Re: [PATCH v2] wifi: mwifiex: bound SDIO fw dump count by memory table size

[Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>]

On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 02:43:51PM +0000, Tianchu Chen wrote:
> From: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
> 
> mwifiex_sdio_fw_dump() reads the number of memory regions (dump_num)
> from a device register and uses it to index the static 15-entry
> mem_type_mapping_tbl[] without any bounds check.  A bogus device can
> report a dump_num larger than the table; each out-of-table loop
> iteration then reads entry->mem_name and entry->done_flag and stores
> a vmalloc pointer and a device-controlled size past the end of the
> table, into adjacent .data (up to ~5.6KiB when dump_num is 255).
> 
> The dump path runs after command timeouts or firmware crashes, so a
> bogus device can first force an error to trigger the dump and then
> report a bogus dump_num.
> 
> Limit dump_num to the table size instead of aborting the dump. This
> is not expected to change the behavior on normal devices.
> 
> Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
> 
> Fixes: 54881c6b37c8d ("mwifiex: add firmware dump feature for SDIO")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
> ---
> v2: clamp dump_num to the table size and continue when bogus dump_num
> detected.

Oops, didn't notice v2 when reviewing v1. This is a valid choice too;
probably a better one.

Acked-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>