* [PATCH] lib/bootconfig: guard xbc_node_compose_key_after() buffer size
@ 2026-03-17 17:37 Josh Law
2026-03-17 18:02 ` Steven Rostedt
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Josh Law @ 2026-03-17 17:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Masami Hiramatsu, Andrew Morton
Cc: Steven Rostedt, linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel
xbc_node_compose_key_after() passes a size_t buffer length to
snprintf(), but snprintf() returns int. Guard against size values above
INT_MAX before the loop, then compare the returned length as size_t when
checking for truncation.
Add a small WARN_ON_ONCE shim for the tools/bootconfig userspace build
so the same source continues to build there.
Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
lib/bootconfig.c | 5 ++++-
tools/bootconfig/include/linux/bootconfig.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/bootconfig.c b/lib/bootconfig.c
index 96cbe6738ffe..bc6751b632e3 100644
--- a/lib/bootconfig.c
+++ b/lib/bootconfig.c
@@ -313,13 +313,16 @@ int __init xbc_node_compose_key_after(struct xbc_node *root,
if (!node && root)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(size > INT_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
while (--depth >= 0) {
node = xbc_nodes + keys[depth];
ret = snprintf(buf, size, "%s%s", xbc_node_get_data(node),
depth ? "." : "");
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (ret >= (int)size) {
+ if ((size_t)ret >= size) {
size = 0;
} else {
size -= (size_t)ret;
diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/include/linux/bootconfig.h b/tools/bootconfig/include/linux/bootconfig.h
index 6784296a0692..48383c10e036 100644
--- a/tools/bootconfig/include/linux/bootconfig.h
+++ b/tools/bootconfig/include/linux/bootconfig.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -19,6 +20,10 @@
((cond) ? printf("Internal warning(%s:%d, %s): %s\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, #cond) : 0)
+#ifndef WARN_ON_ONCE
+#define WARN_ON_ONCE(cond) WARN_ON(cond)
+#endif
+
#define unlikely(cond) (cond)
/* Copied from lib/string.c */
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] lib/bootconfig: guard xbc_node_compose_key_after() buffer size
2026-03-17 17:37 [PATCH] lib/bootconfig: guard xbc_node_compose_key_after() buffer size Josh Law
@ 2026-03-17 18:02 ` Steven Rostedt
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Steven Rostedt @ 2026-03-17 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Josh Law
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu, Andrew Morton, linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel
On Tue, 17 Mar 2026 17:37:03 +0000
Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org> wrote:
> @@ -313,13 +313,16 @@ int __init xbc_node_compose_key_after(struct xbc_node *root,
> if (!node && root)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(size > INT_MAX))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> while (--depth >= 0) {
> node = xbc_nodes + keys[depth];
> ret = snprintf(buf, size, "%s%s", xbc_node_get_data(node),
> depth ? "." : "");
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
> - if (ret >= (int)size) {
> + if ((size_t)ret >= size) {
Hmm, if size can't be greater than INT_MAX, this code should be able to
stay the same.
-- Steve
> size = 0;
> } else {
> size -= (size_t)ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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