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Thu, 16 Apr 2026 20:03:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Delene Tchio Romuald To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: error27@gmail.com, luka.gejak@linux.dev, hansg@kernel.org, linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Delene Tchio Romuald Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] staging: rtl8723bs: fix negative length in WEP decryption Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 04:01:10 +0100 Message-ID: <20260417030110.42991-6-delenetchior1@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20260417030110.42991-1-delenetchior1@gmail.com> References: <20260417030110.42991-1-delenetchior1@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-staging@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In rtw_wep_decrypt(), the payload length is computed as: length = frame->len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len; All operands are unsigned. If the frame is shorter than the sum of the header length, IV length and the 4-byte ICV, this subtraction wraps around or produces a value smaller than 4; the subsequent crc32_le(~0, payload, length - 4) call then wraps length - 4 to a huge value and reads past the end of the receive buffer. An attacker within WiFi radio range can exploit this by sending a crafted short WEP-encrypted frame. No authentication is required. Validate that the frame is large enough to contain at least the 4-byte ICV on top of the header and IV before computing length. Found by reviewing length arithmetic in the WEP decrypt path. Not tested on hardware. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Delene Tchio Romuald --- v5: tighten the length check to also cover the 4-byte ICV so that the subsequent crc32_le(payload, length - 4) call cannot underflow length - 4. v4: add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Dan Carpenter). v3: rebased on staging-next; sent as numbered series with proper Cc from get_maintainer.pl. v2: rebased on staging-next (v1 was based on v7.0-rc6 and did not apply). drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c index a00504ff29109..ddd6ed2245035 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c @@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe) memcpy(&wepkey[0], iv, 3); /* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */ memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0], keylength); + + /* Ensure the frame is long enough for WEP payload and ICV */ + if (((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len < + prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len + 4) + return; + length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len; payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen; -- 2.43.0