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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: "Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Nathaniel McCallum" <nathaniel@profian.com>,
	"Reinette Chatre" <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Thomas Bogendoerfer" <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	"Florian Fainelli" <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
	"Matthew Auld" <matthew.auld@intel.com>,
	"Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>,
	"Daniel Vetter" <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	"Jason Ekstrand" <jason@jlekstrand.net>,
	"Chris Wilson" <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>,
	"Maarten Lankhorst" <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Tvrtko Ursulin" <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>,
	"Vasily Averin" <vvs@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Shakeel Butt" <shakeelb@google.com>,
	"Mike Kravetz" <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	"Alexey Gladkov" <legion@kernel.org>,
	zhangyiru <zhangyiru3@huawei.com>,
	"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
	dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc()
Date: Sun,  6 Mar 2022 07:32:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220306053211.135762-3-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220306053211.135762-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be
used in the implementation for MAP_POPULATE, which requires to allocate
new enclave pages.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 38 ---------------------------------
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 89aeed798ffb..79e39bd99c09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -914,6 +914,44 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  unsigned long offset,
+					  u64 secinfo_flags)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	unsigned long prot;
+
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+	prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ)  |
+	       _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+	       _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+
+	/*
+	 * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+	 * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+	 * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+	 */
+	if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+		prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+
+	/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same
+	 * as the maximum protection bits.
+	 */
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
+	return encl_page;
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave
  * @encl: the enclave
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index 1b6ce1da7c92..3df0d3faf3a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
 int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				  struct sgx_encl_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  unsigned long offset,
+					  u64 secinfo_flags);
 void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void);
 unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index d8c3c07badb3..3e3ca27a6f72 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -169,44 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						 unsigned long offset,
-						 u64 secinfo_flags)
-{
-	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
-	unsigned long prot;
-
-	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!encl_page)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
-	encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
-	encl_page->encl = encl;
-
-	prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ)  |
-	       _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
-	       _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
-
-	/*
-	 * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
-	 * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
-	 * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
-		prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
-
-	/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
-	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
-
-	/*
-	 * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same
-	 * as the maximum protection bits.
-	 */
-	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits;
-
-	return encl_page;
-}
-
 static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
 {
 	u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
-- 
2.35.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-06  5:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-06  5:32 [PATCH RFC 0/3] MAP_POPULATE for device memory Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06  5:32 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] mm: Add f_ops->populate() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 10:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-06 17:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 17:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 22:43       ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-03-07 13:16         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 13:26           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06  5:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-03-06  5:32 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement EAUG population with MAP_POPULATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06  8:30 ` [PATCH RFC 0/3] MAP_POPULATE for device memory David Laight
2022-03-06 16:52   ` 'Jarkko Sakkinen'
2022-03-06 11:33 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-03-07  7:48   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-07 13:29     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 15:56       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-07 15:58         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 22:11         ` David Laight
2022-03-08 10:10           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 10:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-03-07 14:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 14:33     ` David Hildenbrand
2022-03-07 15:49       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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