From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v3 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 20:11:45 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261027121151.1887650-13-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261027121151.1887650-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
The inode_set_acl, inode_get_acl and inode_remove_acl hooks receive a
struct path, so rename them to path_set_acl, path_get_acl and
path_remove_acl to follow the path_* naming convention used for the
other hooks that take a struct path (path_chmod, path_chown, ...).
Rename the security_inode_*_acl() inline wrappers to
security_path_*_acl() and the SELinux, Smack, EVM and IMA
implementations accordingly. The inode_post_set_acl and
inode_post_remove_acl notification hooks still take a dentry and keep
their names.
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
fs/posix_acl.c | 6 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 44 +++++++++++++--------------
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 26 ++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 20 ++++++------
security/security.c | 32 +++++++++----------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 ++++++++--------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 +++++++++----------
8 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 487e17e91e2b..5feeb651fa85 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
- error = security_inode_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, kacl, file);
+ error = security_path_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, kacl, file);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ struct posix_acl *vfs_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* The VFS has no restrictions on reading POSIX ACLs so calling
* something like xattr_permission() isn't needed. Only LSMs get a say.
*/
- error = security_inode_get_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, file);
+ error = security_path_get_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, file);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
- error = security_inode_remove_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, file);
+ error = security_path_remove_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, file);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 4f3d19bf4644..7602a3074375 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -173,15 +173,15 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, const struct path *path,
struct file_kattr *fa, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, const struct path *path,
struct file_kattr *fa, struct file *file)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_set_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_get_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
struct file *file)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_remove_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_remove_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index afbc12c6e614..305b92c0494c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -440,17 +440,17 @@ int security_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags,
struct file *file);
-int security_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl, struct file *file);
+int security_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl, struct file *file);
void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl);
-int security_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file);
-int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file);
+int security_path_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file);
+int security_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file);
void security_inode_post_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name);
@@ -1030,11 +1030,11 @@ static inline int security_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return cap_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags, file);
}
-static inline int security_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl,
- struct file *file)
+static inline int security_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl,
+ struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1044,18 +1044,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
struct posix_acl *kacl)
{ }
-static inline int security_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file)
+static inline int security_path_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file)
+static inline int security_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 025606fe5fe8..a0702eeba02b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* File: evm_main.c
* implements evm_path_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
- * evm_path_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
+ * evm_path_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_path_set_acl.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
#endif
/**
- * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * evm_path_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: pointer to the affected object
* @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -702,10 +702,10 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
*/
-static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
- struct file *file)
+static int evm_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
+ struct file *file)
{
enum integrity_status evm_status;
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * evm_path_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: pointer to the affected object
* @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -758,11 +758,11 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
*/
-static int evm_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int evm_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
- return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, NULL, file);
+ return evm_path_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, NULL, file);
}
static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
@@ -1217,9 +1217,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setxattr, evm_path_setxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, evm_path_set_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, evm_path_remove_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, evm_path_removexattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index c701dce1e837..8b12f73afa62 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -795,10 +795,10 @@ static int ima_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return result;
}
-static int ima_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
- struct file *file)
+static int ima_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
+ struct file *file)
{
if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(path->dentry), -1);
@@ -823,19 +823,19 @@ static int ima_path_removexattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return result;
}
-static int ima_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int ima_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
- return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, NULL, file);
+ return ima_path_set_acl(idmap, path, acl_name, NULL, file);
}
static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setxattr, ima_path_setxattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, ima_path_set_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, ima_path_removexattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, ima_path_remove_acl),
};
void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bca46f5444bd..13778c83fd3a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1969,7 +1969,7 @@ int security_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
+ * security_path_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: file (the VFS makes no guarantees with regard to @path->mnt)
* @acl_name: acl name
@@ -1981,14 +1981,14 @@ int security_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl, struct file *file)
+int security_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl, struct file *file)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, kacl,
- file);
+ return call_int_hook(path_set_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, kacl,
+ file);
}
/**
@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
}
/**
- * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
+ * security_path_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: file (the VFS makes no guarantees with regard to @path->mnt)
* @acl_name: acl name
@@ -2020,17 +2020,17 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file)
+int security_path_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, file);
+ return call_int_hook(path_get_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, file);
}
/**
- * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
+ * security_path_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: file (the VFS makes no guarantees with regard to @path->mnt)
* @acl_name: acl name
@@ -2041,13 +2041,13 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
- struct file *file)
+int security_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
+ struct file *file)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, file);
+ return call_int_hook(path_remove_acl, idmap, path, acl_name, file);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 62053a9f7d9e..e0aaaee537d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3477,24 +3477,24 @@ static int selinux_path_setxattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
&ad);
}
-static int selinux_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
- struct file *file)
+static int selinux_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
+ struct file *file)
{
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int selinux_path_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int selinux_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
@@ -7745,9 +7745,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, selinux_path_removexattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_getattr, selinux_inode_file_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_setattr, selinux_inode_file_setattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, selinux_path_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_get_acl, selinux_path_get_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, selinux_path_remove_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index eed06cf7af99..95a048bcf3a6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ static int smack_path_removexattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * smack_inode_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
+ * smack_path_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
* @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
* @path: the object
* @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -1560,10 +1560,10 @@ static int smack_path_removexattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
- struct file *file)
+static int smack_path_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl,
+ struct file *file)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * smack_path_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
* @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
* @path: the object
* @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -1585,9 +1585,9 @@ static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int smack_path_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * smack_path_remove_acl - Smack check for removing posix acls
* @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
* @path: the object
* @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -1609,9 +1609,9 @@ static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- const struct path *path,
- const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
+static int smack_path_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, struct file *file)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -5205,9 +5205,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getxattr, smack_path_getxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, smack_path_removexattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, smack_inode_set_acl),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, smack_inode_get_acl),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, smack_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, smack_path_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_get_acl, smack_path_get_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, smack_path_remove_acl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 11:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-27 12:11 [PATCH v3 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:48 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 13:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 15:01 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-10-28 10:51 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 13:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 09/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 14:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 11/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 14/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 15/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 14:49 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 15:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
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