From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:37678 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S936045AbeFNWQv (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Jun 2018 18:16:51 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx10.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.25]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D45A4BDD1 for ; Thu, 14 Jun 2018 22:16:51 +0000 (UTC) From: Marco Benatto Subject: [PATCH] xfs_repair: Fix root inode's parent when it's bogus for sf directory Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 19:16:46 -0300 Message-Id: <20180614221646.20017-1-mbenatto@redhat.com> Sender: linux-xfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: List-Id: xfs To: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: mbenatto@redhat.com, sandeen@redhat.com Currently when root inode is in short-form and its parent ino has an invalid value, process_sf_dir2() ends up not fixing it, because if verify_inum() fails we never get to the next case which would fix the root inode's parent pointer. This behavior triggers the following assert on process_dir2(): ASSERT((ino != mp->m_sb.sb_rootino && ino != *parent) || (ino == mp->m_sb.sb_rootino && (ino == *parent || need_root_dotdot == 1))); This patch fixes this behavior by making sure we always properly handle rootino parent pointer in process_sf_dir2() Signed-off-by: Marco Benatto --- repair/dir2.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/repair/dir2.c b/repair/dir2.c index e162d2b..225f926 100644 --- a/repair/dir2.c +++ b/repair/dir2.c @@ -495,8 +495,10 @@ _("corrected entry offsets in directory %" PRIu64 "\n"), /* * if parent entry is bogus, null it out. we'll fix it later . + * If the validation fails for the root inode we fix it in + * the next else case. */ - if (verify_inum(mp, *parent)) { + if (verify_inum(mp, *parent) && ino != mp->m_sb.sb_rootino) { do_warn( _("bogus .. inode number (%" PRIu64 ") in directory inode %" PRIu64 ", "), -- 2.9.5