From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 13/38] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 13:34:57 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240621113706.315500-14-iii@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240621113706.315500-1-iii@linux.ibm.com>
Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().
There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object()
can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used
with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the
function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a
concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change
in the future.
Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls.
The downside is that init_object() is called from
free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the
distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
---
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 2 +-
mm/slub.c | 15 +++++++++++----
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 267d0afa2e8b..26d86dfdc819 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
return;
/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
- if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
+ if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return;
/*
* If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 1373ac365a46..1134091abac5 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1139,7 +1139,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
- memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
+ /*
+ * Here and below, avoid overwriting the KMSAN shadow. Keeping
+ * the shadow makes it possible to distinguish uninit-value
+ * from use-after-free.
+ */
+ memset_no_sanitize_memory(p - s->red_left_pad, val,
+ s->red_left_pad);
if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
/*
@@ -1152,12 +1158,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
}
if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
- memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
- p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END;
+ memset_no_sanitize_memory(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
+ memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size - 1, POISON_END, 1);
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
- memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
+ memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size, val,
+ s->inuse - poison_size);
}
static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data,
--
2.45.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-21 11:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-21 11:34 [PATCH v7 00/38] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 01/38] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 02/38] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 03/38] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 04/38] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 05/38] kmsan: Fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spaces Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 06/38] kmsan: Fix kmsan_copy_to_user() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 07/38] kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 08/38] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 09/38] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 10/38] kmsan: Export panic_on_kmsan Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 11/38] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 12/38] kmsan: Introduce memset_no_sanitize_memory() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 14/38] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:34 ` [PATCH v7 15/38] kmsan: Do not round up pg_data_t size Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 16/38] kmsan: Expose KMSAN_WARN_ON() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 17/38] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 18/38] mm: slub: Disable KMSAN when checking the padding bytes Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-24 7:34 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 19/38] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 20/38] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 21/38] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 22/38] s390/boot: Turn off KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 23/38] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 24/38] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 25/38] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 26/38] s390/cpacf: Unpoison the results of cpacf_trng() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 27/38] s390/cpumf: Unpoison STCCTM output buffer Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 28/38] s390/diag: Unpoison diag224() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 29/38] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 30/38] s390/irqflags: Do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 31/38] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 32/38] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 33/38] s390/traps: Unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 34/38] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 35/38] s390/uaccess: Add the missing linux/instrumented.h #include Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 36/38] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 37/38] s390/kmsan: Implement the architecture-specific functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 11:35 ` [PATCH v7 38/38] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-21 17:55 ` [PATCH v7 00/38] " Andrew Morton
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