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Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 13:03:01 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Hao-Qun Huang <alvinhuang0603@gmail.com>,
	Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Nadzeya Hutsko <nadzya.info@gmail.com>,
	linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Martyn Welch <martyn@welchs.me.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in fake
 bridge
Message-ID: <2026070945-tropics-shredder-bad7@gregkh>
References: <20260704065817.403111-1-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com>
 <ak986K54RhRDMpfn@stanley.mountain>
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In-Reply-To: <ak986K54RhRDMpfn@stanley.mountain>

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 01:50:16PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> Hi Greg, I'm back from travel.  Should we just delete staging/vme_user/?
> I don't know really if it's used but there are some pretty severe
> security issues with this code.

There are probably lots of issues with this code, but from what I
recall, the systems that use this do not have "untrusted" userspace
processes on it, so it shouldn't be an issue.  If that's not the case,
then yes, it should be deleted, but really, no one cares about security
issues with code that adds TAINT_CRAP to the system when loaded :)

Martyn, any thoughts?

thanks,

greg k-h