From: Delene Tchio Romuald <delenetchior1@gmail.com>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: dan.carpenter@linaro.org, error27@gmail.com,
luka.gejak@linux.dev, hansg@kernel.org,
linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Delene Tchio Romuald <delenetchior1@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 19:55:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260415185501.440492-6-delenetchior1@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260415185501.440492-1-delenetchior1@gmail.com>
In rtw_wep_decrypt(), the payload length is computed as:
length = frame->len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
All operands are unsigned. If the frame is shorter than the sum of
the header length and the IV length, this subtraction wraps around
and length becomes a huge unsigned value. That value is then used
to drive an arc4_crypt() call that reads and writes past the end
of the receive buffer.
An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a
crafted short WEP-encrypted frame. No authentication is required.
Validate that the frame is large enough to contain a WEP payload
before computing length.
Found by reviewing length arithmetic in the WEP decrypt path.
Not tested on hardware.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Delene Tchio Romuald <delenetchior1@gmail.com>
---
v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter); carry Luka Gejak's
Reviewed-by.
v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper
Cc from get_maintainer.pl.
v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not
apply).
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index a00504ff29109..f3bc2240749a4 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
memcpy(&wepkey[0], iv, 3);
/* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */
memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0], keylength);
+
+ /* Ensure the frame is long enough for WEP decryption */
+ if (((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len <=
+ prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len)
+ return;
+
length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-15 18:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-15 18:54 [PATCH v4 0/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix multiple security vulnerabilities Delene Tchio Romuald
2026-04-15 18:54 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in recvframe_defrag() Delene Tchio Romuald
2026-04-15 19:56 ` Dan Carpenter
2026-04-15 18:54 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix integer underflow in TKIP MIC verification Delene Tchio Romuald
2026-04-15 18:54 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds read in portctrl() Delene Tchio Romuald
2026-04-16 16:36 ` Dan Carpenter
2026-04-16 17:44 ` Luka Gejak
2026-04-15 18:55 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix out-of-bounds reads in IE parsing functions Delene Tchio Romuald
2026-04-16 16:44 ` Dan Carpenter
2026-04-15 18:55 ` Delene Tchio Romuald [this message]
2026-04-16 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption Dan Carpenter
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