Linux Trace Kernel
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From: Linyu Yuan <quic_linyyuan@quicinc.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] trace: acquire buffer from temparary trace sequence
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 10:49:37 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5f37bdef-5447-8def-7bb0-a498879abc4c@quicinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230130213735.72cdcee4@gandalf.local.home>


On 1/31/2023 10:37 AM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 31 Jan 2023 10:06:22 +0800
> Linyu Yuan <quic_linyyuan@quicinc.com> wrote:
>
>> yes, agree it will be safe for dwc3, but i don't know if any possible
>> hacker,
>>
>> as the function always return a valid pointer even when hacker input a
>> large size.
> But gives a nice big warning if that's the case. This is not something that
> can be modified by user input. We do not need to worry about
> kernel implementations that could overflow (and trigger a WARN_ON() when
> they do). Especially since the max size is greater than the max size of the
> content of an event.
>
> A lot of systems that worry about hackers enable "panic_on_warn" which
> means that if the WARN_ON() triggers, the machine will crash, which will at
> most cause a DOS, but not something people can use to hack into the machine
> with.


thanks, please help review the change.


>
> -- Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-31  2:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-30  7:54 [PATCH v5] trace: acquire buffer from temparary trace sequence Linyu Yuan
2023-01-30 13:14 ` Linyu Yuan
2023-01-30 19:30   ` Steven Rostedt
2023-01-31  2:06     ` Linyu Yuan
2023-01-31  2:37       ` Steven Rostedt
2023-01-31  2:49         ` Linyu Yuan [this message]
2023-01-31  3:58           ` Steven Rostedt
2023-01-31  4:59             ` Linyu Yuan

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