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From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
To: maz@kernel.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org, arnd@arndb.de, nathan@kernel.org,
	 linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	 kernel-team@android.com,
	Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] tracing: Generate undef symbols allowlist for simple_ring_buffer
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 10:58:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260313105829.1214123-1-vdonnefort@google.com> (raw)

Compiler and tooling-generated symbols are difficult to maintain
across all supported architectures. Make the allowlist more robust by
replacing the harcoded list with a mechanism that automatically detects
these symbols.

This mechanism generates a C function designed to trigger common
compiler-inserted symbols.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>

---

Changes in v2:

  - Use filechk (Nathan)
  - Removed deprecated extra-y (Nathan)
  - Added simple_ring_buffer in allowlist (Nathan)
  - Added memcpy() to generate more symbols (Nathan)
  - Added __sancov 

diff --git a/kernel/trace/Makefile b/kernel/trace/Makefile
index beb15936829d..96627a909ecc 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/trace/Makefile
@@ -136,17 +136,42 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACE_REMOTE_TEST) += remote_test.o
 # simple_ring_buffer is used by the pKVM hypervisor which does not have access
 # to all kernel symbols. Fail the build if forbidden symbols are found.
 #
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST := memset alt_cb_patch_nops __x86 __ubsan __asan __kasan __gcov __aeabi_unwind
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST += __stack_chk_fail stackleak_track_stack __ref_stack __sanitizer llvm_gcda llvm_gcov
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST += .TOC\. __clear_pages_unrolled __memmove copy_page warn_slowpath_fmt
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST += ftrace_likely_update __hwasan_load __hwasan_store __hwasan_tag_memory
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST += warn_bogus_irq_restore __stack_chk_guard
-UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST := $(addprefix -e , $(UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST))
+# undefsyms_base generates a set of compiler and tooling-generated symbols that can
+# safely be ignored for simple_ring_buffer.
+#
+filechk_undefsyms_base = \
+	echo '$(pound)include <linux/atomic.h>'; \
+	echo '$(pound)include <linux/string.h>'; \
+	echo '$(pound)include <asm/page.h>'; \
+	echo 'static char page[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);'; \
+	echo 'void undefsyms_base(void *p, int n);'; \
+	echo 'void undefsyms_base(void *p, int n) {'; \
+	echo '	char buffer[256] = { 0 };'; \
+	echo '	u32 u = 0;'; \
+	echo '	memset((char * volatile)page, 8, PAGE_SIZE);'; \
+	echo '	memset((char * volatile)buffer, 8, sizeof(buffer));'; \
+	echo '	memcpy((void * volatile)p, buffer, sizeof(buffer));'; \
+	echo '	cmpxchg((u32 * volatile)&u, 0, 8);'; \
+	echo '	WARN_ON(n == 0xdeadbeef);'; \
+	echo '}'
+
+$(obj)/undefsyms_base.c: FORCE
+	$(call filechk,undefsyms_base)
+
+clean-files += undefsyms_base.c
+
+$(obj)/undefsyms_base.o: $(obj)/undefsyms_base.c
+
+targets += undefsyms_base.o
+
+UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST = __asan __gcov __kasan __kcsan __hwasan __sancov __sanitizer __tsan __ubsan __x86_indirect_thunk \
+		      simple_ring_buffer \
+		      $(shell $(NM) -u $(obj)/undefsyms_base.o 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $$2}')
 
 quiet_cmd_check_undefined = NM      $<
-      cmd_check_undefined = test -z "`$(NM) -u $< | grep -v $(UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST)`"
+      cmd_check_undefined = test -z "`$(NM) -u $< | grep -v $(addprefix -e , $(UNDEFINED_ALLOWLIST))`"
 
-$(obj)/%.o.checked: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
+$(obj)/%.o.checked: $(obj)/%.o $(obj)/undefsyms_base.o FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,check_undefined)
 
 always-$(CONFIG_SIMPLE_RING_BUFFER) += simple_ring_buffer.o.checked

base-commit: 33f2e266515717c4b2df585dadefa0525557726c
-- 
2.53.0.851.ga537e3e6e9-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2026-03-13 10:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-13 10:58 Vincent Donnefort [this message]
2026-03-13 16:37 ` [PATCH v2] tracing: Generate undef symbols allowlist for simple_ring_buffer Nathan Chancellor
2026-03-16  9:31   ` Vincent Donnefort

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