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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 14sm93977517pfy.40.2019.08.08.13.27.08 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Thu, 08 Aug 2019 13:27:08 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 13:27:07 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Matthew Wilcox Cc: syzbot , allison@lohutok.net, andreyknvl@google.com, cai@lca.pw, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, tglx@linutronix.de, Jiri Kosina Subject: Re: BUG: bad usercopy in hidraw_ioctl Message-ID: <201908081319.E2123D5A@keescook> References: <000000000000ce6527058f8bf0d0@google.com> <20190807195821.GD5482@bombadil.infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190807195821.GD5482@bombadil.infradead.org> Sender: linux-usb-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 12:58:21PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 12:28:06PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from wrapped address > > (offset 0, size 0)! > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:98! > > This report is confusing because the arguments to usercopy_abort() are wrong. > > /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */ > if (ptr + n < ptr) > usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n); This test actually contains an off-by-one which was recently fixed: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1564509253-23287-1-git-send-email-isaacm@codeaurora.org/ So, this is actually a false positive if "ptr + n" yields a 0 (e.g. 0xffffffff + 1 == 0). > ptr + n is not 'size', it's what wrapped. I don't know what 'offset' > should be set to, but 'size' should be 'n'. Presumably we don't want to > report 'ptr' because it'll leak a kernel address ... reporting 'n' will Right, I left offset 0 (this is normally the offset into a reported area like a specific kmalloc region, but isn't meaningful here IMO). And I left the size as "how far we wrapped". (Which is pretty telling: we wrapped 0 bytes ... *cough*.) > leak a range for a kernel address, but I think that's OK? Admittedly an > attacker can pass in various values for 'n', but it'll be quite noisy > and leave a trace in the kernel logs for forensics to find afterwards. > > > Call Trace: > > check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:151 [inline] > > __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:260 [inline] > > __check_object_size.cold+0xb2/0xba mm/usercopy.c:250 > > check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:119 [inline] > > check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline] > > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:151 [inline] > > hidraw_ioctl+0x38c/0xae0 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:392 > > The root problem would appear to be: > > else if (copy_to_user(user_arg + offsetof( > struct hidraw_report_descriptor, > value[0]), > dev->hid->rdesc, > min(dev->hid->rsize, len))) > > That 'min' should surely be a 'max'? > > Jiri, this looks like it was your code back in 2007. I think this code is correct and the usercopy reporting fix already in -mm solves the problem. -- Kees Cook