From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 11/20] landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain tracepoint
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:11:43 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260722171159.2776765-12-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260722171159.2776765-1-mic@digikod.net>
The landlock_create_domain event records that a domain was created,
once, before thread-sync. It cannot tell which threads end up enforcing
it: a successful landlock_restrict_self(2) with
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC applies the domain to the caller and every
eligible sibling. Creation (the operation) and enforcement (the
per-thread outcome) are distinct.
Add landlock_enforce_domain(domain, complete, process_wide), emitted
once per thread the domain is applied to, strictly after that thread's
commit_creds(), so it fires only for a thread that is enforcing the
domain, never speculatively; an aborted operation emits none. The
lifecycle now reads create -> enforce* -> free.
The two booleans name properties, not the implementation:
- complete: marks the single event that concludes the operation. It
names the outcome, the set is now enforced, not which thread
finishes, which the contract leaves unspecified.
- process_wide: means every eligible thread of the process is
covered. It is set race-free by either establishing path,
thread-sync or a single-threaded process, so
complete && process_wide is the whole-process-enforced guarantee.
The requesting thread and source ruleset are not repeated here: they are
on create_domain (joined via domain->hierarchy->id) and on the immutable
domain->hierarchy->details. Source ruleset means the ruleset_id and
ruleset_version recorded on create_domain, not the ruleset object, which
the caller may close before enforcement.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v2:
- New patch.
---
include/trace/events/landlock.h | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 13 ++++++++-
security/landlock/tsync.c | 15 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
index cb0e21a2fa1f..7f221d8fff38 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/landlock.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
@@ -289,6 +289,58 @@ TRACE_EVENT(landlock_create_domain,
__entry->ruleset_id, __entry->ruleset_version)
);
+/**
+ * landlock_enforce_domain - Domain enforced on a thread
+ *
+ * @domain: Domain now enforced on the current thread (never NULL,
+ * immutable; read locklessly). Correlate to
+ * landlock_create_domain via @domain->hierarchy->id for the
+ * source ruleset and requesting thread, or read
+ * @domain->hierarchy->details for the requesting process.
+ * @complete: Set on the single event that concludes the operation, after
+ * all its other enforcements; filter on it for one event per
+ * operation.
+ * @process_wide: The enforcement covers every eligible (non-exiting)
+ * thread of the process: set when the caller used
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC or the process is
+ * single-threaded. A lone thread whose group still
+ * holds a zombie leader is not counted single-threaded,
+ * so process_wide == 0 never proves the opposite.
+ *
+ * Emitted for each thread sys_landlock_restrict_self() enforces the
+ * domain on, in that thread's own context, right after its
+ * commit_creds(), so it fires only once the thread is irreversibly
+ * enforcing the domain (aborted operations emit none). Not
+ * balanced; every enforcement falls between the domain's
+ * landlock_create_domain and landlock_free_domain events.
+ *
+ * @complete == 1 && @process_wide == 1 means the whole process is
+ * sandboxed by @domain, durably (Landlock domains are monotonic and
+ * inherited on :manpage:`clone(2)`).
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(landlock_enforce_domain,
+
+ TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_domain *domain, bool complete,
+ bool process_wide),
+
+ TP_ARGS(domain, complete, process_wide),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field( __u64, domain_id )
+ __field( bool, complete )
+ __field( bool, process_wide )
+ ),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->domain_id = domain->hierarchy->id;
+ __entry->complete = complete;
+ __entry->process_wide = process_wide;
+ ),
+
+ TP_printk("domain=%llx complete=%d process_wide=%d",
+ __entry->domain_id, __entry->complete, __entry->process_wide)
+);
+
/**
* landlock_free_domain - Domain freed
*
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 7a1ec140cf14..bf838f65b060 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -539,6 +540,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
struct landlock_domain *new_dom = NULL;
struct cred *new_cred;
struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred;
+ bool process_wide;
bool __maybe_unused log_same_exec, log_new_exec, log_subdomains,
prev_log_subdomains;
@@ -677,5 +679,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
}
}
- return commit_creds(new_cred);
+ /* Whole process: thread-sync swept siblings, or single-threaded. */
+ process_wide = (flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) ||
+ get_nr_threads(current) == 1;
+ commit_creds(new_cred);
+
+ /* The caller commits last, so its event concludes the operation. */
+ if (ruleset)
+ trace_landlock_enforce_domain(new_dom, true, process_wide);
+
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/tsync.c b/security/landlock/tsync.c
index c5730bbd9ed3..b7de4f9624c7 100644
--- a/security/landlock/tsync.c
+++ b/security/landlock/tsync.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include "cred.h"
#include "tsync.h"
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
/*
* Shared state between multiple threads which are enforcing Landlock rulesets
* in lockstep with each other.
@@ -78,6 +80,8 @@ struct tsync_work {
*/
static void restrict_one_thread(struct tsync_shared_context *ctx)
{
+ const struct landlock_domain *new_dom =
+ landlock_cred(ctx->new_cred)->domain;
int err;
struct cred *cred = NULL;
@@ -146,6 +150,17 @@ static void restrict_one_thread(struct tsync_shared_context *ctx)
commit_creds(cred);
+ /*
+ * Emitted strictly after commit_creds() and before the out: label, so
+ * it fires only for a thread now enforcing new_dom, and every
+ * non-concluding (complete == false) event happens-before the
+ * operation's single concluding one. Skipped on the flags-only path,
+ * where old_cred and new_cred carry the same domain. A sibling never
+ * concludes the operation and its enforcement is always process-wide.
+ */
+ if (new_dom != landlock_cred(ctx->old_cred)->domain)
+ trace_landlock_enforce_domain(new_dom, false, true);
+
out:
/* Notify the calling thread once all threads are done */
if (atomic_dec_return(&ctx->num_unfinished) == 0)
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-22 17:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-22 17:11 [PATCH v3 00/20] Landlock tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 01/20] landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 02/20] landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 03/20] landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 04/20] landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 05/20] landlock: Decouple the per-denial logging decision from CONFIG_AUDIT Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 06/20] landlock: Consolidate access-right and scope names in a shared header Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 07/20] tracing: Add __print_untrusted_str() Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 08/20] landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 09/20] landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 10/20] landlock: Add create_domain and free_domain tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 12/20] landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 13/20] landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 14/20] landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 15/20] selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 16/20] selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 17/20] selftests/landlock: Add network " Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 18/20] selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace " Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 19/20] selftests/landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain trace tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-07-22 17:11 ` [PATCH v3 20/20] landlock: Document tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
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