From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@linbit.com>,
xfs@oss.sgi.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 10:52:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140415175228.GE26404@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140410122944.GA6579@infradead.org>
So any opinions from other fs / security people on how O_TMPFILE files
should behave for ACL inheritance / labeling?
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 05:29:44AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 08:19:48AM -0400, Brian Foster wrote:
> > Are you saying it doesn't have to initialize security or the default
> > acl, or both?
>
> The ACLs for sure. LSM do run-time access decisions, so they will
> probably rely on the security data being initialized. Given that
> O_TMPFILE files aren't publicly available I'm not sure there's a point
> in them doing that, though.
>
> LSMs are also affected by the lack of a proper parent I'll discuss for
> ACLs below.
>
> > The intent here was to have the case covered where the inode happens to
> > be linked back into the namespace since we don't do this work in the
> > link path.
>
> That's an interesting one. O_TMFILE files don't have a real parent
> to inherit ACLs from, the pathname passed in just needs to point to
> a directory to find the filesystem to create the tmpfile in. On
> the other hand it seem like the extN implementations do inherity the
> ACL in this case.
>
> The link into the namespace is irrelavant here as ACL inheritance only
> happens on initial create, not at link time.
>
> I also think we'll absolutely need a test case for ACLs+tmpfile to
> make sure all filesystems handle it the same way.
>
> > The bulk of the refactoring was with the idea that the inode setup for
> > the tmpfile case is generally equivalent for the traditional create
> > case. The original version was posted here:
> >
> > http://oss.sgi.com/archives/xfs/2014-04/msg00149.html
> >
> > ... and it just fixes the deadlock and adds the security initialization.
> > I suppose I could still break that out into multiple patches, but that
> > aside, is that behavior preferred?
>
> I think just fixing the deadlock and initializing the security is enough
> for the first pass. If you want to do the refactoring on top send it as
> a second series on top of the actual fixes.
>
> _______________________________________________
> xfs mailing list
> xfs@oss.sgi.com
> http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs
---end quoted text---
_______________________________________________
xfs mailing list
xfs@oss.sgi.com
http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-04-15 17:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-04-09 19:21 [PATCH v2 0/2] xfs: tmpfile fixes for inode security/acl Brian Foster
2014-04-09 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl Brian Foster
2014-04-10 10:24 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-10 12:19 ` Brian Foster
2014-04-10 12:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-15 17:52 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2014-04-15 19:31 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2014-04-16 11:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-16 17:29 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2014-04-18 16:39 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-30 12:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-09 19:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] xfs: fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create() Brian Foster
2014-04-10 10:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-04-10 12:19 ` Brian Foster
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20140415175228.GE26404@infradead.org \
--to=hch@infradead.org \
--cc=agruen@linbit.com \
--cc=bfoster@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-man@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=xfs@oss.sgi.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).