From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DE64C2D0DB for ; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 14:29:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54D94206F0 for ; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 14:29:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1579876169; bh=rOC8U+f1daTPhWJ4bxWs0HkmJ05pAb0NOy3PkAdNkRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=rM1AS2P1h/YcLaMR+dfFi29jRLO7P7DLkHuJ4R8fFNRjoO/wJb8tG5AqL3VlPX4tN jgDLCnvlXznPc5W5LXP4TbjPsPVFfwR1mCLl0s32sSAES4SzEEOWZLF+PsAUvkVWY6 hh1qyHCAKwlDU9+QLb4WMNE3Jq6d6hc55dNbmjMs= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2391343AbgAXO3Y (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jan 2020 09:29:24 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42384 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2405143AbgAXOU7 (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jan 2020 09:20:59 -0500 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D07BD20661; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 14:20:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1579875658; bh=rOC8U+f1daTPhWJ4bxWs0HkmJ05pAb0NOy3PkAdNkRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Oeh33EDKwFPowxcFShGOdKdqL4X0/JSJg7bifuH9S7+qH1gPHIEs6M6nDGUDkA3DR bcQkIJ8H5PYcV41UwmibqS1t17CMbAa6JY7gZsE73qCR1Y8qSabrXi1uD49YP7wbEJ Kf21FVROrT4klv2KkhDknJ8B+sWa22G5WgPD4YBQ= From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jouni Malinen , Johannes Berg , Sasha Levin , linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 39/56] mac80211: Fix TKIP replay protection immediately after key setup Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 09:19:55 -0500 Message-Id: <20200124142012.29752-39-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200124142012.29752-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20200124142012.29752-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org From: Jouni Malinen [ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ] TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame from the AP is received by the station. Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK). Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/mac80211/tkip.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/tkip.c b/net/mac80211/tkip.c index b3622823bad23..ebd66e8f46b3f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tkip.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.c @@ -266,9 +266,21 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, if ((keyid >> 6) != key->conf.keyidx) return TKIP_DECRYPT_INVALID_KEYIDX; - if (rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT && - (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 || - (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 && iv16 <= rx_ctx->iv16))) + /* Reject replays if the received TSC is smaller than or equal to the + * last received value in a valid message, but with an exception for + * the case where a new key has been set and no valid frame using that + * key has yet received and the local RSC was initialized to 0. This + * exception allows the very first frame sent by the transmitter to be + * accepted even if that transmitter were to use TSC 0 (IEEE 802.11 + * described TSC to be initialized to 1 whenever a new key is taken into + * use). + */ + if (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 || + (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 && + (iv16 < rx_ctx->iv16 || + (iv16 == rx_ctx->iv16 && + (rx_ctx->iv32 || rx_ctx->iv16 || + rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT))))) return TKIP_DECRYPT_REPLAY; if (only_iv) { -- 2.20.1