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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Tengda Wu" <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>,
	"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] rethook: Remove the running task check in rethook_find_ret_addr()
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 01:50:31 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260610015032.4BFAA1F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260610013658.1837963-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Removing `task_is_running()` from `rethook_find_ret_addr()` exposes stack unwinders to use-after-free, wild pointer dereferences, and list corruption when unwinding running tasks, because `rethook_node` recycling and unwinding lack adequate RCU synchronization.
--

commit 83e1fac9c64377191cc2b41ef9da781c46f1e95a
Author: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>

rethook: Remove the running task check in rethook_find_ret_addr()

This commit removes the task_is_running() check from rethook_find_ret_addr().
The commit message states the check is unnecessary because unwinders hold RCU
and rethook_node structures are RCU-freed. Callers are expected to provide
their own safe context.

> The iteration is already safe from crashes because
> unwind_next_frame() holds RCU and rethook_node structures are RCU-freed;
> even if the iteration goes off the rails and returns invalid information,
> it will not crash. Callers that require consistency must provide a safe
> context themselves.

[ ... ]

> diff --git a/kernel/trace/rethook.c b/kernel/trace/rethook.c
> index 5a8bdf88999a9..1e7fdebe3cd5d 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/rethook.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/rethook.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -250,9 +251,6 @@ unsigned long rethook_find_ret_addr(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long frame
>  	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cur))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	if (tsk != current && task_is_running(tsk))
> -		return 0;
> -
>  	do {
>  		ret = __rethook_find_ret_addr(tsk, cur);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does removing this check entirely expose
the stack unwinders to a use-after-free and list corruption?

The commit message mentions that rethook_node structures are RCU-freed, but
looking at rethook_recycle(), the nodes appear to be immediately pushed back
to the lockless objpool without an RCU grace period:

kernel/trace/rethook.c:rethook_recycle() {
    ...
    objpool_push(node, &node->rethook->pool);
}

Additionally, while unwind_next_frame() does hold RCU for a single frame
iteration, stack unwinders like x86 ORC drop the read lock between frames:

arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c:unwind_next_frame() {
    ...
    guard(rcu)();
    ...
}

Because the unwinder retains the list cursor (*cur) across frame iterations
while RCU is dropped, could unwinding a running task allow the target task
to recycle the node?

If the node is recycled and instantly reallocated to another task, the next
call to __rethook_find_ret_addr() would execute:

kernel/trace/rethook.c:__rethook_find_ret_addr() {
    ...
    node = node->next;

on a stale pointer. Could removing this check turn a theoretical race into
an easily triggered use-after-free when reading /proc/<pid>/stack for tasks
executing kretprobes?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260610013658.1837963-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-06-10  1:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-10  1:36 [PATCH v4] rethook: Remove the running task check in rethook_find_ret_addr() Tengda Wu
2026-06-10  1:50 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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