From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Guangshuo Li" <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-sunxi@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: fix autosuspend cleanup during teardown
Date: Sat, 08 Aug 2026 09:11:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260808091146.C52F81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260808085337.2715506-1-lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Unbalanced clock cleanup in the runtime PM resume error path
- [High] Memory leak and Use-After-Free of debugfs entries during device removal
- [High] Use-After-Free of device context when unbinding the device via sysfs with active TFMs
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: fix autosuspend cleanup during teardown ---
commit 498a2e7e81cded38e9654e9d63d7f5c6261e2d92
Author: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
crypto: sun4i-ss: fix autosuspend cleanup during teardown
sun4i_ss_pm_init() calls pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(), but the
autosuspend setting is not undone if pm_runtime_set_suspended() fails
or when runtime PM is later torn down by sun4i_ss_pm_exit().
If the autosuspend delay is set to a negative value while autosuspend
is enabled, the runtime PM core increments usage_count to prevent
runtime suspend. Without calling pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend()
during cleanup, this reference is not dropped and usage_count remains
unbalanced.
Undo the autosuspend setting when pm_runtime_set_suspended() fails and
in sun4i_ss_pm_exit() before disabling runtime PM.
Fixes: 554c42b4efd4 ("crypto: sun4i-ss - enable pm_runtime")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun4i-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun4i-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
> index 35ef0930e77f1..10c0f05994ed8 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun4i-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun4i-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
> @@ -304,14 +304,17 @@ static int sun4i_ss_pm_init(struct sun4i_ss_ctx *ss)
> pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(ss->dev, 2000);
>
> err = pm_runtime_set_suspended(ss->dev);
> - if (err)
> + if (err) {
> + pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(ss->dev);
> return err;
> + }
> pm_runtime_enable(ss->dev);
> return err;
> }
>
> static void sun4i_ss_pm_exit(struct sun4i_ss_ctx *ss)
> {
> + pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(ss->dev);
> pm_runtime_disable(ss->dev);
> }
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the error path in sun4i_ss_pm_resume()
corrupt the clock framework's reference counting?
If clk_prepare_enable(ss->busclk) fails, the code jumps to err_enable:
err_enable:
sun4i_ss_pm_suspend(dev);
return err;
sun4i_ss_pm_suspend() then unconditionally disables both clocks:
clk_disable_unprepare(ss->ssclk);
clk_disable_unprepare(ss->busclk);
Since busclk failed to enable and ssclk wasn't attempted yet, does calling
clk_disable_unprepare() on them drop the prepare_count and enable_count below
zero?
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the driver leak debugfs
entries during device removal?
In sun4i_ss_probe(), the debugfs entries are created:
ss->dbgfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir("sun4i-ss", NULL);
ss->dbgfs_stats = debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, ss->dbgfs_dir, ss,
&sun4i_ss_debugfs_fops);
The device removal path in sun4i_ss_remove() lacks a corresponding
debugfs_remove_recursive() call.
Could this leak the debugfs dentries, and potentially lead to a use-after-free
if a user reads the leaked stats file after devres has freed the ss context?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a use-after-free risk when unbinding
the device with active TFMs?
In sun4i_ss_remove(), algorithms are unregistered:
crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ss_algs[i].alg.crypto);
This merely removes the algorithms from the active list without waiting for
active TFMs to close. Since the context is managed by devm_kzalloc, devres
will free it immediately after remove completes.
If an unprivileged user keeps a TFM open, could callbacks like
sun4i_ss_cipher_poll() access freed memory when dereferencing op->ss?
sun4i_ss_cipher_poll()
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct sun4i_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
// op->ss is accessed here
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260808085337.2715506-1-lgs201920130244@gmail.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-08 9:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-08 8:53 [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: fix autosuspend cleanup during teardown Guangshuo Li
2026-08-08 9:11 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260808091146.C52F81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=lgs201920130244@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-sunxi@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox