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AJvYcCWGkAiyoODhegMhpIvAqwOQeNgnLW02y7rYTUqAd13zyl8YBLLINsNppJCPrByrpKZf73TIZI2CW8OJCIn7nuaFohU=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yy8LPuGpuIqz92N4wJuV54rptSByS6whTh/TptakUgjdtWayD5z epZUi8AHgaO97Z1rd2CvNo7qInzZCfRIGtJQylLmzcNchWmLDGT0DAGlQhzobeWZ9iVkRGwG+70 WnQyvaeWmC6C+8xwz83yMmS8KmJcP3sWKK6UuV22/r2pKMJXA0dEe X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGzGAumkHrr2bDnkqRNDINvDYeTyLaFVCvxRDWY8NaodXVwMYUWwwjnEltyVzzl/ubtMR1u/3thAFVQbJZiYv0= X-Received: by 2002:a05:622a:11c8:b0:456:7228:c0a2 with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-4583efc8c1fmr3705951cf.13.1725985941140; Tue, 10 Sep 2024 09:32:21 -0700 (PDT) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20240906051205.530219-1-andrii@kernel.org> <20240906051205.530219-3-andrii@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: From: Suren Baghdasaryan Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 09:32:08 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] uprobes: add speculative lockless VMA-to-inode-to-uprobe resolution To: Andrii Nakryiko , Christian Brauner Cc: Jann Horn , Liam Howlett , Andrii Nakryiko , linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, oleg@redhat.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jolsa@kernel.org, paulmck@kernel.org, willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, mjguzik@gmail.com, Miklos Szeredi , Amir Goldstein , linux-fsdevel Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 2:29=E2=80=AFPM Andrii Nakryiko wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 6:13=E2=80=AFAM Jann Horn wrote= : > > > > On Fri, Sep 6, 2024 at 7:12=E2=80=AFAM Andrii Nakryiko wrote: > > > Given filp_cachep is already marked SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, we can safe= ly > > > access vma->vm_file->f_inode field locklessly under just rcu_read_loc= k() > > > > No, not every file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU - see for example > > ovl_mmap(), which uses backing_file_mmap(), which does > > vma_set_file(vma, file) where "file" comes from ovl_mmap()'s > > "realfile", which comes from file->private_data, which is set in > > ovl_open() to the return value of ovl_open_realfile(), which comes > > from backing_file_open(), which allocates a file with > > alloc_empty_backing_file(), which uses a normal kzalloc() without any > > RCU stuff, with this comment: > > > > * This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not= be > > * installed into file tables or such. > > > > And when a backing_file is freed, you can see on the path > > __fput() -> file_free() > > that files with FMODE_BACKING are directly freed with kfree(), no RCU d= elay. > > Good catch on FMODE_BACKING, I didn't realize there is this exception, th= anks! > > I think the way forward would be to detect that the backing file is in > FMODE_BACKING and fall back to mmap_lock-protected code path. > > I guess I have the question to Liam and Suren, do you think it would > be ok to add another bool after `bool detached` in struct > vm_area_struct (guarded by CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK), or should we try to > add an extra bit into vm_flags_t? The latter would work without > CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK, but I don't know what's acceptable with mm folks. > > This flag can be set in vma_set_file() when swapping backing file and > wherever else vma->vm_file might be set/updated (I need to audit the > code). I understand that this would work but I'm not very eager to leak vm_file attributes like FMODE_BACKING into vm_area_struct. Instead maybe that exception can be avoided? Treating all vm_files equally as RCU-safe would be a much simpler solution. I see that this exception was introduced in [1] and I don't know if this was done for performance reasons or something else. Christian, CCing you here to please clarify. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231005-sakralbau-wappnen-f5c31755ed70@bra= uner/ > > > > > So the RCU-ness of "struct file" is an implementation detail of the > > VFS, and you can't rely on it for ->vm_file unless you get the VFS to > > change how backing file lifetimes work, which might slow down some > > other workload, or you find a way to figure out whether you're dealing > > with a backing file without actually accessing the file. > > > > > +static struct uprobe *find_active_uprobe_speculative(unsigned long b= p_vaddr) > > > +{ > > > + const vm_flags_t flags =3D VM_HUGETLB | VM_MAYEXEC | VM_MAYSH= ARE; > > > + struct mm_struct *mm =3D current->mm; > > > + struct uprobe *uprobe; > > > + struct vm_area_struct *vma; > > > + struct file *vm_file; > > > + struct inode *vm_inode; > > > + unsigned long vm_pgoff, vm_start; > > > + int seq; > > > + loff_t offset; > > > + > > > + if (!mmap_lock_speculation_start(mm, &seq)) > > > + return NULL; > > > + > > > + rcu_read_lock(); > > > + > > > + vma =3D vma_lookup(mm, bp_vaddr); > > > + if (!vma) > > > + goto bail; > > > + > > > + vm_file =3D data_race(vma->vm_file); > > > > A plain "data_race()" says "I'm fine with this load tearing", but > > you're relying on this load not tearing (since you access the vm_file > > pointer below). > > You're also relying on the "struct file" that vma->vm_file points to > > being populated at this point, which means you need CONSUME semantics > > here, which READ_ONCE() will give you, and something like RELEASE > > semantics on any pairing store that populates vma->vm_file, which > > means they'd all have to become something like smp_store_release()). > > vma->vm_file should be set in VMA before it is installed and is never > modified afterwards, isn't that the case? So maybe no extra barrier > are needed and READ_ONCE() would be enough. > > > > > You might want to instead add another recheck of the sequence count > > (which would involve at least a read memory barrier after the > > preceding patch is fixed) after loading the ->vm_file pointer to > > ensure that no one was concurrently changing the ->vm_file pointer > > before you do memory accesses through it. > > > > > + if (!vm_file || (vma->vm_flags & flags) !=3D VM_MAYEXEC) > > > + goto bail; > > > > missing data_race() annotation on the vma->vm_flags access > > ack > > > > > > + vm_inode =3D data_race(vm_file->f_inode); > > > > As noted above, this doesn't work because you can't rely on having RCU > > lifetime for the file. One *very* ugly hack you could do, if you think > > this code is so performance-sensitive that you're willing to do fairly > > atrocious things here, would be to do a "yes I am intentionally doing > > a UAF read and I know the address might not even be mapped at this > > point, it's fine, trust me" pattern, where you use > > copy_from_kernel_nofault(), kind of like in prepend_copy() in > > fs/d_path.c, and then immediately recheck the sequence count before > > doing *anything* with this vm_inode pointer you just loaded. > > > > > > yeah, let's leave it as a very unfortunate plan B and try to solve it > a bit cleaner. > > > > > > > + vm_pgoff =3D data_race(vma->vm_pgoff); > > > + vm_start =3D data_race(vma->vm_start); > > > + > > > + offset =3D (loff_t)(vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + (bp_vaddr - vm_= start); > > > + uprobe =3D find_uprobe_rcu(vm_inode, offset); > > > + if (!uprobe) > > > + goto bail; > > > + > > > + /* now double check that nothing about MM changed */ > > > + if (!mmap_lock_speculation_end(mm, seq)) > > > + goto bail; > > > + > > > + rcu_read_unlock(); > > > + > > > + /* happy case, we speculated successfully */ > > > + return uprobe; > > > +bail: > > > + rcu_read_unlock(); > > > + return NULL; > > > +}