[PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[Kelvin Mbogo]

usbip_recv_iso() computes the iso descriptor buffer size as:

    int size = np * sizeof(*iso);

where np comes straight from the wire (urb->number_of_packets, set by
usbip_pack_ret_submit() before we get here).  With np = 0x10000001 and
sizeof(*iso) == 16 the product is 0x100000010 which truncates to 16 on
a 32-bit int.  kzalloc(16) succeeds but the following receive loop
writes np * 16 bytes into it - game over.

USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS (1024) already exists in usbip_common.h for the
submit path but was never enforced on the receive side.

Clamp np to [1, USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS] and switch to kcalloc() so
the allocator itself can catch overflows in the future.  Fold the
existing np == 0 early return into the new bounds check.

usbip_pack_ret_submit() already copied the bogus np into
urb->number_of_packets before we run, so just returning -EPROTO is
not enough - processcompl() in the HCD will still iterate that many
iso_frame_desc entries when it completes the failed URB.  Zero out
urb->number_of_packets before bailing to prevent that secondary crash
(confirmed on 6.12.0, processcompl+0x63 with CR2 in unmapped slab).

Signed-off-by: Kelvin Mbogo <addcontent08@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
  - Fold np == 0 early return into the new bounds check (Greg)
  - Switch from kmalloc_array() to kcalloc() (Greg)
  - Keep size variable to avoid repeating np * sizeof(*iso) (Greg)
  - Use proper block comment style (Greg)
  - Drop Reported-by (author is signer)
  - Drop security@kernel.org CC

 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index a2b2da1..8b6eb74 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	void *buff;
 	struct usbip_iso_packet_descriptor *iso;
 	int np = urb->number_of_packets;
-	int size = np * sizeof(*iso);
+	int size;
 	int i;
 	int ret;
 	int total_length = 0;
@@ -670,11 +670,21 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	if (!usb_pipeisoc(urb->pipe))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* my Bluetooth dongle gets ISO URBs which are np = 0 */
-	if (np == 0)
-		return 0;
+	if (np <= 0 || np > USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS) {
+		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+			"recv iso: invalid number_of_packets %d\n", np);
+		/*
+		 * usbip_pack_ret_submit() already set urb->number_of_packets
+		 * from the wire.  Zero it so processcompl() does not iterate
+		 * OOB descriptors on the way out.
+		 */
+		urb->number_of_packets = 0;
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+
+	size = np * sizeof(*iso);
 
-	buff = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buff = kcalloc(np, sizeof(*iso), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buff)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 2/3] usb: usbip: validate iso frame actual_length in usbip_recv_iso()

[Kelvin Mbogo]

usbip_recv_iso() sums each frame's actual_length into an int
accumulator without checking the individual values first:

    total_length += urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length;

A malicious server can send actual_length = 0xFFFFFFFC for one frame
and a small value for the other, making the signed sum wrap around to
match urb->actual_length.  The sanity check passes, and usbip_pad_iso()
later computes a negative actualoffset, feeding it to memmove() as a
source pointer - reads before the allocation, leaked to userspace via
USBDEVFS_REAPURB.

Reject any frame whose actual_length exceeds transfer_buffer_length
(one frame can't carry more data than the whole buffer), and widen the
accumulator to u32 so that many moderately-large frames can't wrap it
either.

Signed-off-by: Kelvin Mbogo <addcontent08@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
  - Drop Reported-by (author is signer)

 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index 8b6eb74..fd620e9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	int size;
 	int i;
 	int ret;
-	int total_length = 0;
+	u32 total_length = 0;
 
 	if (!usb_pipeisoc(urb->pipe))
 		return 0;
@@ -706,14 +706,23 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	for (i = 0; i < np; i++) {
 		usbip_iso_packet_correct_endian(&iso[i], 0);
 		usbip_pack_iso(&iso[i], &urb->iso_frame_desc[i], 0);
+		if (urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length >
+				(unsigned int)urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+			dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+				"recv iso: frame actual_length %u exceeds buffer %d\n",
+				urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length,
+				urb->transfer_buffer_length);
+			kfree(buff);
+			return -EPROTO;
+		}
 		total_length += urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length;
 	}
 
 	kfree(buff);
 
-	if (total_length != urb->actual_length) {
+	if (total_length != (u32)urb->actual_length) {
 		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
-			"total length of iso packets %d not equal to actual length of buffer %d\n",
+			"total length of iso packets %u not equal to actual length of buffer %d\n",
 			total_length, urb->actual_length);
 
 		if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB || ud->side == USBIP_VUDC)
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 3/3] usb: usbip: fix OOB read/write in usbip_pad_iso()

[Kelvin Mbogo]

usbip_pad_iso() repositions ISO frame data within the transfer buffer
via memmove().  Neither the source offset (actualoffset, derived by
subtracting wire-supplied actual_length values) nor the destination
offset (iso_frame_desc[i].offset, taken directly from the wire) is
bounds-checked.

If a crafted actual_length wraps actualoffset negative through the
subtraction (see patch 2/3 for the root cause), the memmove source
points before the allocation - slab OOB read, data returned to
userspace.

Independently, iso_frame_desc[i].offset is never validated against
transfer_buffer_length.  Setting offset past the end of the buffer
gives a fully controlled OOB write into whatever sits next in the
slab - confirmed with offset=400 on a 392-byte buffer, 64-byte write.

Add bounds checks for both the source and destination ranges before
each memmove call.  Use unsigned comparisons after the sign check on
actualoffset to avoid signed/unsigned conversion surprises.

Signed-off-by: Kelvin Mbogo <addcontent08@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
  - Fix indentation to pass checkpatch (Greg)
  - Reword comments to describe what is being validated (Greg)
  - Drop Reported-by (author is signer)

 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index fd620e9..8ebaaea 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -770,6 +770,42 @@ void usbip_pad_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	 */
 	for (i = np-1; i > 0; i--) {
 		actualoffset -= urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length;
+
+		/*
+		 * Validate source range: actualoffset can go negative
+		 * via crafted actual_length values from the wire.
+		 */
+		if (actualoffset < 0 ||
+		    (unsigned int)actualoffset >
+				(unsigned int)urb->transfer_buffer_length ||
+		    urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length >
+				(unsigned int)urb->transfer_buffer_length -
+				(unsigned int)actualoffset) {
+			dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+				"pad_iso: bad src off=%d len=%u bufsz=%d\n",
+				actualoffset,
+				urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length,
+				urb->transfer_buffer_length);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Validate destination range: iso_frame_desc[i].offset
+		 * is wire-supplied and must not exceed the buffer.
+		 */
+		if (urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset >
+				(unsigned int)urb->transfer_buffer_length ||
+		    urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length >
+				(unsigned int)urb->transfer_buffer_length -
+				urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset) {
+			dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+				"pad_iso: bad dst off=%u len=%u bufsz=%d\n",
+				urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset,
+				urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length,
+				urb->transfer_buffer_length);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		memmove(urb->transfer_buffer + urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset,
 			urb->transfer_buffer + actualoffset,
 			urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length);
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[Nathan Rebello]

[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4092 bytes --]

Hi Kelvin,

Your series hardens usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() against
malicious number_of_packets values, but the bad value still lands in
urb->number_of_packets via usbip_pack_ret_submit() before those
checks run.

The patch below validates at the source — in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
before the overwrite — and checks against the original
urb->number_of_packets (the actual allocation bound) rather than
USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS. This is a tighter check because the URB may
have been allocated for far fewer than 1024 packets.

This could complement your series as an additional layer, or stand
alone. Would be glad to rework this however the maintainers see fit —
whether folded into your series or submitted separately.

---

From: Nathan Rebello <nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] usbip: vhci: reject RET_SUBMIT with inflated
 number_of_packets

When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,
usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites
urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is
subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible
array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the
*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.

A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response
to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap
out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to
urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.

KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69

  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)

The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already
validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits
c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle
malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden
CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates
against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.
On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter
bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.

This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against
transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the
response value against the original allocation size.

Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against
urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the
overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.

Fixes: 0775a9cbc798 ("staging: usbip: vhci extension: modifications to the client side")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Rebello <nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -470,7 +470,18 @@ static void usbip_pack_ret_submit(struct usbip_header *pdu, struct urb *urb,
 		urb->status		= rpdu->status;
 		urb->actual_length	= rpdu->actual_length;
 		urb->start_frame	= rpdu->start_frame;
-		urb->number_of_packets = rpdu->number_of_packets;
+		/*
+		 * The number_of_packets field determines the length of
+		 * iso_frame_desc[], which is a flexible array allocated
+		 * at URB creation time. A response must never claim more
+		 * packets than originally submitted; doing so would cause
+		 * an out-of-bounds write in usbip_recv_iso() and
+		 * usbip_pad_iso(). Clamp to zero on violation so both
+		 * functions safely return early.
+		 */
+		if (rpdu->number_of_packets < 0 ||
+		    rpdu->number_of_packets > urb->number_of_packets)
+			rpdu->number_of_packets = 0;
+		urb->number_of_packets = rpdu->number_of_packets;
 		urb->error_count	= rpdu->error_count;
 	}
 }

Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[Greg KH]

On Fri, Mar 27, 2026 at 12:31:53AM -0400, Nathan Rebello wrote:
> Hi Kelvin,
> 
> Your series hardens usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() against
> malicious number_of_packets values, but the bad value still lands in
> urb->number_of_packets via usbip_pack_ret_submit() before those
> checks run.
> 
> The patch below validates at the source — in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
> before the overwrite — and checks against the original
> urb->number_of_packets (the actual allocation bound) rather than
> USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS. This is a tighter check because the URB may
> have been allocated for far fewer than 1024 packets.
> 
> This could complement your series as an additional layer, or stand
> alone. Would be glad to rework this however the maintainers see fit —
> whether folded into your series or submitted separately.

Please submit it separately, on top of that series, to make it easier to
review and apply.

thanks,

greg k-h

[PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[Kelvin Mbogo]

usbip_recv_iso() computes the iso descriptor buffer size as:

    int size = np * sizeof(*iso);

where np comes straight from the wire (urb->number_of_packets, set by
usbip_pack_ret_submit() before we get here).  With np = 0x10000001 and
sizeof(*iso) == 16 the product is 0x100000010 which truncates to 16 on
a 32-bit int.  kzalloc(16) succeeds but the following receive loop
writes np * 16 bytes into it - game over.

USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS (1024) already exists in usbip_common.h for the
submit path but was never enforced on the receive side.

Clamp np to [1, USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS] and switch to kcalloc() so
the allocator itself can catch overflows in the future.  Fold the
existing np == 0 early return into the new bounds check.

usbip_pack_ret_submit() already copied the bogus np into
urb->number_of_packets before we run, so just returning -EPROTO is
not enough - processcompl() in the HCD will still iterate that many
iso_frame_desc entries when it completes the failed URB.  Zero out
urb->number_of_packets before bailing to prevent that secondary crash
(confirmed on 6.12.0, processcompl+0x63 with CR2 in unmapped slab).

Signed-off-by: Kelvin Mbogo <addcontent08@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index a2b2da1..8b6eb74 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	void *buff;
 	struct usbip_iso_packet_descriptor *iso;
 	int np = urb->number_of_packets;
-	int size = np * sizeof(*iso);
+	int size;
 	int i;
 	int ret;
 	int total_length = 0;
@@ -670,11 +670,21 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	if (!usb_pipeisoc(urb->pipe))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* my Bluetooth dongle gets ISO URBs which are np = 0 */
-	if (np == 0)
-		return 0;
+	if (np <= 0 || np > USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS) {
+		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
+			"recv iso: invalid number_of_packets %d\n", np);
+		/*
+		 * usbip_pack_ret_submit() already set urb->number_of_packets
+		 * from the wire.  Zero it so processcompl() does not iterate
+		 * OOB descriptors on the way out.
+		 */
+		urb->number_of_packets = 0;
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+
+	size = np * sizeof(*iso);
 
-	buff = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buff = kcalloc(np, sizeof(*iso), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buff)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()

[Greg KH]

On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 01:36:38PM +0300, Kelvin Mbogo wrote:
> usbip_recv_iso() computes the iso descriptor buffer size as:
> 
>     int size = np * sizeof(*iso);
> 
> where np comes straight from the wire (urb->number_of_packets, set by
> usbip_pack_ret_submit() before we get here).  With np = 0x10000001 and
> sizeof(*iso) == 16 the product is 0x100000010 which truncates to 16 on
> a 32-bit int.  kzalloc(16) succeeds but the following receive loop
> writes np * 16 bytes into it - game over.
> 
> USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS (1024) already exists in usbip_common.h for the
> submit path but was never enforced on the receive side.
> 
> Clamp np to [1, USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS] and switch to kcalloc() so
> the allocator itself can catch overflows in the future.  Fold the
> existing np == 0 early return into the new bounds check.
> 
> usbip_pack_ret_submit() already copied the bogus np into
> urb->number_of_packets before we run, so just returning -EPROTO is
> not enough - processcompl() in the HCD will still iterate that many
> iso_frame_desc entries when it completes the failed URB.  Zero out
> urb->number_of_packets before bailing to prevent that secondary crash
> (confirmed on 6.12.0, processcompl+0x63 with CR2 in unmapped slab).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kelvin Mbogo <addcontent08@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
> index a2b2da1..8b6eb74 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
> @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
>  	void *buff;
>  	struct usbip_iso_packet_descriptor *iso;
>  	int np = urb->number_of_packets;
> -	int size = np * sizeof(*iso);
> +	int size;
>  	int i;
>  	int ret;
>  	int total_length = 0;
> @@ -670,11 +670,21 @@ int usbip_recv_iso(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
>  	if (!usb_pipeisoc(urb->pipe))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	/* my Bluetooth dongle gets ISO URBs which are np = 0 */
> -	if (np == 0)
> -		return 0;
> +	if (np <= 0 || np > USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS) {
> +		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
> +			"recv iso: invalid number_of_packets %d\n", np);
> +		/*
> +		 * usbip_pack_ret_submit() already set urb->number_of_packets
> +		 * from the wire.  Zero it so processcompl() does not iterate
> +		 * OOB descriptors on the way out.
> +		 */
> +		urb->number_of_packets = 0;
> +		return -EPROTO;
> +	}
> +
> +	size = np * sizeof(*iso);
>  
> -	buff = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	buff = kcalloc(np, sizeof(*iso), GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!buff)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 

Hi,

This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman.  You have sent him
a patch that has triggered this response.  He used to manually respond
to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept
writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was
created.  Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem
in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux
kernel tree.

You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s)
as indicated below:

- This looks like a new version of a previously submitted patch, but you
  did not list below the --- line any changes from the previous version.
  Please read the section entitled "The canonical patch format" in the
  kernel file, Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst for what
  needs to be done here to properly describe this.

If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about
how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and
Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received
from other developers.

thanks,

greg k-h's patch email bot