From: Jason Merrill <jason@redhat.com>
To: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>,
gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: PING^2 (C/C++): Re: [PATCH 6/6] Add __attribute__ ((tainted))
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 14:08:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0627276a-7bd5-022b-5f8a-2c8ac499e2aa@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ba34d7708c94c2c3929fc357c8195a2d59e80ff4.camel@redhat.com>
On 1/12/22 10:33, David Malcolm wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 23:36 -0500, Jason Merrill wrote:
>> On 1/10/22 16:36, David Malcolm via Gcc-patches wrote:
>>> On Thu, 2022-01-06 at 09:08 -0500, David Malcolm wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 2021-11-13 at 15:37 -0500, David Malcolm wrote:
>>>>> This patch adds a new __attribute__ ((tainted)) to the C/C++
>>>>> frontends.
>>>>
>>>> Ping for GCC C/C++ mantainers for review of the C/C++ FE parts of
>>>> this
>>>> patch (attribute registration, documentation, the name of the
>>>> attribute, etc).
>>>>
>>>> (I believe it's independent of the rest of the patch kit, in that
>>>> it
>>>> could go into trunk without needing the prior patches)
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Dave
>>>
>>> Getting close to end of stage 3 for GCC 12, so pinging this patch
>>> again...
>>>
>>> https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2021-November/584376.html
>>
>> The c-family change is OK.
>
> Thanks.
>
> I'm retesting the patch now, but it now seems to me that
> __attribute__((tainted_args))
> would lead to more readable code than:
> __attribute__((tainted))
>
> in that the name "tainted_args" better conveys the idea that all
> arguments are under attacker-control (as opposed to the body of the
> function or the function pointer being under attacker-control).
>
> Looking at
> https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Function-Attributes.html
> we already have some attributes with underscores in their names.
>
> Does this sound good?
Makes sense to me.
>>
>>> Thanks
>>> Dave
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It can be used on function decls: the analyzer will treat as
>>>>> tainted
>>>>> all parameters to the function and all buffers pointed to by
>>>>> parameters
>>>>> to the function. Adding this in one place to the Linux kernel's
>>>>> __SYSCALL_DEFINEx macro allows the analyzer to treat all syscalls
>>>>> as
>>>>> having tainted inputs. This gives additional testing beyond e.g.
>>>>> __user
>>>>> pointers added by earlier patches - an example of the use of this
>>>>> can
>>>>> be
>>>>> seen in CVE-2011-2210, where given:
>>>>>
>>>>> SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user
>>>>> *,
>>>>> buffer,
>>>>> unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start,
>>>>> void
>>>>> __user *, arg)
>>>>>
>>>>> the analyzer will treat the nbytes param as under attacker
>>>>> control,
>>>>> and
>>>>> can complain accordingly:
>>>>>
>>>>> taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c: In function ‘sys_osf_getsysinfo’:
>>>>> taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c:69:21: warning: use of attacker-
>>>>> controlled
>>>>> value
>>>>> ‘nbytes’ as size without upper-bounds checking [CWE-129] [-
>>>>> Wanalyzer-tainted-size]
>>>>> 69 | if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes)
>>>>> != 0)
>>>>> | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>>>>
>>>>> Additionally, the patch allows the attribute to be used on field
>>>>> decls:
>>>>> specifically function pointers. Any function used as an
>>>>> initializer
>>>>> for such a field gets treated as tainted. An example can be seen
>>>>> in
>>>>> CVE-2020-13143, where adding __attribute__((tainted)) to the
>>>>> "store"
>>>>> callback of configfs_attribute:
>>>>>
>>>>> struct configfs_attribute {
>>>>> /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> ssize_t (*store)(struct config_item *, const char *,
>>>>> size_t)
>>>>> __attribute__((tainted));
>>>>> /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> };
>>>>>
>>>>> allows the analyzer to see:
>>>>>
>>>>> CONFIGFS_ATTR(gadget_dev_desc_, UDC);
>>>>>
>>>>> and treat gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store as tainted, so that it
>>>>> complains:
>>>>>
>>>>> taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c: In function
>>>>> ‘gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store’:
>>>>> taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c:33:17: warning: use of attacker-
>>>>> controlled
>>>>> value
>>>>> ‘len + 18446744073709551615’ as offset without upper-bounds
>>>>> checking [CWE-823] [-Wanalyzer-tainted-offset]
>>>>> 33 | if (name[len - 1] == '\n')
>>>>> | ~~~~^~~~~~~~~
>>>>>
>>>>> Similarly, the attribute could be used on the ioctl callback
>>>>> field,
>>>>> USB device callbacks, network-handling callbacks etc. This
>>>>> potentially
>>>>> gives a lot of test coverage with relatively little code
>>>>> annotation,
>>>>> and
>>>>> without necessarily needing link-time analysis (which -fanalyzer
>>>>> can
>>>>> only do at present on trivial examples).
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe this is the first time we've had an attribute on a
>>>>> field.
>>>>> If that's an issue, I could prepare a version of the patch that
>>>>> merely allowed it on functions themselves.
>>>>>
>>>>> As before this currently still needs -fanalyzer-checker=taint (in
>>>>> addition to -fanalyzer).
>>>>>
>>>>> gcc/analyzer/ChangeLog:
>>>>> * engine.cc: Include "stringpool.h", "attribs.h", and
>>>>> "tree-dfa.h".
>>>>> (mark_params_as_tainted): New.
>>>>> (class tainted_function_custom_event): New.
>>>>> (class tainted_function_info): New.
>>>>> (exploded_graph::add_function_entry): Handle functions
>>>>> with
>>>>> "tainted" attribute.
>>>>> (class tainted_field_custom_event): New.
>>>>> (class tainted_callback_custom_event): New.
>>>>> (class tainted_call_info): New.
>>>>> (add_tainted_callback): New.
>>>>> (add_any_callbacks): New.
>>>>> (exploded_graph::build_initial_worklist): Find callbacks
>>>>> that
>>>>> are
>>>>> reachable from global initializers, calling
>>>>> add_any_callbacks
>>>>> on
>>>>> them.
>>>>>
>>>>> gcc/c-family/ChangeLog:
>>>>> * c-attribs.c (c_common_attribute_table): Add "tainted".
>>>>> (handle_tainted_attribute): New.
>>>>>
>>>>> gcc/ChangeLog:
>>>>> * doc/extend.texi (Function Attributes): Note that
>>>>> "tainted"
>>>>> can
>>>>> be used on field decls.
>>>>> (Common Function Attributes): Add entry on "tainted"
>>>>> attribute.
>>>>>
>>>>> gcc/testsuite/ChangeLog:
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-1.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-misuses.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c: New test.
>>>>> * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c: New test.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> gcc/analyzer/engine.cc | 317
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++-
>>>>> gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c | 36 ++
>>>>> gcc/doc/extend.texi | 22 +-
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-1.c | 88 +++++
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-misuses.c | 6 +
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c | 93 +++++
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c | 38 +++
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c | 32 ++
>>>>> .../gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h | 91 +++++
>>>>> gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c | 21 ++
>>>>> gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c | 31 ++
>>>>> 11 files changed, 772 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-
>>>>> 1.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-
>>>>> misuses.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-
>>>>> 2011-
>>>>> 2210-1.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-
>>>>> 2020-
>>>>> 13143-1.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-
>>>>> 2020-
>>>>> 13143-2.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-
>>>>> 2020-
>>>>> 13143.h
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-
>>>>> 3.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-
>>>>> 4.c
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc b/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc
>>>>> index 096e219392d..5fab41daf93 100644
>>>>> --- a/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc
>>>>> @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ along with GCC; see the file COPYING3. If not
>>>>> see
>>>>> #include "plugin.h"
>>>>> #include "target.h"
>>>>> #include <memory>
>>>>> +#include "stringpool.h"
>>>>> +#include "attribs.h"
>>>>> +#include "tree-dfa.h"
>>>>>
>>>>> /* For an overview, see gcc/doc/analyzer.texi. */
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -2276,6 +2279,116 @@ exploded_graph::~exploded_graph ()
>>>>> delete (*iter).second;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/* Subroutine for use when implementing __attribute__((tainted))
>>>>> + on functions and on function pointer fields in structs.
>>>>> +
>>>>> + Called on STATE representing a call to FNDECL.
>>>>> + Mark all params of FNDECL in STATE as "tainted". Mark the
>>>>> value
>>>>> of all
>>>>> + regions pointed to by params of FNDECL as "tainted".
>>>>> +
>>>>> + Return true if successful; return false if the "taint" state
>>>>> machine
>>>>> + was not found. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static bool
>>>>> +mark_params_as_tainted (program_state *state, tree fndecl,
>>>>> + const extrinsic_state &ext_state)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + unsigned taint_sm_idx;
>>>>> + if (!ext_state.get_sm_idx_by_name ("taint", &taint_sm_idx))
>>>>> + return false;
>>>>> + sm_state_map *smap = state->m_checker_states[taint_sm_idx];
>>>>> +
>>>>> + const state_machine &sm = ext_state.get_sm (taint_sm_idx);
>>>>> + state_machine::state_t tainted = sm.get_state_by_name
>>>>> ("tainted");
>>>>> +
>>>>> + region_model_manager *mgr = ext_state.get_model_manager ();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + function *fun = DECL_STRUCT_FUNCTION (fndecl);
>>>>> + gcc_assert (fun);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + for (tree iter_parm = DECL_ARGUMENTS (fndecl); iter_parm;
>>>>> + iter_parm = DECL_CHAIN (iter_parm))
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + tree param = iter_parm;
>>>>> + if (tree parm_default_ssa = ssa_default_def (fun,
>>>>> iter_parm))
>>>>> + param = parm_default_ssa;
>>>>> + const region *param_reg = state->m_region_model-
>>>>>> get_lvalue
>>>>> (param, NULL);
>>>>> + const svalue *init_sval = mgr->get_or_create_initial_value
>>>>> (param_reg);
>>>>> + smap->set_state (state->m_region_model, init_sval,
>>>>> + tainted, NULL /*origin_new_sval*/,
>>>>> ext_state);
>>>>> + if (POINTER_TYPE_P (TREE_TYPE (param)))
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + const region *pointee_reg = mgr->get_symbolic_region
>>>>> (init_sval);
>>>>> + /* Mark "*param" as tainted. */
>>>>> + const svalue *init_pointee_sval
>>>>> + = mgr->get_or_create_initial_value (pointee_reg);
>>>>> + smap->set_state (state->m_region_model,
>>>>> init_pointee_sval,
>>>>> + tainted, NULL /*origin_new_sval*/,
>>>>> ext_state);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return true;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Custom event for use by tainted_function_info when a function
>>>>> + has been marked with __attribute__((tainted)). */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +class tainted_function_custom_event : public custom_event
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +public:
>>>>> + tainted_function_custom_event (location_t loc, tree fndecl,
>>>>> int
>>>>> depth)
>>>>> + : custom_event (loc, fndecl, depth),
>>>>> + m_fndecl (fndecl)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + return make_label_text
>>>>> + (can_colorize,
>>>>> + "function %qE marked with %<__attribute__((tainted))%>",
>>>>> + m_fndecl);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +private:
>>>>> + tree m_fndecl;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Custom exploded_edge info for top-level calls to a function
>>>>> + marked with __attribute__((tainted)). */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +class tainted_function_info : public custom_edge_info
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +public:
>>>>> + tainted_function_info (tree fndecl)
>>>>> + : m_fndecl (fndecl)
>>>>> + {}
>>>>> +
>>>>> + void print (pretty_printer *pp) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + pp_string (pp, "call to tainted function");
>>>>> + };
>>>>> +
>>>>> + bool update_model (region_model *,
>>>>> + const exploded_edge *,
>>>>> + region_model_context *) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + /* No-op. */
>>>>> + return true;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + void add_events_to_path (checker_path *emission_path,
>>>>> + const exploded_edge &) const FINAL
>>>>> OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + emission_path->add_event
>>>>> + (new tainted_function_custom_event
>>>>> + (DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION (m_fndecl), m_fndecl, 0));
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +private:
>>>>> + tree m_fndecl;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> /* Ensure that there is an exploded_node representing an
>>>>> external
>>>>> call to
>>>>> FUN, adding it to the worklist if creating it.
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -2302,14 +2415,25 @@ exploded_graph::add_function_entry
>>>>> (function
>>>>> *fun)
>>>>> program_state state (m_ext_state);
>>>>> state.push_frame (m_ext_state, fun);
>>>>>
>>>>> + custom_edge_info *edge_info = NULL;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (lookup_attribute ("tainted", DECL_ATTRIBUTES (fun->decl)))
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + if (mark_params_as_tainted (&state, fun->decl,
>>>>> m_ext_state))
>>>>> + edge_info = new tainted_function_info (fun->decl);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> if (!state.m_valid)
>>>>> return NULL;
>>>>>
>>>>> exploded_node *enode = get_or_create_node (point, state,
>>>>> NULL);
>>>>> if (!enode)
>>>>> - return NULL;
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + delete edge_info;
>>>>> + return NULL;
>>>>> + }
>>>>>
>>>>> - add_edge (m_origin, enode, NULL);
>>>>> + add_edge (m_origin, enode, NULL, edge_info);
>>>>>
>>>>> m_functions_with_enodes.add (fun);
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -2623,6 +2747,184 @@ toplevel_function_p (function *fun,
>>>>> logger
>>>>> *logger)
>>>>> return true;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/* Custom event for use by tainted_call_info when a callback
>>>>> field
>>>>> has been
>>>>> + marked with __attribute__((tainted)), for labelling the
>>>>> field.
>>>>> */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +class tainted_field_custom_event : public custom_event
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +public:
>>>>> + tainted_field_custom_event (tree field)
>>>>> + : custom_event (DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION (field), NULL_TREE, 0),
>>>>> + m_field (field)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + return make_label_text (can_colorize,
>>>>> + "field %qE of %qT"
>>>>> + " is marked with
>>>>> %<__attribute__((tainted))%>",
>>>>> + m_field, DECL_CONTEXT (m_field));
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +private:
>>>>> + tree m_field;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Custom event for use by tainted_call_info when a callback
>>>>> field
>>>>> has been
>>>>> + marked with __attribute__((tainted)), for labelling the
>>>>> function
>>>>> used
>>>>> + in that callback. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +class tainted_callback_custom_event : public custom_event
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +public:
>>>>> + tainted_callback_custom_event (location_t loc, tree fndecl,
>>>>> int
>>>>> depth,
>>>>> + tree field)
>>>>> + : custom_event (loc, fndecl, depth),
>>>>> + m_field (field)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + return make_label_text (can_colorize,
>>>>> + "function %qE used as initializer for
>>>>> field %qE"
>>>>> + " marked with
>>>>> %<__attribute__((tainted))%>",
>>>>> + m_fndecl, m_field);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +private:
>>>>> + tree m_field;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Custom edge info for use when adding a function used by a
>>>>> callback field
>>>>> + marked with '__attribute__((tainted))'. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +class tainted_call_info : public custom_edge_info
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +public:
>>>>> + tainted_call_info (tree field, tree fndecl, location_t loc)
>>>>> + : m_field (field), m_fndecl (fndecl), m_loc (loc)
>>>>> + {}
>>>>> +
>>>>> + void print (pretty_printer *pp) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + pp_string (pp, "call to tainted field");
>>>>> + };
>>>>> +
>>>>> + bool update_model (region_model *,
>>>>> + const exploded_edge *,
>>>>> + region_model_context *) const FINAL OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + /* No-op. */
>>>>> + return true;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + void add_events_to_path (checker_path *emission_path,
>>>>> + const exploded_edge &) const FINAL
>>>>> OVERRIDE
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + /* Show the field in the struct declaration
>>>>> + e.g. "(1) field 'store' is marked with
>>>>> '__attribute__((tainted))'" */
>>>>> + emission_path->add_event
>>>>> + (new tainted_field_custom_event (m_field));
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* Show the callback in the initializer
>>>>> + e.g.
>>>>> + "(2) function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as
>>>>> initializer
>>>>> + for field 'store' marked with
>>>>> '__attribute__((tainted))'".
>>>>> */
>>>>> + emission_path->add_event
>>>>> + (new tainted_callback_custom_event (m_loc, m_fndecl, 0,
>>>>> m_field));
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +private:
>>>>> + tree m_field;
>>>>> + tree m_fndecl;
>>>>> + location_t m_loc;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Given an initializer at LOC for FIELD marked with
>>>>> '__attribute__((tainted))'
>>>>> + initialized with FNDECL, add an entrypoint to FNDECL to EG
>>>>> (and
>>>>> to its
>>>>> + worklist) where the params to FNDECL are marked as tainted.
>>>>> */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void
>>>>> +add_tainted_callback (exploded_graph *eg, tree field, tree
>>>>> fndecl,
>>>>> + location_t loc)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + logger *logger = eg->get_logger ();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + LOG_SCOPE (logger);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!gimple_has_body_p (fndecl))
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + const extrinsic_state &ext_state = eg->get_ext_state ();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + function *fun = DECL_STRUCT_FUNCTION (fndecl);
>>>>> + gcc_assert (fun);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + program_point point
>>>>> + = program_point::from_function_entry (eg->get_supergraph (),
>>>>> fun);
>>>>> + program_state state (ext_state);
>>>>> + state.push_frame (ext_state, fun);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!mark_params_as_tainted (&state, fndecl, ext_state))
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!state.m_valid)
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + exploded_node *enode = eg->get_or_create_node (point, state,
>>>>> NULL);
>>>>> + if (logger)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + if (enode)
>>>>> + logger->log ("created EN %i for tainted %qE entrypoint",
>>>>> + enode->m_index, fndecl);
>>>>> + else
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + logger->log ("did not create enode for tainted %qE
>>>>> entrypoint",
>>>>> + fndecl);
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + tainted_call_info *info = new tainted_call_info (field,
>>>>> fndecl,
>>>>> loc);
>>>>> + eg->add_edge (eg->get_origin (), enode, NULL, info);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Callback for walk_tree for finding callbacks within
>>>>> initializers;
>>>>> + ensure that any callback initializer where the corresponding
>>>>> field is
>>>>> + marked with '__attribute__((tainted))' is treated as an
>>>>> entrypoint to the
>>>>> + analysis, special-casing that the inputs to the callback are
>>>>> + untrustworthy. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static tree
>>>>> +add_any_callbacks (tree *tp, int *, void *data)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + exploded_graph *eg = (exploded_graph *)data;
>>>>> + if (TREE_CODE (*tp) == CONSTRUCTOR)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + /* Find fields with the "tainted" attribute.
>>>>> + walk_tree only walks the values, not the index values;
>>>>> + look at the index values. */
>>>>> + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT idx;
>>>>> + constructor_elt *ce;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + for (idx = 0; vec_safe_iterate (CONSTRUCTOR_ELTS (*tp),
>>>>> idx,
>>>>> &ce);
>>>>> + idx++)
>>>>> + if (ce->index && TREE_CODE (ce->index) == FIELD_DECL)
>>>>> + if (lookup_attribute ("tainted", DECL_ATTRIBUTES (ce-
>>>>>> index)))
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + tree value = ce->value;
>>>>> + if (TREE_CODE (value) == ADDR_EXPR
>>>>> + && TREE_CODE (TREE_OPERAND (value, 0)) ==
>>>>> FUNCTION_DECL)
>>>>> + add_tainted_callback (eg, ce->index, TREE_OPERAND
>>>>> (value, 0),
>>>>> + EXPR_LOCATION (value));
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return NULL_TREE;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> /* Add initial nodes to EG, with entrypoints for externally-
>>>>> callable
>>>>> functions. */
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -2648,6 +2950,17 @@ exploded_graph::build_initial_worklist ()
>>>>> logger->log ("did not create enode for %qE
>>>>> entrypoint",
>>>>> fun->decl);
>>>>> }
>>>>> }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* Find callbacks that are reachable from global
>>>>> initializers. */
>>>>> + varpool_node *vpnode;
>>>>> + FOR_EACH_VARIABLE (vpnode)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + tree decl = vpnode->decl;
>>>>> + tree init = DECL_INITIAL (decl);
>>>>> + if (!init)
>>>>> + continue;
>>>>> + walk_tree (&init, add_any_callbacks, this, NULL);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> /* The main loop of the analysis.
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c b/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c
>>>>> index 9e03156de5e..835ba6e0e8c 100644
>>>>> --- a/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c
>>>>> @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static tree
>>>>> handle_no_profile_instrument_function_attribute (tree *, tree,
>>>>>
>>>>> tree,
>>>>> int, bool *);
>>>>> static tree handle_malloc_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int,
>>>>> bool
>>>>> *);
>>>>> static tree handle_dealloc_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int,
>>>>> bool
>>>>> *);
>>>>> +static tree handle_tainted_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int,
>>>>> bool
>>>>> *);
>>>>> static tree handle_returns_twice_attribute (tree *, tree, tree,
>>>>> int,
>>>>> bool *);
>>>>> static tree handle_no_limit_stack_attribute (tree *, tree,
>>>>> tree,
>>>>> int,
>>>>> bool *);
>>>>> @@ -569,6 +570,8 @@ const struct attribute_spec
>>>>> c_common_attribute_table[] =
>>>>> handle_objc_nullability_attribute,
>>>>> NULL
>>>>> },
>>>>> { "*dealloc", 1, 2, true, false, false, false,
>>>>> handle_dealloc_attribute, NULL },
>>>>> + { "tainted", 0, 0, true, false, false, false,
>>>>> + handle_tainted_attribute, NULL },
>>>>> { NULL, 0, 0, false, false, false, false,
>>>>> NULL, NULL }
>>>>> };
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -5857,6 +5860,39 @@ handle_objc_nullability_attribute (tree
>>>>> *node,
>>>>> tree name, tree args,
>>>>> return NULL_TREE;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/* Handle a "tainted" attribute; arguments as in
>>>>> + struct attribute_spec.handler. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static tree
>>>>> +handle_tainted_attribute (tree *node, tree name, tree, int,
>>>>> + bool *no_add_attrs)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + if (TREE_CODE (*node) != FUNCTION_DECL
>>>>> + && TREE_CODE (*node) != FIELD_DECL)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + warning (OPT_Wattributes, "%qE attribute ignored; valid
>>>>> only "
>>>>> + "for functions and function pointer fields",
>>>>> + name);
>>>>> + *no_add_attrs = true;
>>>>> + return NULL_TREE;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (TREE_CODE (*node) == FIELD_DECL
>>>>> + && !(TREE_CODE (TREE_TYPE (*node)) == POINTER_TYPE
>>>>> + && TREE_CODE (TREE_TYPE (TREE_TYPE (*node))) ==
>>>>> FUNCTION_TYPE))
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + warning (OPT_Wattributes, "%qE attribute ignored;"
>>>>> + " field must be a function pointer",
>>>>> + name);
>>>>> + *no_add_attrs = true;
>>>>> + return NULL_TREE;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + *no_add_attrs = false; /* OK */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return NULL_TREE;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> /* Attempt to partially validate a single attribute ATTR as if
>>>>> it were to be applied to an entity OPER. */
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/doc/extend.texi b/gcc/doc/extend.texi
>>>>> index 5a6ef464779..826bbd48e7e 100644
>>>>> --- a/gcc/doc/extend.texi
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/doc/extend.texi
>>>>> @@ -2465,7 +2465,8 @@ variable declarations (@pxref{Variable
>>>>> Attributes}),
>>>>> labels (@pxref{Label Attributes}),
>>>>> enumerators (@pxref{Enumerator Attributes}),
>>>>> statements (@pxref{Statement Attributes}),
>>>>> -and types (@pxref{Type Attributes}).
>>>>> +types (@pxref{Type Attributes}),
>>>>> +and on field declarations (for @code{tainted}).
>>>>>
>>>>> There is some overlap between the purposes of attributes and
>>>>> pragmas
>>>>> (@pxref{Pragmas,,Pragmas Accepted by GCC}). It has been
>>>>> @@ -3977,6 +3978,25 @@ addition to creating a symbol version (as
>>>>> if
>>>>> @code{"@var{name2}@@@var{nodename}"} was used) the version will
>>>>> be
>>>>> also used
>>>>> to resolve @var{name2} by the linker.
>>>>>
>>>>> +@item tainted
>>>>> +@cindex @code{tainted} function attribute
>>>>> +The @code{tainted} attribute is used to specify that a function
>>>>> is
>>>>> called
>>>>> +in a way that requires sanitization of its arguments, such as a
>>>>> system
>>>>> +call in an operating system kernel. Such a function can be
>>>>> considered part
>>>>> +of the ``attack surface'' of the program. The attribute can be
>>>>> used
>>>>> both
>>>>> +on function declarations, and on field declarations containing
>>>>> function
>>>>> +pointers. In the latter case, any function used as an
>>>>> initializer
>>>>> of
>>>>> +such a callback field will be treated as tainted.
>>>>> +
>>>>> +The analyzer will pay particular attention to such functions
>>>>> when
>>>>> both
>>>>> +@option{-fanalyzer} and @option{-fanalyzer-checker=taint} are
>>>>> supplied,
>>>>> +potentially issuing warnings guarded by
>>>>> +@option{-Wanalyzer-exposure-through-uninit-copy},
>>>>> +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-allocation-size},
>>>>> +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-array-index},
>>>>> +@option{Wanalyzer-tainted-offset},
>>>>> +and @option{Wanalyzer-tainted-size}.
>>>>> +
>>>>> @item target_clones (@var{options})
>>>>> @cindex @code{target_clones} function attribute
>>>>> The @code{target_clones} attribute is used to specify that a
>>>>> function
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-1.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-1.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..cc4d5900372
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-1.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#include "analyzer-decls.h"
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct arg_buf
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + int i;
>>>>> + int j;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Example of marking a function as tainted. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void __attribute__((tainted))
>>>>> +test_1 (int i, void *p, char *q)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* There should be a single enode,
>>>>> + for the "tainted" entry to the function. */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1
>>>>> processed
>>>>> enode" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", *q); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + struct arg_buf *args = p;
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->i); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->j); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Example of marking a callback field as tainted. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct s2
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + void (*cb) (int, void *, char *)
>>>>> + __attribute__((tainted));
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Function not marked as tainted. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void
>>>>> +test_2a (int i, void *p, char *q)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* There should be a single enode,
>>>>> + for the normal entry to the function. */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1
>>>>> processed
>>>>> enode" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'start'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'start'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'start'" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + struct arg_buf *args = p;
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->i); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "state:
>>>>> 'start'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->j); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "state:
>>>>> 'start'" } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Function referenced via t2b.cb, marked as "tainted". */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void
>>>>> +test_2b (int i, void *p, char *q)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* There should be two enodes
>>>>> + for the direct call, and the "tainted" entry to the
>>>>> function.
>>>>> */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "2
>>>>> processed
>>>>> enodes" } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Callback used via t2c.cb, marked as "tainted". */
>>>>> +void
>>>>> +__analyzer_test_2c (int i, void *p, char *q)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* There should be a single enode,
>>>>> + for the "tainted" entry to the function. */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1
>>>>> processed
>>>>> enode" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct s2 t2b =
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + .cb = test_2b
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct s2 t2c =
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + .cb = __analyzer_test_2c
>>>>> +};
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-misuses.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-misuses.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..6f4cbc82efb
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted-misuses.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
>>>>> +int not_a_fn __attribute__ ((tainted)); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "'tainted'
>>>>> attribute ignored; valid only for functions and function pointer
>>>>> fields" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct s
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + int f __attribute__ ((tainted)); /* { dg-warning "'tainted'
>>>>> attribute ignored; field must be a function pointer" } */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-
>>>>> 1.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..fe6c7ebbb1f
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
>>>>> +/* "The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
>>>>> in
>>>>> the
>>>>> + Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not
>>>>> properly
>>>>> + restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which
>>>>> allows
>>>>> + local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel
>>>>> memory
>>>>> via
>>>>> + a crafted call."
>>>>> +
>>>>> + Fixed in 3d0475119d8722798db5e88f26493f6547a4bb5b on linux-
>>>>> 2.6.39.y
>>>>> + in linux-stable. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option:
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#include "analyzer-decls.h"
>>>>> +#include "test-uaccess.h"
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/linkage.h. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define asmlinkage
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/syscalls.h. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL1(t1, a1) t1 a1
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL2(t2, a2, ...) t2 a2, __SC_DECL1(__VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL3(t3, a3, ...) t3 a3, __SC_DECL2(__VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL4(t4, a4, ...) t4 a4, __SC_DECL3(__VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL5(t5, a5, ...) t5 a5, __SC_DECL4(__VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +#define __SC_DECL6(t6, a6, ...) t6 a6, __SC_DECL5(__VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...) \
>>>>> + __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define SYSCALL_DEFINE(name) asmlinkage long sys_##name
>>>>> +#define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name,
>>>>> ...) \
>>>>> + asmlinkage __attribute__((tainted)) \
>>>>> + long sys##name(__SC_DECL##x(__VA_ARGS__))
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(5, _##name,
>>>>> __VA_ARGS__)
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from arch/alpha/include/asm/hwrpb.h. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct hwrpb_struct {
>>>>> + unsigned long phys_addr; /* check: physical
>>>>> address of
>>>>> the hwrpb */
>>>>> + unsigned long id; /* check: "HWRPB\0\0\0"
>>>>> */
>>>>> + unsigned long revision;
>>>>> + unsigned long size; /* size of hwrpb */
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +extern struct hwrpb_struct *hwrpb;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user
>>>>> *,
>>>>> buffer,
>>>>> + unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void
>>>>> __user *, arg)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", nbytes); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "tainted" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* TODO: should have an event explaining why "nbytes" is
>>>>> treated as
>>>>> + attacker-controlled. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* case GSI_GET_HWRPB: */
>>>>> + if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
>>>>> + return -1;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", nbytes); /* {
>>>>> dg-
>>>>> warning "has_lb" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0) /*
>>>>> {
>>>>> dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'nbytes' as size
>>>>> without
>>>>> upper-bounds checking" } */
>>>>> + return -2;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return 1;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* With the fix for the sense of the size comparison. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo_fixed, unsigned long, op, void
>>>>> __user
>>>>> *, buffer,
>>>>> + unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void
>>>>> __user *, arg)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* case GSI_GET_HWRPB: */
>>>>> + if (nbytes > sizeof(*hwrpb))
>>>>> + return -1;
>>>>> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0) /*
>>>>> {
>>>>> dg-bogus "attacker-controlled" } */
>>>>> + return -2;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return 1;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-
>>>>> 1.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..0b9a94a8d6c
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
>>>>> +/* See notes in this header. */
>>>>> +#include "taint-CVE-2020-13143.h"
>>>>> +
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct configfs_attribute {
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> + ssize_t (*store)(struct config_item *, const char *,
>>>>> size_t)
>>>>> /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) field 'store' of 'struct
>>>>> configfs_attribute'
>>>>> is marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> + __attribute__((tainted)); /* (this is added). */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +static inline struct gadget_info *to_gadget_info(struct
>>>>> config_item
>>>>> *item)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + return container_of(to_config_group(item), struct
>>>>> gadget_info, group);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static ssize_t gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store(struct config_item
>>>>> *item,
>>>>> + const char *page, size_t len)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct gadget_info *gi = to_gadget_info(item);
>>>>> + char *name;
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#if 0
>>>>> + /* FIXME: this is the fix. */
>>>>> + if (strlen(page) < len)
>>>>> + return -EOVERFLOW;
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +
>>>>> + name = kstrdup(page, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>>> + if (!name)
>>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>>> + if (name[len - 1] == '\n') /* { dg-warning "use of
>>>>> attacker-
>>>>> controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds
>>>>> checking" } */
>>>>> + name[len - 1] = '\0'; /* { dg-warning "use of
>>>>> attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without
>>>>> upper-
>>>>> bounds checking" } */
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */ \
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +CONFIGFS_ATTR(gadget_dev_desc_, UDC); /* { dg-message "\\(2\\)
>>>>> function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as initializer for
>>>>> field
>>>>> 'store' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-
>>>>> 2.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..e05da9276c1
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
>>>>> +/* See notes in this header. */
>>>>> +#include "taint-CVE-2020-13143.h"
>>>>> +
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct configfs_attribute {
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> + ssize_t (*store)(struct config_item *, const char *,
>>>>> size_t)
>>>>> /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) field 'store' of 'struct
>>>>> configfs_attribute'
>>>>> is marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> + __attribute__((tainted)); /* (this is added). */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Highly simplified version. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static ssize_t gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store(struct config_item
>>>>> *item,
>>>>> + const char *page, size_t len)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* TODO: ought to have state_change_event talking about
>>>>> where
>>>>> the tainted value comes from. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + char *name;
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + name = kstrdup(page, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>>> + if (!name)
>>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>>> + if (name[len - 1] == '\n') /* { dg-warning "use of
>>>>> attacker-
>>>>> controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds
>>>>> checking" } */
>>>>> + name[len - 1] = '\0'; /* { dg-warning "use of
>>>>> attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without
>>>>> upper-
>>>>> bounds checking" } */
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +CONFIGFS_ATTR(gadget_dev_desc_, UDC); /* { dg-message "\\(2\\)
>>>>> function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as initializer for
>>>>> field
>>>>> 'store' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..0ba023539af
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
>>>>> +/* Shared header for the various taint-CVE-2020-13143.h tests.
>>>>> +
>>>>> + "gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store in drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c
>>>>> in
>>>>> the
>>>>> + Linux kernel 3.16 through 5.6.13 relies on kstrdup without
>>>>> considering
>>>>> + the possibility of an internal '\0' value, which allows
>>>>> attackers
>>>>> to
>>>>> + trigger an out-of-bounds read, aka CID-15753588bcd4."
>>>>> +
>>>>> + Fixed by 15753588bcd4bbffae1cca33c8ced5722477fe1f on linux-
>>>>> 5.7.y
>>>>> + in linux-stable. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#include <stddef.h>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/uapi/asm-generic/posix_types.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +typedef unsigned int __kernel_size_t;
>>>>> +typedef int __kernel_ssize_t;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/types.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +//typedef __kernel_size_t size_t;
>>>>> +typedef __kernel_ssize_t ssize_t;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/kernel.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define container_of(ptr, type, member)
>>>>> ({ \
>>>>> + void *__mptr = (void
>>>>> *)(ptr); \
>>>>> + /* [...snip...]
>>>>> */ \
>>>>> + ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); })
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/configfs.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct config_item {
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct config_group {
>>>>> + struct config_item cg_item;
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static inline struct config_group *to_config_group(struct
>>>>> config_item *item)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + return item ? container_of(item,struct
>>>>> config_group,cg_item)
>>>>> : NULL;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define CONFIGFS_ATTR(_pfx, _name) \
>>>>> +static struct configfs_attribute _pfx##attr_##_name = { \
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */ \
>>>>> + .store = _pfx##_name##_store, \
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define __force
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/asm-generic/errno-base.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define ENOMEM 12 /* Out of memory */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/types.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define __bitwise__
>>>>> +typedef unsigned __bitwise__ gfp_t;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/gfp.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define ___GFP_WAIT 0x10u
>>>>> +#define ___GFP_IO 0x40u
>>>>> +#define ___GFP_FS 0x80u
>>>>> +#define __GFP_WAIT ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_WAIT)
>>>>> +#define __GFP_IO ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_IO)
>>>>> +#define __GFP_FS ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_FS)
>>>>> +#define GFP_KERNEL (__GFP_WAIT | __GFP_IO | __GFP_FS)
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler_attributes.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define __malloc
>>>>> __attribute__((__malloc__))
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from include/linux/string.h */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* Adapted from drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct gadget_info {
>>>>> + struct config_group group;
>>>>> + /* [...snip...] */ \
>>>>> +};
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..4c567b2ffdf
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option:
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#include "analyzer-decls.h"
>>>>> +#include <stdio.h>
>>>>> +#include <stdlib.h>
>>>>> +#include <string.h>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* malloc with tainted size from a syscall. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void *p;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void __attribute__((tainted))
>>>>> +test_1 (size_t sz) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) function 'test_1'
>>>>> marked
>>>>> with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* TODO: should have a message saying why "sz" is tainted,
>>>>> e.g.
>>>>> + "treating 'sz' as attacker-controlled because 'test_1' is
>>>>> marked with '__attribute__((tainted))'" */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + p = malloc (sz); /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled
>>>>> value
>>>>> 'sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "warning"
>>>>> } */
>>>>> + /* { dg-message "\\(\[0-9\]+\\) use of attacker-controlled
>>>>> value
>>>>> 'sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "final
>>>>> event"
>>>>> { target *-*-* } .-1 } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c
>>>>> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 00000000000..f52cafcd71d
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
>>>>> +// TODO: remove need for this option:
>>>>> +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#include "analyzer-decls.h"
>>>>> +#include <stdio.h>
>>>>> +#include <stdlib.h>
>>>>> +#include <string.h>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +/* malloc with tainted size from a syscall. */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +struct arg_buf
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + size_t sz;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void *p;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +void __attribute__((tainted))
>>>>> +test_1 (void *data) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) function 'test_1'
>>>>> marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted\\)\\)'" } */
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* we should treat pointed-to-structs as tainted. */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", data); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + struct arg_buf *args = data;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args); /* { dg-warning "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->sz); /* { dg-warning
>>>>> "state:
>>>>> 'tainted'" } */
>>>>> +
>>>>> + p = malloc (args->sz); /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-
>>>>> controlled
>>>>> value '\\*args.sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds
>>>>> checking"
>>>>> "warning" } */
>>>>> + /* { dg-message "\\(\[0-9\]+\\) use of attacker-controlled
>>>>> value
>>>>> '\\*args.sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking"
>>>>> "final
>>>>> event" { target *-*-* } .-1 } */
>>>>> +}
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-13 19:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-13 20:37 [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1a/6] RFC: Implement "#pragma GCC custom_address_space" David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1b/6] Add __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-12-09 22:54 ` Martin Sebor
2022-01-06 15:10 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-06 18:59 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/6] Add returns_zero_on_success/failure attributes David Malcolm
2021-11-15 7:03 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-15 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-15 22:30 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-15 22:12 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-17 9:23 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-17 22:43 ` Joseph Myers
2021-11-18 20:08 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:45 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-19 21:52 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:34 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-06 18:34 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-18 23:15 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 4a/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of custom address spaces David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 4b/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 5/6] analyzer: use region::untrusted_p in taint detection David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 6/6] Add __attribute__ ((tainted)) David Malcolm
2022-01-06 14:08 ` PING (C/C++): " David Malcolm
2022-01-10 21:36 ` PING^2 " David Malcolm
2022-01-12 4:36 ` Jason Merrill
2022-01-12 15:33 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-13 19:08 ` Jason Merrill [this message]
2022-01-14 1:25 ` [committed] Add __attribute__ ((tainted_args)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 23:20 ` [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-14 2:54 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-14 13:54 ` Miguel Ojeda
2021-12-06 18:12 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-06 19:40 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 0:06 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-09 0:41 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 16:42 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-09 23:40 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-08 23:11 ` David Malcolm
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