[v3,2/2] usb: misc: xapea00x: perform platform initialization of TPM

[Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>]

On Tue, May 08, 2018 at 10:29:41AM -0500, David R. Bild wrote:
> On Tue, May 8, 2018 at 10:25 AM, James Bottomley
> <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 04, 2018 at 02:56:25PM -0500, David R. Bild wrote:
> > [...]
> > > > In particular, it sets the credentials for the platform hierarchy.
> > > > The platform hierarchy is essentially the "root" account of the
> > > > TPM, so it's critical that those credentials be set before the TPM
> > > > is exposed to user-space.  (The platform credentials aren't
> > > > persisted in the TPM and must be set by the platform on every
> > > > boot.)  If the driver registers the TPM before doing
> > > > initialization, there's a chance that something else could access
> > > > the TPM before the platform credentials get set.
> >
> > I don't see any reason to set an unreachable password for the platform
> > hierarchy if the UEFI didn't.  If the desire is to disable the platform
> > hierarchy, then it should be disabled, not have a random password set.
> 
> "Set random password and throw away the key" was my way of disabling
> the platform hierarchy.  Is there a better way of doing that?
> 
> > I'd also say this is probably the job of early boot based on policy.
> 
> Agreed.  And since this card has no "early boot", the driver/kernel
> need to do it.
> 
> Best,
> David

Who is able to test these changes if we even consider pulling them?
I do not have such a card so it will be hard to accept also given
that it is more intrusive change than usual.

/Jarkko
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