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From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
To: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: guaneryu@gmail.com, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, fstests@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/3] generic: posix acl extended attribute memory corruption test
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 13:00:55 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190225210055.GG21626@magnolia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ac4a3f51-150f-e089-52bb-9adea57dc731@suse.com>

On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 01:57:51PM -0500, Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> On 2/13/19 3:48 PM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > From: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
> > 
> > XFS had a use-after-free bug when xfs_xattr_put_listent runs out of
> > listxattr buffer space while trying to store the name
> > "system.posix_acl_access" and then corrupts memory by not checking the
> > seen_enough state and then trying to shove "trusted.SGI_ACL_FILE" into
> > the buffer as well.
> > 
> > In order to tickle the bug in a user visible way we must have already
> > put a name in the buffer, so we take advantage of the fact that
> > "security.evm" sorts before "system.posix_acl_access" to make sure this
> > happens.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
> 
> [...]
> 
> > +
> > +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > +{
> > +	struct myacl acl = {
> > +		.d = 2,
> > +		.e = {
> > +			{1, 0, 0},
> > +			{4, 0, 0},
> > +			{0x10, 0, 0},
> > +			{0x20, 0, 0},
> > +		},
> > +	};
> > +	char buf[64];
> > +	ssize_t sz;
> > +	int fd;
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	if (argc > 1) {
> > +		ret = chdir(argv[1]);
> > +		if (ret)
> > +			die(argv[1]);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	fd = creat("file0", 0644);
> > +	if (fd < 0)
> > +		die("create");
> > +
> > +	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "system.posix_acl_access", &acl, sizeof(acl), 0);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		die("set posix acl");
> > +
> > +	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		die("set evm");
> 
> How is this working on your test system?

CONFIG_EVM=n, that's how. :(

> The EVM xattr is a formatted structure and this is passing it an
> uninitialized buffer.  It *should* return EPERM and on our test
> systems it is.

Er... what is the structure of the evm attr, anyway?  Does passing in a
single byte 0x03 actually work?

Oh, it's in security/integrity/integrity.h, that's why I couldn't find
it....

enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
	EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
	EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
	IMA_XATTR_LAST
};

struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
	u8 type;
	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;


So I guess we're passing in a xattr_data of type EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG?
With no actual digest information, which seems suspect to me.

Now I wonder if the VM they used to generate the syzkaller report has
EVM enabled....

(And this is why I hate syzkaller reports, all of the mechanisation I
can't (under)stand and none of the context to help me write a decent
regression test case that actually just friggin works.)

> Using security.capability will sort before system.posix_acl_access and
> accepts unformatted contents.

I'll try that and report back, thank you.  Sorry for the mess.

--D

> -Jeff
> 
> > +	sz = flistxattr(fd, buf, 30);
> > +	if (sz < 0)
> > +		die("list attr");
> > +
> > +	printf("%s\n", buf);
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +#if 0
> > +	/* original syzkaller reproducer */
> > +
> > +	syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0);
> > +
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000180, "./file0", 8);
> > +	syscall(__NR_creat, 0x20000180, 0);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000000, "./file0", 8);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "system.posix_acl_access", 24);
> > +	*(uint32_t*)0x20000680 = 2;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x20000684 = 1;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x20000686 = 0;
> > +	*(uint32_t*)0x20000688 = 0;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x2000068c = 4;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x2000068e = 0;
> > +	*(uint32_t*)0x20000690 = 0;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x20000694 = 0x10;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x20000696 = 0;
> > +	*(uint32_t*)0x20000698 = 0;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x2000069c = 0x20;
> > +	*(uint16_t*)0x2000069e = 0;
> > +	*(uint32_t*)0x200006a0 = 0;
> > +	syscall(__NR_setxattr, 0x20000000, 0x20000040, 0x20000680, 0x24, 0);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000080, "./file0", 8);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x200000c0, "security.evm", 13);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x57", 5);
> > +	syscall(__NR_lsetxattr, 0x20000080, 0x200000c0, 0x20000100, 1, 1);
> > +	memcpy((void*)0x20000300, "./file0", 8);
> > +	syscall(__NR_listxattr, 0x20000300, 0x200002c0, 0x1e);
> > +	return 0;
> > +#endif
> > +}
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Jeff Mahoney
> SUSE Labs

      reply	other threads:[~2019-02-25 21:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-12  2:17 [PATCH 0/3] fstests: fixes and new tests Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-12  2:17 ` [PATCH 1/3] common: fix kmemleak to work with sections Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-12  2:17 ` [PATCH 2/3] common: fix _require_btime for lazy filesystems Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-12  2:17 ` [PATCH 3/3] generic: check for reasonable inode creation time Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-13 20:48 ` [PATCH 4/3] generic: posix acl extended attribute memory corruption test Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-16 12:05   ` Eryu Guan
2019-02-16 17:24     ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-20 13:29   ` David Sterba
2019-02-20 14:09     ` Holger Hoffstätte
2019-02-20 18:58       ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-25 18:57   ` Jeff Mahoney
2019-02-25 21:00     ` Darrick J. Wong [this message]

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