From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Cc: luto@amacapital.net, wad@chromium.org, oleg@redhat.com,
ldv@strace.io, mhiramat@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org,
jolsa@kernel.org, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com,
olsajiri@gmail.com, cyphar@cyphar.com, songliubraving@fb.com,
yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, peterz@infradead.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, daniel@iogearbox.net,
ast@kernel.org, andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
rafi@rbk.io, shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 11:43:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202501271142.71C1B5EE6@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHsH6GtPBt329FeN7K4X4Hqc_uZ=a8uofDN15mqqC4obQ-RK5g@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jan 27, 2025 at 11:39:44AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 27, 2025 at 11:33 AM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jan 27, 2025 at 11:24:02AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> > > Hi Kees,
> > >
> > > On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 1:34 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Jan 18, 2025 at 07:39:25PM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> > > > > Alternatively, maybe this syscall implementation should be reverted?
> > > >
> > > > Honestly, that seems the best choice. I don't think any thought was
> > > > given to how it would interact with syscall interposers (including
> > > > ptrace, strict mode seccomp, etc).
> > >
> > > I don't know if you noticed Andrii's and others' comments on this [1].
> > >
> > > Given that:
> > > - this issue requires immediate remediation
> > > - there seems to be pushback for reverting the syscall implementation
> > > - filtering uretprobe is not within the capabilities of seccomp without this
> > > syscall (so reverting the syscall is equivalent to just passing it through
> > > seccomp)
> > >
> > > is it possible to consider applying this current fix, with the possibility of
> > > extending seccomp in the future to support filtering uretprobe if deemed
> > > necessary (for example by allowing userspace to define a stricter policy)?
> >
> > I still think this is a Docker problem, but I agree that uretprobe
> > without syscall is just as unfilterable as seccomp ignoring the syscall.
> >
> > Can you please update the patch to use the existing action_cache bitmaps
> > instead of adding an open-coded check? We can consider adding
> > syscall_restart to this as well in the future...
>
> I can. The main difference as far as I can tell is that it would not
> apply to strict mode. Is that OK? it means that existing binaries using
> strict mode would still crash if uretprobe is attached to them.
Ah, good point. Please also add it to mode1_syscalls for strict. :)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-27 19:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-17 0:55 [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 1:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 8:02 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2025-01-17 13:36 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 14:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 17:51 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-17 19:24 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 19:34 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-18 15:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 18:34 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2025-01-17 18:52 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-18 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-18 20:31 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-01-18 20:45 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19 2:24 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-19 3:39 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19 10:44 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-20 21:34 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:24 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:33 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:39 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:43 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-01-21 14:38 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 14:47 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 16:16 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 16:44 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-21 16:55 ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 22:38 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-21 22:46 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 23:13 ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 23:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-19 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-01-19 12:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 15:28 ` Oleg Nesterov
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