From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
To: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xfs: verify buffer contents when we skip log replay
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 14:03:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230601130351.GA1787684@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230411233159.GH360895@frogsfrogsfrogs>
Hi Darrick,
On Tue, 11 Apr 2023, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
>
> syzbot detected a crash during log recovery:
>
> XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791
> XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200.
> XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal)
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
> Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106
> print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306
> print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417
> kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517
> xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
> xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913
> xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713
> xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953
> xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946
> xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930
> xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493
> xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829
> xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933
> xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666
> get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282
> vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
> do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
> do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
> __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
> __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca
> Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca
> RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10
> RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d
> R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004
> R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50
> </TASK>
>
> The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage
> agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item
> for that AGF. The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log
> item. xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the
> LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be
> newer.
>
> Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the
> buffer with no buffer ops specified:
>
> error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, buf_f->blf_blkno,
> buf_f->blf_len, buf_flags, &bp, NULL);
>
> Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified. This sets
> us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers
> reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read
> verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32. This is
> impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash.
>
> Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting
> log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt. It might be smarter to
> force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the
> write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the
> conservative option where we stop immediately.
>
> Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994e
> Fixes: 67dc288c2106 ("xfs: ensure verifiers are attached to recovered buffers")
> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
Rightly or wrongly, CVE-2023-212 has been raised against this issue.
It looks as though the Fixes: tag above was stripped when applied.
Should this still be submitted to Stable?
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
> index 5368a0d34452..ebe7f2c3cf63 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
> @@ -971,6 +971,16 @@ xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2(
> if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0) {
> trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_skip(log, buf_f);
> xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
> +
> + /*
> + * We're skipping replay of this buffer log item due to the log
> + * item LSN being behind the ondisk buffer. Verify the buffer
> + * contents since we aren't going to run the write verifier.
> + */
> + if (bp->b_ops) {
> + bp->b_ops->verify_read(bp);
> + error = bp->b_error;
> + }
> goto out_release;
> }
>
--
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-01 13:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-11 23:31 [PATCH] xfs: verify buffer contents when we skip log replay Darrick J. Wong
2023-04-11 23:53 ` Dave Chinner
2023-04-12 12:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-04-12 21:40 ` Dave Chinner
2023-06-01 13:03 ` Lee Jones [this message]
2023-06-01 15:11 ` Darrick J. Wong
2023-06-02 10:16 ` Amir Goldstein
2023-06-02 19:17 ` Leah Rumancik
2023-06-06 16:56 ` Lee Jones
2023-06-06 17:28 ` Leah Rumancik
2023-06-07 9:09 ` Lee Jones
2023-06-04 5:51 ` Amir Goldstein
2023-06-04 18:32 ` Darrick J. Wong
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