From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 16:44:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1791526.rYj1Ea3vWT@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Wednesday, November 05, 2014 03:42:48 PM David Howells wrote:
> Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub
> discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
> the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index e66314138b38..f3fe7dbbf741 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3142,6 +3142,19 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
> *inode, u32 *secid) *secid = isec->sid;
> }
>
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry
> ...*dst,
> + const char *name, void *value, size_t *size)
> +{
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
> + return 1; /* Discard */
I understand that this is just a stub, but I we need to discuss this at some
point and I figure better in this patch than elsewhere where it might get
lost.
For the docker, context= mount use case (similar to SELinux/sVirt) dropping
the SELinux xattr is probably an okay behavior. However, I would expect that
ultimately this is something we would want to control by policy and/or the
presence of a context= label.
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* file security operations */
>
> static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -5868,6 +5881,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
> .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
> .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
> + .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up,
> + .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
>
> .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
> .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
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> majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-11-07 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-05 15:42 [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 14:49 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 21:22 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:10 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:28 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2014-11-07 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:05 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:45 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2014-11-07 21:44 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2014-11-07 22:08 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 4/7] Security: Pass the union-layer file path into security_file_open() David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 12:03 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:34 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25 ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30 ` David Howells
2015-06-15 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 9:41 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 21:34 ` David Howells
2015-06-17 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 10:15 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:26 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 17:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-27 14:17 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 7/7] SELinux: Check against union and lower labels for file ops on lower files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 18:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 15:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 18:54 ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-09 1:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-10 13:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
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