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* [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow
@ 2023-01-03  9:17 Szymon Heidrich
  2023-01-03  9:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Szymon Heidrich @ 2023-01-03  9:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni
  Cc: szymon.heidrich, linux-usb, netdev, linux-kernel

Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function
are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their
value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large
value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass
the implemented validation step. Consequently the response
pointer will be referring to a location past the expected
buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via
RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.

Fixes: ddda08624013 ("USB: rndis_host, various cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
index f79333fe1..7b3739b29 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
@@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf,
 
 	off = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->offset);
 	len = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->len);
-	if (unlikely((8 + off + len) > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE))
+	if (unlikely((off > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8) ||
+		     (len > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8 - off)))
 		goto response_error;
 
 	if (*reply_len != -1 && len != *reply_len)
-- 
2.39.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow
  2023-01-03  9:17 [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow Szymon Heidrich
@ 2023-01-03  9:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2023-01-03  9:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Szymon Heidrich
  Cc: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, linux-usb, netdev, linux-kernel

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master)
by David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>:

On Tue,  3 Jan 2023 10:17:09 +0100 you wrote:
> Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function
> are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their
> value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large
> value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass
> the implemented validation step. Consequently the response
> pointer will be referring to a location past the expected
> buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via
> RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/c7dd13805f8b

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2023-01-03  9:17 [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow Szymon Heidrich
2023-01-03  9:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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