Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file

Eric W. Biederman
2021-08-20T14:36:33Z

David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> writes:

> On 19.08.21 22:51, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> So I like this series.
>>
>> However, logically, I think this part in replace_mm_exe_file() no
>> longer makes sense:
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 12:50 PM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> + /* Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. */
>>> + old_exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
>>> + if (old_exe_file) {
>>> + mmap_read_lock(mm);
>>> + for (vma = mm->mmap; vma && !ret; vma = vma->vm_next) {
>>> + if (!vma->vm_file)
>>> + continue;
>>> + if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
>>> + &old_exe_file->f_path))
>>> + ret = -EBUSY;
>>> + }
>>> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
>>> + fput(old_exe_file);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>> + }
>>
>> and should just be removed.
>>
>> NOTE! I think it makes sense within the context of this patch (where
>> you just move code around), but that it should then be removed in the
>> next patch that does that "always deny write access to current MM
>> exe_file" thing.
>>
>> I just quoted it in the context of this patch, since the next patch
>> doesn't actually show this code any more.
>>
>> In the *old* model - where the ETXTBUSY was about the mmap() of the
>> file - the above tests make sense.
>>
>> But in the new model, walking the mappings just doesn't seem to be a
>> sensible operation any more. The mappings simply aren't what ETXTBUSY
>> is about in the new world order, and so doing that mapping walk seems
>> nonsensical.
>>
>> Hmm?
>
> I think this is somewhat another kind of "stop user space trying
> to do stupid things" thingy, not necessarily glued to ETXTBUSY:
> don't allow replacing exe_file if that very file is still mapped
> and consequently eventually still in use by the application.
>
> I don't think it necessarily has many things to do with ETXTBUSY:
> we only check if there is a VMA mapping that file, not that it's
> a VM_DENYWRITE mapping.
>
> That code originates from
>
> commit 4229fb1dc6843c49a14bb098719f8a696cdc44f8
> Author: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
> Date: Wed Jul 11 14:02:11 2012 -0700
>
> c/r: prctl: less paranoid prctl_set_mm_exe_file()
>
> "no other files mapped" requirement from my previous patch (c/r: prctl:
> update prctl_set_mm_exe_file() after mm->num_exe_file_vmas removal) is too
> paranoid, it forbids operation even if there mapped one shared-anon vma.
> Let's check that current mm->exe_file already unmapped, in this case
> exe_file symlink already outdated and its changing is reasonable.
>
>
> The statement "exe_file symlink already outdated and its
> changing is reasonable" somewhat makes sense.
>
>
> Long story short, I think this check somehow makes a bit of sense, but
> we wouldn't lose too much if we drop it -- just another sanity check.
>
> Your call :)

There has been quite a bit of conversation of the years about how bad is
it to allow changing /proc/self/exe as some userspace depends on it.

I think this check is there to keep from changing /proc/self/exe
arbitrarily.

Maybe it is all completely silly and we should not care about the code
that thinks /proc/self/exe is a reliable measure of anything, but short
of that I think we should either keep the code or put in some careful
thought as to which restrictions make sense when changing
/proc/self/exe.

Eric