From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>,
kees@kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net, wad@chromium.org,
mhiramat@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org, jolsa@kernel.org,
alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, olsajiri@gmail.com,
cyphar@cyphar.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, peterz@infradead.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, daniel@iogearbox.net,
ast@kernel.org, andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
rafi@rbk.io, shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 17:02:29 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250117170229.f1e1a9f03a8547d31cd875db@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250117013927.GB2610@redhat.com>
On Fri, 17 Jan 2025 02:39:28 +0100
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 01/16, Eyal Birger wrote:
> >
> > Fixes: ff474a78cef5 ("uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe")
> > Reported-by: Rafael Buchbinder <rafi@rbk.io>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHsH6Gs3Eh8DFU0wq58c_LF8A4_+o6z456J7BidmcVY2AqOnHQ@mail.gmail.com/
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ...
> > @@ -1359,6 +1359,11 @@ int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> > this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
> > syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > + if (unlikely(this_syscall == __NR_uretprobe) && !in_ia32_syscall())
> > + return 0;
> > +#endif
>
> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>
>
> A note for the seccomp maintainers...
>
> I don't know what do you think, but I agree in advance that the very fact this
> patch adds "#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64" into __secure_computing() doesn't look nice.
>
Indeed. in_ia32_syscall() depends arch/x86 too.
We can add an inline function like;
``` uprobes.h
static inline bool is_uprobe_syscall(int syscall)
{
// arch_is_uprobe_syscall check can be replaced by Kconfig,
// something like CONFIG_ARCH_URETPROBE_SYSCALL.
#ifdef arch_is_uprobe_syscall
return arch_is_uprobe_syscall(syscall)
#else
return false;
#endif
}
```
and
``` arch/x86/include/asm/uprobes.h
#define arch_is_uprobe_syscall(syscall) \
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && syscall == __NR_uretprobe && !in_ia32_syscall())
```
> The problem is that we need a simple patch for -stable which fixes the real
> problem. We can cleanup this logic later, I think.
Hmm, at least we should make it is_uprobe_syscall() in uprobes.h so that
do not pollute the seccomp subsystem with #ifdef.
Thank you,
>
> Oleg.
>
--
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-17 8:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-17 0:55 [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 1:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 8:02 ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2025-01-17 13:36 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 14:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 17:51 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-17 19:24 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 19:34 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-18 15:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 18:34 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2025-01-17 18:52 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-18 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-18 20:31 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-01-18 20:45 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19 2:24 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-19 3:39 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19 10:44 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-20 21:34 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:24 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:33 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:39 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 14:38 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 14:47 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 16:16 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 16:44 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-21 16:55 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 22:38 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-21 22:46 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 23:13 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 23:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-19 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-01-19 12:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 15:28 ` Oleg Nesterov
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