From: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
To: Martin Sebor <msebor@gmail.com>
Cc: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>,
gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 17:40:48 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211209234048.GY614@gate.crashing.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5453a10-193d-855d-8f7c-97651a1c8135@gmail.com>
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 09:42:04AM -0700, Martin Sebor wrote:
> On 12/6/21 12:40 PM, Segher Boessenkool wrote:
> >Named address spaces are completely target-specific.
>
> My understanding of these kernel/user address spaces that David
> is adding for the benefit of the analyzer is that the correspond
> to what TR 18037 calls nested namespaces. They're nested within
> the generic namespace that's a union of the twp. With that, I'd
> expect them to be fully handled early on and be transparent
> afterwards. Is implementing this idea not feasible in the GCC
> design?
As long as you can explain it, it can be implemented. What I am saying
though is it is imnsho a very bad idea to try to implement this in terms
of named address spaces (which is a GCC extension).
Segher
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-09 23:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-13 20:37 [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1a/6] RFC: Implement "#pragma GCC custom_address_space" David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1b/6] Add __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-12-09 22:54 ` Martin Sebor
2022-01-06 15:10 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-06 18:59 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/6] Add returns_zero_on_success/failure attributes David Malcolm
2021-11-15 7:03 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-15 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-15 22:30 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-15 22:12 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-17 9:23 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-17 22:43 ` Joseph Myers
2021-11-18 20:08 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:45 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-19 21:52 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:34 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-06 18:34 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-18 23:15 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 4a/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of custom address spaces David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 4b/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 5/6] analyzer: use region::untrusted_p in taint detection David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 6/6] Add __attribute__ ((tainted)) David Malcolm
2022-01-06 14:08 ` PING (C/C++): " David Malcolm
2022-01-10 21:36 ` PING^2 " David Malcolm
2022-01-12 4:36 ` Jason Merrill
2022-01-12 15:33 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-13 19:08 ` Jason Merrill
2022-01-14 1:25 ` [committed] Add __attribute__ ((tainted_args)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 23:20 ` [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-14 2:54 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-14 13:54 ` Miguel Ojeda
2021-12-06 18:12 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-06 19:40 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 0:06 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-09 0:41 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 16:42 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-09 23:40 ` Segher Boessenkool [this message]
2021-12-08 23:11 ` David Malcolm
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