From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2CCEC226D1D; Tue, 24 Jun 2025 04:13:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1750738402; cv=none; b=Qocw8q03RU83iYdvJLVeSbpzRJ6drr4ybeQt2K0R6Eq7w9HyEgwd1J0MqbVx7JqJrNq4E8t6GdpA5nbMPFqAijc72JU1dFyAaTCdtXF1MCGr+vZCKOsWrSY/WMwb3QGsrn6Lih/kYJimQrlaFH+6rWnu2jYh/LyEFZbnaXFG5J0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1750738402; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HMVe7lQo575duoaf8EdPnCZz9T+6DE8NvNucjaVjrmI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=qNOPKvsKFL01Fl9XWJ3mUldjs+okE1ZNKrqiFCJaX6H8INDOXgsyqSaGlykBKyubOuujQ5VuBZvbiZndKoZterisWEju01ddI9EfOU4ATf0urplY3cCYVDqqLCjN1HX/ZUIR8XqfaZ2k1A4mxrDVeBV4K1RRGAVrKhbTxtTrXZU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=jcSj/Cm9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="jcSj/Cm9" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 638F4C4CEE3; Tue, 24 Jun 2025 04:13:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1750738401; bh=HMVe7lQo575duoaf8EdPnCZz9T+6DE8NvNucjaVjrmI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jcSj/Cm92+HDx8c70WeQ//OpSEx5ktSgXGwQWWDaXfcunevFqt+DbuIsqVsFQXgH3 bdbhxyLrl57sKxisgoKjQzdHTjZ12WopN4kXZwNVjbDz/eYFosxF5k3feZwZFKwg5c zsOGoVD967QjGYbuE7dWHPdunOYzJ12ZAYxsu02xNEIUUzPrOld7nNGu7ZbrsFcp0Y 077lr8unfdf3W54ucklE4C6jgoKpv2d1VaEGinWW/0Yd7NWG1/EVnVxndpYL5pGnAe KNQ70ZzNOwOKnEFncncYVPVdZsGFSdEwBzg6gEYFGnKps7GxMwlhNI/wo/tLe+MqNc tWaWufBVE1aXg== From: Sasha Levin To: patches@lists.linux.dev, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Johannes Berg , syzbot+8b512026a7ec10dcbdd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Sasha Levin , johannes@sipsolutions.net, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 5/8] wifi: mac80211: drop invalid source address OCB frames Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 00:13:12 -0400 Message-Id: <20250624041316.85209-5-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20250624041316.85209-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20250624041316.85209-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore X-stable-base: Linux 5.10.238 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Johannes Berg [ Upstream commit d1b1a5eb27c4948e8811cf4dbb05aaf3eb10700c ] In OCB, don't accept frames from invalid source addresses (and in particular don't try to create stations for them), drop the frames instead. Reported-by: syzbot+8b512026a7ec10dcbdd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6788d2d9.050a0220.20d369.0028.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Tested-by: syzbot+8b512026a7ec10dcbdd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616171838.7433379cab5d.I47444d63c72a0bd58d2e2b67bb99e1fea37eec6f@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Security Vulnerability Fixed The commit fixes a clear security vulnerability in OCB (Outside Context of a BSS) mode where frames with invalid source addresses are accepted and processed. Looking at the code change: ```c + /* reject invalid/our STA address */ + if (!is_valid_ether_addr(hdr->addr2) || + ether_addr_equal(sdata->dev->dev_addr, hdr->addr2)) + return false; ``` This adds critical validation that was missing, preventing: 1. **Invalid MAC addresses** (all zeros, broadcast/multicast addresses) from being accepted 2. **Self-spoofing attacks** where frames appear to come from the device's own address ## Comparison with Similar Historical Fixes This fix follows the exact pattern of Similar Commit #1 (Backport Status: YES): - That commit added `!is_valid_ether_addr(hdr->addr2)` check to ADHOC mode - It fixed WARN_ON spam in `sta_info_insert_check()` - It was deemed suitable for stable backporting The OCB fix addresses the same class of vulnerability in a different interface mode. ## Impact Without the Fix Without this validation, the `ieee80211_ocb_rx_no_sta()` function would: 1. Create station entries for invalid addresses 2. Potentially trigger WARN_ON messages causing log spam 3. Allow resource exhaustion attacks by creating many invalid stations 4. Risk crashes or undefined behavior from invalid station entries ## Stable Backport Criteria Met 1. **Fixes a real bug**: Yes - invalid frames are incorrectly accepted 2. **Security impact**: Yes - potential DoS via resource exhaustion 3. **Small and contained**: Yes - adds 4 lines of validation 4. **Clear fix**: Yes - straightforward address validation 5. **No new features**: Correct - only adds missing validation 6. **Tested**: Yes - verified by syzbot ## Not Like the "NO" Examples Unlike the commits marked for NO backporting: - This is not adding new functionality (like link-addressed frames support) - This is not a code cleanup or optimization - This is fixing a concrete security issue reported by syzbot - This has minimal risk of regression The fix is essential for OCB mode security and should be backported to all stable kernels that support OCB mode (since 2014). net/mac80211/rx.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 65fea564c9c00..b46c4c770608c 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -4097,6 +4097,10 @@ static bool ieee80211_accept_frame(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (!multicast && !ether_addr_equal(sdata->dev->dev_addr, hdr->addr1)) return false; + /* reject invalid/our STA address */ + if (!is_valid_ether_addr(hdr->addr2) || + ether_addr_equal(sdata->dev->dev_addr, hdr->addr2)) + return false; if (!rx->sta) { int rate_idx; if (status->encoding != RX_ENC_LEGACY) -- 2.39.5