Re: [PATCH v5 06/24] fsverity: pass tree_blocksize to end_enable_verity()

Darrick J. Wong
2024-03-11T22:38:16Z

[add willy and linux-mm]

On Thu, Mar 07, 2024 at 08:40:17PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2024 at 07:46:50PM -0800, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > BTW, is xfs_repair planned to do anything about any such extra blocks?
> >
> > Sorry to answer your question with a question, but how much checking is
> > $filesystem expected to do for merkle trees?
> >
> > In theory xfs_repair could learn how to interpret the verity descriptor,
> > walk the merkle tree blocks, and even read the file data to confirm
> > intactness. If the descriptor specifies the highest block address then
> > we could certainly trim off excess blocks. But I don't know how much of
> > libfsverity actually lets you do that; I haven't looked into that
> > deeply. :/
> >
> > For xfs_scrub I guess the job is theoretically simpler, since we only
> > need to stream reads of the verity files through the page cache and let
> > verity tell us if the file data are consistent.
> >
> > For both tools, if something finds errors in the merkle tree structure
> > itself, do we turn off verity? Or do we do something nasty like
> > truncate the file?
>
> As far as I know (I haven't been following btrfs-progs, but I'm familiar with
> e2fsprogs and f2fs-tools), there isn't yet any precedent for fsck actually
> validating the data of verity inodes against their Merkle trees.
>
> e2fsck does delete the verity metadata of inodes that don't have the verity flag
> enabled. That handles cleaning up after a crash during FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
>
> I suppose that ideally, if an inode's verity metadata is invalid, then fsck
> should delete that inode's verity metadata and remove the verity flag from the
> inode. Checking for a missing or obviously corrupt fsverity_descriptor would be
> fairly straightforward, but it probably wouldn't catch much compared to actually
> validating the data against the Merkle tree. And actually validating the data
> against the Merkle tree would be complex and expensive. Note, none of this
> would work on files that are encrypted.
>
> Re: libfsverity, I think it would be possible to validate a Merkle tree using
> libfsverity_compute_digest() and the callbacks that it supports. But that's not
> quite what it was designed for.
>
> > Is there an ioctl or something that allows userspace to validate an
> > entire file's contents? Sort of like what BLKVERIFY would have done for
> > block devices, except that we might believe its answers?
>
> Just reading the whole file and seeing whether you get an error would do it.
>
> Though if you want to make sure it's really re-reading the on-disk data, it's
> necessary to drop the file's pagecache first.

I tried a straight pagecache read and it worked like a charm!

But then I thought to myself, do I really want to waste memory bandwidth
copying a bunch of data? No. I don't even want to incur system call
overhead from reading a single byte every $pagesize bytes.

So I created 2M mmap areas and read a byte every $pagesize bytes. That
worked too, insofar as SIGBUSes are annoying to handle. But it's
annoying to take signals like that.

Then I started looking at madvise. MADV_POPULATE_READ looked exactly
like what I wanted -- it prefaults in the pages, and "If populating
fails, a SIGBUS signal is not generated; instead, an error is returned."

But then I tried rigging up a test to see if I could catch an EIO, and
instead I had to SIGKILL the process! It looks filemap_fault returns
VM_FAULT_RETRY to __xfs_filemap_fault, which propagates up through
__do_fault -> do_read_fault -> do_fault -> handle_pte_fault ->
handle_mm_fault -> faultin_page -> __get_user_pages. At faultin_pages,
the VM_FAULT_RETRY is translated to -EBUSY.

__get_user_pages squashes -EBUSY to 0, so faultin_vma_page_range returns
that to madvise_populate. Unfortunately, madvise_populate increments
its loop counter by the return value (still 0) so it runs in an
infinite loop. The only way out is SIGKILL.

So I don't know what the correct behavior is here, other than the
infinite loop seems pretty suspect. Is it the correct behavior that
madvise_populate returns EIO if __get_user_pages ever returns zero?
That doesn't quite sound right if it's the case that a zero return could
also happen if memory is tight.

I suppose filemap_fault could return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS in this one
scenario so userspace would get an -EFAULT. That would solve this one
case of weird behavior. But I think that doesn't happen in the
page_not_uptodate case because fpin is non-null?

As for xfs_scrub validating data files, I suppose it's not /so/
terrible to read one byte every $fsblocksize so that we can report
exactly where fsverity and the file data became inconsistent. The
POPULATE_READ interface doesn't tell you how many pages it /did/ manage
to load, so perhaps MADV_POPULATE_READ isn't workable anyway.

(and now I'm just handwaving wildly about pagecache behaviors ;))

--D

> > Also -- inconsistencies between the file data and the merkle tree aren't
> > something that xfs can self-heal, right?
>
> Similar to file data itself, only way to self-heal would be via mechanisms that
> provide redundancy. There's been some interest in adding support forward error
> correction (FEC) to fsverity similar to what dm-verity has, but this would be
> complex, and it's not something that anyone has gotten around to yet.
>
> - Eric
>