From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 706102E6CA8; Thu, 19 Feb 2026 18:45:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1771526703; cv=none; b=TB1QvRbdvaG8uIIcCd4Zcu9CD38a+5Sv2LV7Axq9OfrnLPHFt5dHfZVZur6TBtISCJikq8eIKM2LCdbxTqECi9UpEmuD6NTPW8InYIYjQFCGrwNgBJm7lw9rM8cof9dQMaiWH+Npy2L3h5+r2b5jcqUuGcxEDTrMHlYapzF93W8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1771526703; c=relaxed/simple; bh=1R8lbLSCOatiPuEN/qf0w4tw6ht2YTutQWzQMSFN9gU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=lqwv/MVFNC5LWcYtGQO5nHnxtR6/OgTjdsz7ecRL8jHDw1vrdjuI2L+drjA6C6RF0xpdZzoh/dqFz3YIXCeVd2DUWElfmWqh+lp/apeBG9KkuLpEEMRSeQh9fy0xBczHai4bMA0wtsRQzcngUe95IoErrDNPlFRC3QAPfn+XU8c= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ExjfXhuF; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ExjfXhuF" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DC3E5C2BCB0; Thu, 19 Feb 2026 18:45:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1771526703; bh=1R8lbLSCOatiPuEN/qf0w4tw6ht2YTutQWzQMSFN9gU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=ExjfXhuFWoHI7QM2AfW+f+YRaTO7Wr+j1OM1uMSeoqWNj8gY0r4xnWCaS7ZU0sxCG zRbDxldW8ji1Ay1gZeGpAdNcPCOgy2uaXbSANC8PObncTo+xg3awAq+f+6Q85hu4Yi wNJiNg8AHKMIkBWDnCgzHXnCViwJu6s56aXJzTBqVp18gFZHh/vkExfWTcc0uE45r/ h91cXYfEpjbgYvzKcqLVBVeVgbHw6krZvM7ycZ2/HQmeutkrAo9NBTe3Seop1Nt0ea oqU7PnoDQqlMIryTUGpB/eMdZD7dQWOVnlVTLKULs80xgNOHF+8NQm9lMWAQF3wv2U hbc7kazo9F9bw== Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 10:45:02 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: Steven Rostedt Cc: Dave Hansen , "Elly I. Esparza" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Naveen N Rao , "David S. Miller" , Masami Hiramatsu , linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: Prevent syscall hooking Message-ID: <202602191041.4CB9C4AAFD@keescook> References: <20260218144735.24307-1-ellyesparza8@gmail.com> <0c5396b5-f084-4ade-adc9-029037031eea@intel.com> <20260218105204.3af7251e@gandalf.local.home> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260218105204.3af7251e@gandalf.local.home> On Wed, Feb 18, 2026 at 10:52:04AM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote: > Honesty, if you are worried about this, just run LOCKDOWN on tracing, and > prevent *ALL* kprobes. Because yes, there's a 1000 ways to get this > information once you have kprobes enabled and have root access. This patch > is hurting legitimate debugging of running systems more than it is limiting > rootkits from hacking the kernel. Yeah, I agree. If kprobes is available, there is a lot of harm an attacker can already do. If a bright line between root/ring-0 is desired, a system needs to be configured to be using lockdown or similar things to turn off the interfaces that let root write to kernel state. -- Kees Cook