From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Peter Chen <hzpeterchen@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
USB list <linux-usb@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: USB: core: prevent malicious bNumInterfaces overflow
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 08:51:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171213075107.GA23219@kroah.com> (raw)
On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 09:27:42AM +0800, Peter Chen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 02:25:13PM -0500, Alan Stern wrote:
> > A malicious USB device with crafted descriptors can cause the kernel
> > to access unallocated memory by setting the bNumInterfaces value too
> > high in a configuration descriptor. Although the value is adjusted
> > during parsing, this adjustment is skipped in one of the error return
> > paths.
> >
> > This patch prevents the problem by setting bNumInterfaces to 0
> > initially. The existing code already sets it to the proper value
> > after parsing is complete.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
> > Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> > CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> >
> > ---
> >
> >
> > [as1855]
> >
> >
> > drivers/usb/core/config.c | 4 +++-
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > Index: usb-4.x/drivers/usb/core/config.c
> > ===================================================================
> > --- usb-4.x.orig/drivers/usb/core/config.c
> > +++ usb-4.x/drivers/usb/core/config.c
> > @@ -555,6 +555,9 @@ static int usb_parse_configuration(struc
> > unsigned iad_num = 0;
> >
> > memcpy(&config->desc, buffer, USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE);
> > + nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
> > + config->desc.bNumInterfaces = 0; // Adjusted later
> > +
>
> The comment format?
Is fine, I've given up that fight :)
greg k-h
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next reply other threads:[~2017-12-13 7:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-13 7:51 Greg KH [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-12-13 15:30 USB: core: prevent malicious bNumInterfaces overflow Alan Stern
2017-12-13 11:28 Greg KH
2017-12-13 1:27 Peter Chen
2017-12-12 19:25 Alan Stern
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