From: Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 21:09:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4c426803-91f8-48fc-ae8e-20676479b370@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <143ca1aa-d053-4947-9817-72462876c224@gmail.com>
12 Mar 2026 21:08:03 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com>:
> 12 Mar 2026 21:06:31 Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>:
>
>> On Thu, 12 Mar 2026 19:11:42 +0000
>> Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
>>>
>>> The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write.
>>> While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds
>>> access (the previous call would have returned an error), the
>>> write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real
>>> out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.
>>>
>>> Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is
>>> self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.
>>
>> This is the only place that increments the index, and the check is >=,
>> which means even if there was just one space left, it would fail.
>>
>> As there's no other place that updates brace_index, I don't believe this
>> patch is needed. It could even replace the >= with ==.
>>
>> -- Steve
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
>>> ---
>>> lib/bootconfig.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/lib/bootconfig.c b/lib/bootconfig.c
>>> index a1e6a2e14b01..62b4ed7a0ba6 100644
>>> --- a/lib/bootconfig.c
>>> +++ b/lib/bootconfig.c
>>> @@ -532,9 +532,9 @@ static char *skip_spaces_until_newline(char *p)
>>> static int __init __xbc_open_brace(char *p)
>>> {
>>> /* Push the last key as open brace */
>>> - open_brace[brace_index++] = xbc_node_index(last_parent);
>>> if (brace_index >= XBC_DEPTH_MAX)
>>> return xbc_parse_error("Exceed max depth of braces", p);
>>> + open_brace[brace_index++] = xbc_node_index(last_parent);
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>
> That's a fair point, Steve. Given that brace_index isn't touched elsewhere and the current check effectively prevents the overflow, I agree this isn't strictly necessary. I'll drop this patch and stick with the fix for the off-by-one reporting error instead. Thanks for the feedback!
Wait Steve,
Thanks for the look. I see your point that it's currently redundant given the call patterns. It looks like Andrew has already merged this into the -mm tree, likely as a 'belt-and-suspenders' safety measure. I'll keep your feedback in mind for future cleanup, but I'm glad we got the other off-by-one fix in as well!
And in my opinion, merging it is a decent idea.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-12 21:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-12 19:11 [PATCH v2 0/3] lib/bootconfig: three bug fixes Josh Law
2026-03-12 19:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] lib/bootconfig: fix off-by-one in xbc_verify_tree() unclosed brace error Josh Law
2026-03-12 21:03 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-12 21:03 ` Josh Law
2026-03-13 1:39 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2026-03-12 19:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace() Josh Law
2026-03-12 21:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-12 21:08 ` Josh Law
2026-03-12 21:09 ` Josh Law [this message]
2026-03-12 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2026-03-12 21:30 ` Josh Law
2026-03-12 21:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-13 4:18 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2026-03-13 2:10 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2026-03-12 19:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] lib/bootconfig: fix snprintf truncation check in xbc_node_compose_key_after() Josh Law
2026-03-12 21:09 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-13 2:26 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2026-03-13 4:18 ` [PATCH] bootconfig: Add bootconfig tests about braces Masami Hiramatsu (Google)
2026-03-13 7:10 ` Josh Law
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