From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 01/34] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func()
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 17:37:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6403223315eda4e8023a828d6f40353c694d474e.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240102101712.515e0fe3@gandalf.local.home>
On Tue, 2024-01-02 at 10:17 -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:24:21 +0100
> Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > Architectures use assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call
> > ftrace_ops_list_func(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view,
> > ftrace_regs is poisoned on ftrace_ops_list_func entry(). This
> > causes
> > KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite.
>
> BTW, why is this only a problem for s390 and no other architectures?
>
> If it is only a s390 thing, then we should do this instead:
>
> in include/linux/ftrace.h:
>
> /* Add a comment here to why this is needed */
> #ifndef ftrace_list_func_unpoison
> # define ftrace_list_func_unpoison(fregs) do { } while(0)
> #endif
>
> In arch/s390/include/asm/ftrace.h:
>
> /* Add a comment to why s390 is special */
> # define ftrace_list_func_unpoison(fregs)
> kmsan_unpoison_memory(fregs, sizeof(*fregs))
>
> >
> > Fix by trusting the architecture-specific assembly code and always
> > unpoisoning ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func.
> >
> > Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
>
> I'm taking my ack away for this change in favor of what I'm
> suggesting now.
>
> > Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 1 +
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
> > index 8de8bec5f366..dfb8b26966aa 100644
> > --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
> > @@ -7399,6 +7399,7 @@ __ftrace_ops_list_func(unsigned long ip,
> > unsigned long parent_ip,
> > void arch_ftrace_ops_list_func(unsigned long ip, unsigned long
> > parent_ip,
> > struct ftrace_ops *op, struct
> > ftrace_regs *fregs)
> > {
> > + kmsan_unpoison_memory(fregs, sizeof(*fregs));
>
> And here have:
>
> ftrace_list_func_unpoison(fregs);
>
> That way we only do it for archs that really need it, and do not
> affect
> archs that do not.
>
>
> I want to know why this only affects s390, because if we are just
> doing
> this because "it works", it could be just covering up a symptom of
> something else and not actually doing the "right thing".
>
>
> -- Steve
>
>
> > __ftrace_ops_list_func(ip, parent_ip, NULL, fregs);
> > }
> > #else
>
Ok, it has been a while, but I believe I have a good answer now. KMSAN
shadow for memory above $rsp is essentially random. Here is an example
(you'll need a GDB hack from [1] if you want to try this at home):
(gdb) x/5i do_nanosleep
0xffffffff843607c0 <do_nanosleep>: call 0xffffffffc0201000
Thread 3 hit Breakpoint 1, 0xffffffffc0201000 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/64bx kmsan_get_metadata($rsp - 64, 0)
0xffffd1000087bd38: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00
0xffffd1000087bd40: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00
0xffffd1000087bd48: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00
0xffffd1000087bd50: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xff 0xff
0xff 0xff
0xffffd1000087bd58: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00
0xffffd1000087bd60: 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff
0xff 0xff
0xffffd1000087bd68: 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff
0xff 0xff
0xffffd1000087bd70: 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff
0xff 0xff
So if assembly (in this case ftrace_regs_caller) allocates struct
pt_regs on stack, it may or may not be poisoned depending on what was
called before. So, by accident, on s390x it's poisoned and trips KMSAN,
and on x86_64 it's not. Based on this observation, I'd say we need
an unpoison call in all ftrace handlers (e.g., kprobe_ftrace_handler),
and not just this one.
But why is this the case? Kernel stacks are created by
alloc_thread_stack_node() using __vmalloc_node_range(__GFP_ZERO), so
they are fully unpoisoned. Then functions are called and return, their
locals are poisoned and unpoisoned. Interestingly enough, on return,
they are not poisoned back, even though
commit 37ad4ee8364255c73026a3c343403b5977fa7e79
Author: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Date: Thu Sep 15 17:04:13 2022 +0200
x86: kmsan: don't instrument stack walking functions
says they do. So what if we introduce that [2]?
# echo "p:nanosleep do_nanosleep %di"
>/sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events
# echo 1 >/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/nanosleep/enable
# sleep 1
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x5b9/0x790
kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x5b9/0x790
0xffffffffc02010de
do_nanosleep+0x5/0x670
hrtimer_nanosleep+0x169/0x3b0
common_nsleep+0xc7/0x100
__x64_sys_clock_nanosleep+0x4e2/0x650
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Local variable nd created at:
do_filp_open+0x3b2/0x5e0
Quite similar to s390. Local variable nd is a random leftover from a
different call stack, which the modified instrumentation poisoned on
return from do_filp_open().
Alexander, what do you think about adding [2] upstream as an option
that can be enabled from the command line? Also, what do you think
about poisoning kernel stacks? Formally they are zeroed out, but I
think valid code has no business reading these zeroes.
[1] https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=31878
[2]
https://github.com/iii-i/llvm-project/commits/msan-poison-allocas-before-returning-2024-06-12/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-12 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-13 23:24 [PATCH v3 00/34] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 01/34] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 15:17 ` Steven Rostedt
2024-06-12 15:37 ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/34] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 03/34] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 04/34] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 05/34] kmsan: Fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spaces Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 06/34] kmsan: Fix kmsan_copy_to_user() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 07/34] kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/34] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 09/34] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 10/34] kmsan: Export panic_on_kmsan Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 11/34] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 12/34] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 13/34] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 14/34] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 15/34] mm: slub: Unpoison the memchr_inv() return value Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 16:10 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 16/34] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 17/34] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-22 11:35 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 18/34] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 19/34] s390: Turn off KMSAN for boot, vdso and purgatory Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 20/34] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 21/34] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 22/34] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 23/34] s390/cpacf: Unpoison the results of cpacf_trng() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 14:34 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 24/34] s390/cpumf: Unpoison STCCTM output buffer Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-20 11:04 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-01-02 14:38 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 25/34] s390/diag: Unpoison diag224() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 14:56 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 26/34] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 14:56 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 27/34] s390/irqflags: Do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-22 11:27 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-01-02 15:01 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 28/34] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-21 12:14 ` Alexander Gordeev
2024-01-02 15:05 ` Heiko Carstens
2024-01-04 10:03 ` Alexander Gordeev
2024-01-04 11:34 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 29/34] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 15:05 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 30/34] s390/traps: Unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 15:06 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 31/34] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 32/34] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 15:09 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 33/34] s390: Implement the architecture-specific kmsan functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-20 11:27 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-01-02 15:14 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-12-13 23:24 ` [PATCH v3 34/34] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-01-02 15:15 ` Heiko Carstens
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=6403223315eda4e8023a828d6f40353c694d474e.camel@linux.ibm.com \
--to=iii@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=42.hyeyoo@gmail.com \
--cc=agordeev@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=borntraeger@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=elver@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=roman.gushchin@linux.dev \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=svens@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).