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From: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
To: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com,
	serge@hallyn.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <david.woodhouse@intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Joey Lee <jlee@suse.de>, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
	zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mricon@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing
Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 19:46:13 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150520164613.GD10473@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150520172446.4dab5399@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>

On 15-05-20 17:24:46, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> 
> More to the point why do you want to sign firmware files ? Leaving aside the 
> fact that someone will produce a device with GPLv3 firmware just to p*ss you 
> off there's the rather more relevant fact that firmware for devices on a so 
> called "trusted" platform already have signed firmware.

For "trusted" systems one would like to make sure everything that goes in has 
known provenance.  Maybe this was the idea?

> For external devices I don't normally have access to read system memory 
> anyway, and signing firmware would achieve nothing unless you start doing 
> crazy DRM style key exchanges to prove the endpoint is trusted. Any NSA trojan 
> wifi stick is simply going to nod as the correct firmware is uploaded, and 
> then ignore it. And if I'm just out to be a pain I can already just plug in a 
> fake device claiming to be a usb disk with 256 bytes per sector (boom... exit 
> machine stage right), or for that matter wire a USB stick with 5v connected to 
> the mains at the nearest wall socket.

Yep, gaining physical access to the system is a game over.  It is arguable how 
"trusted" a networked machine could be and i guess the answer is "not much"...


		Petko

  reply	other threads:[~2015-05-20 16:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-05-19 20:02 [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-19 20:40 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-19 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-19 22:11   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-19 22:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-21 15:51     ` David Howells
2015-05-21 16:30       ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-21 16:39       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-21 16:51         ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 16:55           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-21 17:44             ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 16:43       ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 16:48         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-21 16:58           ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 16:59         ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-19 23:30   ` Julian Calaby
2015-05-19 23:42     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-20  0:39       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-20  0:41         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-21 22:26           ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-21 23:15             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-05-19 21:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-19 22:19   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-19 23:37     ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-20  0:22       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-20  1:06         ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-20  1:29           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-20  2:05             ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-20  2:10               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-20 15:49                 ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-20 16:08         ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-20 14:04 ` Seth Forshee
2015-05-20 15:08   ` David Howells
2015-05-20 15:47     ` Seth Forshee
2015-05-21 16:23       ` David Howells
2015-05-20 16:24   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-05-20 16:46     ` Petko Manolov [this message]
2015-05-21  4:41       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-21  5:41         ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21  6:14           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-21 13:05             ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-21 15:45               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-21 15:53                 ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 16:57                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-26 17:08                   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-05-26 19:15                     ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-26 19:52                     ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-26 23:06                     ` David Howells
2015-05-21 16:03                 ` Woodhouse, David
2015-05-21 16:22                   ` Mimi Zohar
2015-05-21 16:31                     ` Woodhouse, David
2015-05-21 17:02                   ` gregkh
2015-05-21 17:14                     ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 18:23                     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-21 18:30                       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-21 19:32                     ` Woodhouse, David
2015-05-21 17:49                   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-21 14:45             ` Petko Manolov
2015-05-21 22:50     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-05-20 20:35   ` Kyle McMartin
2015-05-20 15:14 ` David Howells

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