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b=HW+yfUaX+/lIhY4sYOK5uaxOty5cWXQg+1734RRldPHoe5aexYk/uv+Y89HaUPuJjw ik85he7xX3utiZ0rS3naDHha2JambdUx00JEuMYhUQt54gKjk8fML39nhfilnzUyfqOi nEL8t2dHPIz7hAtSUC3J1SOVKItGGT/9IbsWrVsArKKRJz8HgT3hMLv1PcFRajYzhme+ LYgb69Py4V/rG9DMMKiQPXX9WeebYRCTZKyB85UR/wOcfW4TKyyqBa6BRNmteCBtjHLs E4jZnJ5ghryy6nRi+eEDRGqBl7u0y1TBeT1u8Z93YDp3lM3JlqxoUk3Tmb2j3Ps5PDJ8 j0Cg== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AKwUvBw7geYQHjoH620oBr31Fqz8b6x4cDGzaYlfCaMZzWDQK1tWMnjGt765eRd9KW7o55o7FtFzC47gsCnteqeLLT0KRRM=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AFq9FYKSsJmxIEectyex8GruusQW5vLMAogrwYGo8P2UFHP6iN2Xi5/C Vo1k5F30HeQ9F8kaup63yihYoP2wE9PsH+q347cjTmO/+LJZ5gq8KtVtZxsgft0WWMD92NFalOJ 3mbxX5JohwngtAJifyCo8ZQ== X-Received: from pjst21.prod.google.com ([2002:a17:90b:195:b0:3ab:3d7f:6c0c]) (user=jthoughton job=prod-delivery.src-stubby-dispatcher) by 2002:a17:90b:3ec7:b0:3ad:3715:d21 with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-3adeafb0481mr6464242a91.49.1793051572848; Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:52:52 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:52:22 +0000 In-Reply-To: <20261026215226.3713941-1-jthoughton@google.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20261026215226.3713941-1-jthoughton@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0.307.g5fe7bd680c-goog Message-ID: <20261026215226.3713941-7-jthoughton@google.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH 06/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on user copies when current->mm is NULL From: James Houghton To: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , Kees Cook , Arnd Bergmann , David Hildenbrand , Lorenzo Stoakes , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Mike Rapoport , Suren Baghdasaryan , Michal Hocko , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini , Jim Mattson , Jens Axboe , Pavel Begunkov , "James E.J. Bottomley" , "Martin K. Petersen" , David Sterba , Chris Mason , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , John Fastabend , Josh Poimboeuf , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Mathieu Desnoyers , Ingo Molnar , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Namhyung Kim , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Houghton Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Accessing user memory from a task that has no mm is always a bug. This can happen from a kernel thread that is not using kthread_use_mm(), or from a task that has already gone through exit_mm() (e.g. when the last reference to a file is dropped from task_work at exit). KVM has had bugs of exactly this kind, and other drivers may have them too. Such an access does not reliably fail. The user portion of the address space belongs to whatever mm happens to be lazily loaded, if any. If the access faults, the fault handler refuses to handle it and the copy fails, but if the page is already mapped, the copy silently reads or writes another task's memory. Add uaccess_should_fail(), which combines the existing should_fail_usercopy() fault injection check with a WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm), and use it in place of every should_fail_usercopy() call. The user copy is then refused as if it had failed, so no access to user memory takes place. This covers copy_{to,from}_user() on all architectures, including the masked user access paths that never call access_ok(), and the __copy_{to,from}_user() variants used by KVM's guest memory accessors. It also covers __copy_to_user_inatomic() (and so copy_to_user_nofault()), the user-backed iov_iter copy routines and strncpy_from_user(). Paths that never called should_fail_usercopy() are not covered, e.g. __copy_from_user_inatomic(), copy_from_user_nofault(), strnlen_user(), get_user()/put_user(), clear_user() and unsafe_*() accesses within user_access_begin() sections. Signed-off-by: James Houghton --- include/linux/uaccess.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- lib/iov_iter.c | 6 +++--- lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h index eddbbb65ccc4..8ab24e706a22 100644 --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -50,6 +50,23 @@ #define mask_user_address(src) (src) #endif +/* + * Return true if a user copy must not be attempted, either because a failure + * is being injected, or because the current task has no mm. + * + * Accessing user memory without an mm (e.g. from a kernel thread that is not + * using kthread_use_mm(), or from a task that has already gone through + * exit_mm()) is always a bug: the user portion of the address space belongs to + * whatever mm happens to be lazily loaded, if any, so the access could + * silently hit another task's memory. + */ +static __always_inline bool uaccess_should_fail(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm)) + return true; + return should_fail_usercopy(); +} + /* * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user()) * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and @@ -114,7 +131,7 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) might_fault(); instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n); - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return n; check_object_size(to, n, false); res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n); @@ -138,7 +155,7 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return n; instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n); check_object_size(from, n, true); @@ -149,7 +166,7 @@ static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { might_fault(); - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return n; instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n); check_object_size(from, n, true); @@ -167,7 +184,7 @@ _inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { unsigned long res = n; might_fault(); - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) goto fail; if (can_do_masked_user_access()) from = mask_user_address(from); @@ -195,7 +212,7 @@ static inline __must_check unsigned long _inline_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { might_fault(); - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return n; if (access_ok(to, n)) { instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n); diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c index 2072c04e99d0..3d6ecb50d778 100644 --- a/lib/iov_iter.c +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static __always_inline size_t copy_to_user_iter(void __user *iter_to, size_t progress, size_t len, void *from, void *priv2) { - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return len; if (access_ok(iter_to, len)) { from += progress; @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ size_t copy_to_user_iter_nofault(void __user *iter_to, size_t progress, { ssize_t res; - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return len; from += progress; @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ size_t copy_from_user_iter(void __user *iter_from, size_t progress, { size_t res = len; - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return len; if (can_do_masked_user_access()) { iter_from = mask_user_address(iter_from); diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c index 5bb752ff7c61..565b3125e752 100644 --- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c +++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count) unsigned long max_addr, src_addr; might_fault(); - if (should_fail_usercopy()) + if (uaccess_should_fail()) return -EFAULT; if (unlikely(count <= 0)) return 0; -- 2.56.0.307.g5fe7bd680c-goog