consisted of two
> transfers and the first has a length of 10 and the second has a length
> of (__u32)(-1), the total length would be seen as 9, even though the
> second transfer is actually very long.  If the second transfer specifies
> a null `rx_buf` and a non-null `tx_buf`, the `copy_from_user()` could
> overrun the spidev's pre-allocated tx buffer before it reaches an
> invalid user memory address.  Fix it by checking that neither the total
> nor the individual transfer lengths exceed the maximum allowed value.
>
> Thanks to Dan Carpenter for reporting the potential integer overflow.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti-GUHe90Wt2aFaa/9Udqfwiw@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: <stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org> # 4.0+
> ---
> This could be backported to kernels prior to 4.0, but the total and
> individual lengths would need to be checked against `bufsiz` instead of
> `INT_MAX`.
> ---
>  drivers/spi/spidev.c | 5 +++--
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/spi/spidev.c b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> index bb6b3ab..23ad978 100644
> --- a/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> +++ b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> @@ -249,9 +249,10 @@ static int spidev_message(struct spidev_data *spidev,
>                 total += k_tmp->len;
>                 /* Since the function returns the total length of transfers
>                  * on success, restrict the total to positive int values to
> -                * avoid the return value looking like an error.
> +                * avoid the return value looking like an error.  Also check
> +                * each transfer length to avoid arithmetic overflow.
>                  */
> -               if (total > INT_MAX) {
> +               if (total > INT_MAX || k_tmp->len > INT_MAX) {

What if total is INT_MAX - 2 and k_tmp->len is 3? What about total is
INT_MAX and k_tmp->len is INT_MAX as well? I think the proper check
should be:

if (total < k_tmp->len || total > INT_MAX) {
        ...
}

>                         status = -EMSGSIZE;
>                         goto done;
>                 }

Thanks.

-- 
Dmitry
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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Ian Abbott]

On 21/05/16 17:50, Dmitry Torokhov wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 10:50 AM, Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> wrote:
>> `spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
>> determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
>> length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for
>> arithmetic overflow.  For example, if the SPI message consisted of two
>> transfers and the first has a length of 10 and the second has a length
>> of (__u32)(-1), the total length would be seen as 9, even though the
>> second transfer is actually very long.  If the second transfer specifies
>> a null `rx_buf` and a non-null `tx_buf`, the `copy_from_user()` could
>> overrun the spidev's pre-allocated tx buffer before it reaches an
>> invalid user memory address.  Fix it by checking that neither the total
>> nor the individual transfer lengths exceed the maximum allowed value.
>>
>> Thanks to Dan Carpenter for reporting the potential integer overflow.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
>> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
>> ---
>> This could be backported to kernels prior to 4.0, but the total and
>> individual lengths would need to be checked against `bufsiz` instead of
>> `INT_MAX`.
>> ---
>>   drivers/spi/spidev.c | 5 +++--
>>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/spi/spidev.c b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
>> index bb6b3ab..23ad978 100644
>> --- a/drivers/spi/spidev.c
>> +++ b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
>> @@ -249,9 +249,10 @@ static int spidev_message(struct spidev_data *spidev,
>>                  total += k_tmp->len;
>>                  /* Since the function returns the total length of transfers
>>                   * on success, restrict the total to positive int values to
>> -                * avoid the return value looking like an error.
>> +                * avoid the return value looking like an error.  Also check
>> +                * each transfer length to avoid arithmetic overflow.
>>                   */
>> -               if (total > INT_MAX) {
>> +               if (total > INT_MAX || k_tmp->len > INT_MAX) {
>
> What if total is INT_MAX - 2 and k_tmp->len is 3? What about total is
> INT_MAX and k_tmp->len is INT_MAX as well? I think the proper check

In your questions, I assume you are referring to the values of 'total' 
before the addition.  I'll call the values 'old_total' and 'new_total' 
(with the same type as 'total', i.e. 'unsigned int').  Note that total 
(and old_total, and new_total) and 'k_tmp->len' have range UINT_MAX, or 
2*INT_MAX+1.

Before the addition, we know that old_total <= INT_MAX (otherwise the 
loop would have errored out already), but k_tmp->len can have any value 
from 0 to UINT_MAX.  After the addition, new_total can have any value 
from 0 to UINT_MAX, and might be less than old_total.  new_total can 
only be less than old_total if old_total + k_tmp->len > UINT_MAX, and 
here I am referring to proper addition, not addition modulo UINT_MAX+1. 
  Rearranging, new_total will be less than old_total if k_tmp->len > 
UINT_MAX - old_total.  Since the maximum value of old_total is INT_MAX, 
the lowest possible value of k_tmp->len that could cause new_total to be 
less than old_total is UINT_MAX - INT_MAX, or INT_MAX+1.  That is what 
the second part of the 'if' test is detecting.

> should be:
>
> if (total < k_tmp->len || total > INT_MAX) {
>          ...
> }
>

That also works.

-- 
-=( Ian Abbott @ MEV Ltd.    E-mail: <abbotti@mev.co.uk> )=-
-=(                          Web: http://www.mev.co.uk/  )=-

Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Dmitry Torokhov]

On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:20:35AM +0100, Ian Abbott wrote:
> On 21/05/16 17:50, Dmitry Torokhov wrote:
> >On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 10:50 AM, Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> wrote:
> >>`spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
> >>determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
> >>length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for
> >>arithmetic overflow.  For example, if the SPI message consisted of two
> >>transfers and the first has a length of 10 and the second has a length
> >>of (__u32)(-1), the total length would be seen as 9, even though the
> >>second transfer is actually very long.  If the second transfer specifies
> >>a null `rx_buf` and a non-null `tx_buf`, the `copy_from_user()` could
> >>overrun the spidev's pre-allocated tx buffer before it reaches an
> >>invalid user memory address.  Fix it by checking that neither the total
> >>nor the individual transfer lengths exceed the maximum allowed value.
> >>
> >>Thanks to Dan Carpenter for reporting the potential integer overflow.
> >>
> >>Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
> >>Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
> >>---
> >>This could be backported to kernels prior to 4.0, but the total and
> >>individual lengths would need to be checked against `bufsiz` instead of
> >>`INT_MAX`.
> >>---
> >>  drivers/spi/spidev.c | 5 +++--
> >>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >>diff --git a/drivers/spi/spidev.c b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> >>index bb6b3ab..23ad978 100644
> >>--- a/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> >>+++ b/drivers/spi/spidev.c
> >>@@ -249,9 +249,10 @@ static int spidev_message(struct spidev_data *spidev,
> >>                 total += k_tmp->len;
> >>                 /* Since the function returns the total length of transfers
> >>                  * on success, restrict the total to positive int values to
> >>-                * avoid the return value looking like an error.
> >>+                * avoid the return value looking like an error.  Also check
> >>+                * each transfer length to avoid arithmetic overflow.
> >>                  */
> >>-               if (total > INT_MAX) {
> >>+               if (total > INT_MAX || k_tmp->len > INT_MAX) {
> >
> >What if total is INT_MAX - 2 and k_tmp->len is 3? What about total is
> >INT_MAX and k_tmp->len is INT_MAX as well? I think the proper check
> 
> In your questions, I assume you are referring to the values of
> 'total' before the addition.  I'll call the values 'old_total' and

Sorry, yes, for some reason I was thinking we are checking before
performing addition. Ignore me.

> 'new_total' (with the same type as 'total', i.e. 'unsigned int').
> Note that total (and old_total, and new_total) and 'k_tmp->len' have
> range UINT_MAX, or 2*INT_MAX+1.
> 
> Before the addition, we know that old_total <= INT_MAX (otherwise
> the loop would have errored out already), but k_tmp->len can have
> any value from 0 to UINT_MAX.  After the addition, new_total can
> have any value from 0 to UINT_MAX, and might be less than old_total.
> new_total can only be less than old_total if old_total + k_tmp->len
> > UINT_MAX, and here I am referring to proper addition, not addition
> modulo UINT_MAX+1.  Rearranging, new_total will be less than
> old_total if k_tmp->len > UINT_MAX - old_total.  Since the maximum
> value of old_total is INT_MAX, the lowest possible value of
> k_tmp->len that could cause new_total to be less than old_total is
> UINT_MAX - INT_MAX, or INT_MAX+1.  That is what the second part of
> the 'if' test is detecting.
> 
> >should be:
> >
> >if (total < k_tmp->len || total > INT_MAX) {
> >         ...
> >}
> >
> 
> That also works.
> 
> -- 
> -=( Ian Abbott @ MEV Ltd.    E-mail: <abbotti@mev.co.uk> )=-
> -=(                          Web: http://www.mev.co.uk/  )=-

-- 
Dmitry

Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Mark Brown]

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On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 09:50:35AM -0700, Dmitry Torokhov wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 10:50 AM, Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> wrote:
> > `spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
> > determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
> > length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for

As documented in SubmittingPatches please send patches to the
maintainers for the code you would like to change.  The normal kernel
workflow is that people apply patches from their inboxes, if they aren't
copied they are likely to not see the patch at all and it is much more
difficult to apply patches.

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Re: [PATCH] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message

[Ian Abbott]

On 23/05/16 12:15, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 09:50:35AM -0700, Dmitry Torokhov wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 10:50 AM, Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> wrote:
>>> `spidev_message()` sums the lengths of the individual SPI transfers to
>>> determine the overall SPI message length.  It restricts the total
>>> length, returning an error if too long, but it does not check for
>
> As documented in SubmittingPatches please send patches to the
> maintainers for the code you would like to change.  The normal kernel
> workflow is that people apply patches from their inboxes, if they aren't
> copied they are likely to not see the patch at all and it is much more
> difficult to apply patches.
>

In this case, Dmitry was replying to my patch that has already been 
applied over a year ago. :)

-- 
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-=(                          Web: http://www.mev.co.uk/  )=-