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From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>,
	mhiramat@kernel.org, linux-trace-devel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] tracing/user_events: Limit showing event names to CAP_SYS_ADMIN users
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 11:57:19 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220312115719.996f8014b9a0aaf6f1cef52c@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220311210606.62d09579@rorschach.local.home>

Hi Beau,

On Fri, 11 Mar 2022 21:06:06 -0500
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:

> 
> [ Added Kees Cook ]
> 
> On Fri, 11 Mar 2022 17:05:09 -0800
> Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 05:01:40PM -0800, Beau Belgrave wrote:
> > > Show actual names only to CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable users.
> > > 
> > > When user_events are configured to have broader write access than
> > > default, this allows seeing names of events from other containers, etc.
> > > Limit who can see the actual names to prevent event squatting or
> > > information leakage.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
> > > ---
> > >  kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c | 8 +++++++-
> > >  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> > > index 2b5e9fdb63a0..fb9fb2071173 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> > > @@ -1480,6 +1480,9 @@ static int user_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
> > >  	struct user_event *user;
> > >  	char status;
> > >  	int i, active = 0, busy = 0, flags;
> > > +	bool show_names;
> > > +
> > > +	show_names = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> > >  
> > >  	mutex_lock(&reg_mutex);
> > >  
> > > @@ -1487,7 +1490,10 @@ static int user_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
> > >  		status = register_page_data[user->index];
> > >  		flags = user->flags;
> > >  
> > > -		seq_printf(m, "%d:%s", user->index, EVENT_NAME(user));
> > > +		if (show_names)
> > > +			seq_printf(m, "%d:%s", user->index, EVENT_NAME(user));
> > > +		else
> > > +			seq_printf(m, "%d:<hidden>", user->index);
> > >  
> > >  		if (flags != 0 || status != 0)
> > >  			seq_puts(m, " #");
> > > 
> > > base-commit: 864ea0e10cc90416a01b46f0d47a6f26dc020820
> > > -- 
> > > 2.17.1  
> > 
> > I wanted to get some comments on this.

I think this is a bit add-hoc. We may need more generic way to hide the
event name from someone (who?) Is it enough to hide only event name?

> > I think for scenarios where
> > user_events is used in a heavy cgroup environment, that we need to have
> > some tracing cgroup awareness.

Would you mean to hide the event name from other cgroups or you need a
filter depends on cgroup/namespace?

As far as I know, current ftrace interface doesn't care about namespace
nor cgroups. It expects to be used outside of cgroups/namespace because
most of the events are for tracing kernel.(except for uprobe events until
user-events is introduced)

I think the easiest option is to introduce a new event filter rule based
on the container (cgroup path or namespace inode). With such filter
you can trace one container application from *outside* of the container.

For tracing from inside a container, I think you may need a mount option
to expose only 'container-local' events and buffer.
If you want only limits the buffer, it will be something like this;

container$ mount -o instance=foo tracefs /sys/kernel/trace

(Note that this may expose the *kernel* events to the containers.
 we should hide those by default)

But limits (and hide) the user-defined events, we have to consider about
namespace confliction. Maybe we can assign a random group name for user
events when mounting the tracefs.

> > Has this come up before? I would like to only show user_events that have
> > been created in the current cgroup (and below) like perf_events do for
> > capturing.
> 
> I added Kees because he had issues with capabilities in the past wrt
> tracing. Talking with him was one of the reasons I decided to push the
> file permissions for who has what access.
> 
> > 
> > I would also like to get to a point where we can limit how many events
> > each cgroup can register under user_events.

I think that requires to extend cgroups itself, something like trace-cgroup,
because it is a bit odd to limit resouces by ftrace itself based on cgroups.
(cgroup is the resouce control group)

> > 
> > To me, this sounds like a large feature that requires some alignment for
> > getting tracing cgroup aware.
> 
> At the moment I do not have a use case in mind to evaluate the
> situation. But understanding more about how this will be used by a
> broader audience would be useful.

Yeah, this is a good & interesting discussion topic :-)

Thank you,


> 
> -- Steve


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-12  2:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-12  1:01 [RFC PATCH] tracing/user_events: Limit showing event names to CAP_SYS_ADMIN users Beau Belgrave
2022-03-12  1:05 ` Beau Belgrave
2022-03-12  2:06   ` Steven Rostedt
2022-03-12  2:57     ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2022-03-14 17:06       ` Beau Belgrave
2022-03-16 14:20         ` Masami Hiramatsu

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