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* [PATCH v3] usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
@ 2026-02-28 10:43 pip-izony
  2026-02-28 16:03 ` Alan Stern
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: pip-izony @ 2026-02-28 10:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: Seungjin Bae, Kyungtae Kim, Christophe JAILLET, Kees Cook,
	Yuping Luo, Felipe Balbi, Michal Nazarewicz, Alan Stern,
	Barry Song, linux-usb

From: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com>

The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size
in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block
size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether
this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the
`common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During
initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction
between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command
requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the
left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data
size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory
corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the
shift and catch any overflows.

Fixes: 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
Signed-off-by: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com>
---
 v1 -> v2: Removed cmnd_size check and applied check_shl_overflow() macro
 v2 -> v3: Fix indentation of continuation line and drop local variable

 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
index 6af96e2b44eb..b7b06cb79ff5 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1853,8 +1854,15 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
 		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
 		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
 {
-	if (common->curlun)
-		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
+	if (common->curlun) {
+		if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd,
+				       common->curlun->blkbits,
+				       &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) {
+			common->phase_error = 1;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
 			mask, needs_medium, name);
 }
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
  2026-02-28 10:43 [PATCH v3] usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks() pip-izony
@ 2026-02-28 16:03 ` Alan Stern
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Alan Stern @ 2026-02-28 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pip-izony
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Kyungtae Kim, Christophe JAILLET, Kees Cook,
	Yuping Luo, Felipe Balbi, Michal Nazarewicz, Barry Song,
	linux-usb

On Sat, Feb 28, 2026 at 05:43:25AM -0500, pip-izony wrote:
> From: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com>
> 
> The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size
> in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block
> size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether
> this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
> 
> Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the
> `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During
> initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction
> between two variables.
> 
> So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command
> requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the
> left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data
> size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory
> corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
> 
> Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the
> shift and catch any overflows.
> 
> Fixes: 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
> Signed-off-by: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com>
> ---

Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>

>  v1 -> v2: Removed cmnd_size check and applied check_shl_overflow() macro
>  v2 -> v3: Fix indentation of continuation line and drop local variable
> 
>  drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 12 ++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
> index 6af96e2b44eb..b7b06cb79ff5 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
> @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kthread.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>  #include <linux/limits.h>
> +#include <linux/overflow.h>
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/rwsem.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> @@ -1853,8 +1854,15 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
>  		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
>  		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
>  {
> -	if (common->curlun)
> -		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
> +	if (common->curlun) {
> +		if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd,
> +				       common->curlun->blkbits,
> +				       &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) {
> +			common->phase_error = 1;
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
>  			mask, needs_medium, name);
>  }
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2026-02-28 10:43 [PATCH v3] usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks() pip-izony
2026-02-28 16:03 ` Alan Stern

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