From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
To: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org,
mhiramat@kernel.org, outbounddisclosures@openai.com,
Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Validate user addresses in faultable buffer copies
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 15:52:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261006225221.54513-1-kylebot@openai.com> (raw)
Syscall entry tracing runs before the syscall implementation validates
its arguments. For a size-bearing user argument,
syscall_copy_user_array() passes the register-supplied pointer directly
to __copy_from_user(), which assumes the user address has already been
checked. On x86-64 this can copy mapped kernel memory into the raw event.
An unprivileged task can open a task-bound sys_enter_write perf event at
perf_event_paranoid=2 and disclose that memory with a write() that even
fails with EBADF.
Use copy_from_user() for each actual array pointer. Use it in the default
trace_user_fault_read() path as well: the original syscall-array tracing
implementation used that path, and the helper is documented to use
copy_from_user(). Keep the existing length limits and per-argument fault
handling, so valid user data is recorded as before and failed copies do
not contribute bytes to the event.
Fixes: b4f7624cfc94 ("tracing: Have system call events record user array data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 2 +-
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index e4a490d3d08c..07acbc44d99c 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -6263,7 +6263,7 @@ char *trace_user_fault_read(struct trace_user_buf_info *tinfo,
if (copy_func) {
ret = copy_func(buffer, ptr, size, data);
} else {
- ret = __copy_from_user(buffer, ptr, size);
+ ret = copy_from_user(buffer, ptr, size);
}
preempt_disable_notrace();
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
index e35744049e3f..d9190fdc030d 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int syscall_copy_user_array(char *buf, const char __user *ptr,
for (int i = 0; i < args->uargs; i++, buf += SYSCALL_FAULT_ARG_SZ) {
ptr = (char __user *)args->ptr_array[i];
- ret = __copy_from_user(buf, ptr, size);
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, ptr, size);
args->read[i] = ret ? -1 : size;
}
return 0;
--
2.53.0
reply other threads:[~2026-10-06 22:52 UTC|newest]
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