From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: Afi0 <capyenglishlite@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Race condition in __modify_ftrace_direct() between tmp_ops registration and direct_functions hash update
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 09:15:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260517091510.7ea4cd28@fedora> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEABq7fMcvHpp4+59Mt-QdgGNpWhOqrGWHKmy+qt3tJSYb69kg@mail.gmail.com>
Added Jiri as he works on this code.
On Sun, 17 May 2026 06:24:11 +0000
Afi0 <capyenglishlite@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi list,
>
> Apologies for initially sending only to Greg. Resending to the full list as
> requested.
> ------------------------------
>
> Component: kernel/trace/ftrace.c Function: __modify_ftrace_direct()
> Affected versions: Linux kernel 5.15+ Type: TOCTOU / Race condition CVSS
> 3.1: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - 7.8 (High)
>
> SUMMARY
>
> A race condition exists in __modify_ftrace_direct() between the
> registration of tmp_ops into ftrace_ops_list and the subsequent update of
> direct_functions hash entries. During this window, concurrent CPUs
> executing traced functions will read the stale direct call address via
> ftrace_find_rec_direct() and jump to it, while the caller may have already
> invalidated or freed the old trampoline memory.
What the above doesn't describe is how the direct was stale to begin
with. Before the assignment, it should be NULL and not a problem, and
if was being modified, the current trampoline that direct points to
should *NOT* be freed before calling this. Otherwise, that itself is a
bug.
-- Steve
>
> VULNERABLE CODE
>
> err = register_ftrace_function_nolock(&tmp_ops);[race window:
> ftrace_ops_list_func now active, direct_functions not yet
> updated]mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);entry->direct = addr; /* update
> happens here, too late */mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock);
>
> IMPACT
>
> CPU executing traced function reads stale direct_functions entry during the
> race window. arch_ftrace_set_direct_caller() redirects execution to
> potentially freed or invalidated trampoline memory. Use-after-free in
> executable code context on SMP systems.
>
> TRIGGER
>
> Requires CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN directly. Also reachable via BPF
> trampolines (kernel/bpf/trampoline.c calls __modify_ftrace_direct()
> internally) with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON, default in many CI/CD container
> runtimes. Live patching via klp_patch_func() also goes through this path.
>
> SUGGESTED FIX
>
> Update entry->direct under ftrace_lock BEFORE registering tmp_ops. Add
> smp_wmb() between the store and registration to ensure ordering on
> weakly-ordered architectures.
>
> Patch attached as 0001-ftrace-fix-race-in-__modify_ftrace_direct.patch
>
> Fixes: 0567d6809440 ("ftrace: Add modify_ftrace_direct()")
>
> Thanks,
>
> Afi0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-17 13:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-17 6:24 Race condition in __modify_ftrace_direct() between tmp_ops registration and direct_functions hash update Afi0
2026-05-17 7:08 ` Greg KH
2026-05-17 13:15 ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
[not found] ` <CAEABq7dxnaLrTOhmD+tKnDenmZTUQD8sG=eoxe72mi_gwaus6g@mail.gmail.com>
2026-05-17 16:53 ` Steven Rostedt
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