From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Cc: linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2026 21:27:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026042612-twiddle-disparate-ebef@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DHT3IJS5RI4B.1GG2CZL3B47RU@linux.dev>
On Tue, Apr 14, 2026 at 08:39:59PM +0200, Luka Gejak wrote:
> On Tue Apr 14, 2026 at 7:19 PM CEST, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > HT_caps_handler() loops up to pIE->length, the IE length byte taken
> > directly from an over-the-air association response, and uses the counter
> > to index pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap[26]. A malicious AP can supply an
> > HT capabilities IE with a length byte up to 255, AND-writing into
> > adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. This is reachable in station
> > mode (the default) via OnAssocRsp.
> >
> > HT_info_handler() already rejects oversized IEs so do the same thing in
> > HT_caps_handler() to resolve this.
> >
> > Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
> > Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > ---
> > drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 +++
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c
> > index 3242978da36c..a2e016c6a01f 100644
> > --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c
> > +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c
> > @@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE)
> > if (phtpriv->ht_option == false)
> > return;
> >
> > + if (pIE->length > sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps))
> > + return;
> > +
> > pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1;
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) {
>
> Good catch. Trusting pIE->length blindly from an unauthenticated
> association response is a classic oob write vector. Since HT_cap is
> fixed-size within the mlme_ext_info struct, this is a clear remote heap
> corruption risk if a malicious AP is in range.
> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
And it's wrong, as per the AI review :(
Also, you have trailing whitespace on your review comments :)
thanks,
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-27 3:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-14 17:19 [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-14 18:39 ` Luka Gejak
2026-04-26 19:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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