Re: [PATCH v1 0/7] Remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE

Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-12T17:35:47Z

On Thu, Aug 12, 2021, at 10:32 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> writes:
>
> > This series is based on v5.14-rc5 and corresponds code-wise to the
> > previously sent RFC [1] (the RFC still applied cleanly).
> >
> > This series removes all in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE from the kernel
> > and removes VM_DENYWRITE. We stopped supporting MAP_DENYWRITE for
> > user space applications a while ago because of the chance for DoS.
> > The last renaming user is binfmt binary loading during exec and
> > legacy library loading via uselib().
> >
> > With this change, MAP_DENYWRITE is effectively ignored throughout the
> > kernel. Although the net change is small, I think the cleanup in mmap()
> > is quite nice.
> >
> > There are some (minor) user-visible changes with this series:
> > 1. We no longer deny write access to shared libaries loaded via legacy
> > uselib(); this behavior matches modern user space e.g., via dlopen().
> > 2. We no longer deny write access to the elf interpreter after exec
> > completed, treating it just like shared libraries (which it often is).
> > 3. We always deny write access to the file linked via /proc/pid/exe:
> > sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) will fail if write access to the file
> > cannot be denied, and write access to the file will remain denied
> > until the link is effectivel gone (exec, termination,
> > PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) -- just as if exec'ing the file.
> >
> > I was wondering if we really care about permanently disabling write access
> > to the executable, or if it would be good enough to just disable write
> > access while loading the new executable during exec; but I don't know
> > the history of that -- and it somewhat makes sense to deny write access
> > at least to the main executable. With modern user space -- dlopen() -- we
> > can effectively modify the content of shared libraries while being
> > used.
>
> So I think what we really want to do is to install executables with
> and shared libraries without write permissions and immutable. So that
> upgrades/replacements of the libraries and executables are forced to
> rename or unlink them. We need the immutable bit as CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
> aka being root ignores the writable bits when a file is opened for
> write. However CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE does not override the immutable state
> of a file.

If we really want to do this, I think we'd want a different flag that's more like sealed. Non-root users should be able to do this, too.

Or we could just more gracefully handle users that overwrite running programs.

--Andy